82 Mass. 1 | Mass. | 1860
The provisions of the St. of 1858, c. 154, have materially affected the course of proceedings in the case of a trial of a party charged with the crime of murder. Although the form of the indictment in such cases remains as heretofore adopted and sanctioned in this commonwealth, yet the punishment for the crime of murder is made to depend upon the finding of the jury whether it is murder in the first or second
As to the second of these classes, although not material to the present case, it may be proper to remark that an obvious error has occurred in the words “ in the commission of an attempt to commit any crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life,” in substituting “ an ” for “ or,” and thus excluding the case of a murder committed in the actual commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and confining it to the case of murder committed in an attempt to commit such crime. Upon recurring to the form of a law proposed by the commissioners on the penal code, reported to the legislature in 1844, from which the St. of 1858, c. 54, was apparently copied, this error will at once be perceived, and it has since the trial in the present case been corrected by the Gen. Sts. c. 160, § 1.
As to the case of murder committed “ with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought,” the instructions given to the jury are not made the subject of any exception. The sole inquiry upon this branch of the case, is of the correctness of the instructions as to what constitutes a murder “ committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.” The counsel for the prisoner contended that to constitute a murder in the first degree, by reason of its being committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty,
In the present case, the instruction to the jury, that “if they were satisfied by the evidence that the deceased, a girl under eight years of age, was by the persuasions of the prisoner enticed from the house of Mrs. Burlin, at or about six o’clock on the evening of the 5th of November 1858, and the prisoner, having thus acquired the confidence of the child and the possession of her person, at once proceeded to perpetrate upon her person the crime of rape, actually ravishing her body by force, and thereby inflicting severe wounds upon the private parts of her body, and as a part of the same transaction and for the purpose of concealing this crime and escaping punishment therefor, proceeded further to inflict numerous severe blows upon her head and face, and then to throw her body into the Connecticut River, and by these means caused her death, it would be competent for them to find the prisoner guilty of murder committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty, and of murder in the first degree,” was in the opinion of the court most fully authorized, these facts showing a case of murder committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty. In this third class it is the barbarity and atrocity which attend such murder, that increase the guilt of the party, and that call for the highest degree of punishment known to our law. The mere recital of the facts that make up the history of this homicide, it would seem, should silence every doubt of its being a case of most aggravated atrocity and cruelty. It is further to be remembered that the instruction to the jury upon this point was merely the legal instruction that it would be competent for the jury to find a
It is upon the present hearing objected, that many of the facts stated as subjects for the consideration of the jury, as bearing upon this point, were not stated in the indictment. We are of opinion that they need not be. Such facts may not have been the cause of death, and yet they may materially have contributed to make the killing one of atrocity and extreme cruelty.
The counsel for the prisoner asked that the jury might be instructed to render a verdict on the three counts separately. These counts charge the offence in different forms as to the mode of perpetrating the same. 1st. That the death was caused by throwing the deceased into the Connecticut River, whereby she was suffocated and drowned. 2d. That the murder was committed by an assault with some weapon and instrument unknown. 3d. That the murder was committed by an assault with a weapon and instrument unknown, and by throwing the deceased into the Connecticut River, by which wounds and casting into the Connecticut River she came to her death.
There being but one offence charged, though set forth in various counts, adapted to meet the evidence, the jury were properly instructed that if they found the prisoner guilty of the murder as set forth in either of the counts, they might return a verdict of guilty, generally. Under this instruction, the jury have, by a general verdict of guilty, found the prisoner guilty of murder as set forth in some one of the counts at least; for it was only upon such finding that the general verdict of guilty, under the ruling of the court, could be rendered. It is important and perhaps material to the consideration of the present question that each and every one of these counts is in technical form, aptly drawn, and sets forth fully all that is necessary to constitute a charge of murder, and to authorize a judgment and sentence therefor. Had a verdict been rendered in form on either of these counts, no objection could have been taken to a judgment and sentence
This practice of rendering a general verdict of guilty, without distinguishing between the particular counts in the indictment, where they charge only a single offence, and various counts are introduced to meet more accurately the precise circumstances of the transaction, has certainly been very general, and usually adopted in capital trials in this court.
In the well known case of Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, in which the defendant was charged with the murder of Dr. Parkman, there were four counts, charging the offence to have been perpetrated in different modes. One of the counts was of the most general character, charging the crime to have been perpetrated “in some way and manner, and by some means, instruments and weapons, to the jurors unknown.” The other counts varied thus : One charging a mortal wound by stabbing with a knife; another by a blow on the head with a hammer; and a third by striking, kicking, beating and throwing on the ground. Yet upon these a general verdict was rendered. It is true that no direct motion was made, as in the present case, by the counsel for the prisoner, that the jury be directed to render a separate verdict as to each count. But from the well known ability of the counsel in that case, it must be assumed that such a motion would have been made if, in their opinion, the law would have sustained it. The necessity for resorting to these various and somewhat inconsistent forms of alleging the mode in which the death was caused, is well stated by the late chief justice in Webster’s case ; and the reason for their being introduced equally requires and justifies a general verdict upon all such as are legally formal. In reference to such counts, it was there said by the court: “ Take the instance of a murder at
In the case of Commonwealth v. Dominic Daley James Halligan, for the murder of Marcus Lyon, tried in the county of Hampshire in the year 1806, I find the indictment to have been thus: The first count charged that Daley with a pistol gave Lyon the blow, of which he instantly died, and that Halligan was present, aiding and abetting; the second count alleged that Daley gave the blow as aforesaid, and immersed the body in Chicopee River, so that Lyon died as well by reason of the immersion as the blow, and that Halligan was present aiding and abetting; the third alleged that Daley and Halligan each with a pistol in his hand gave the mortal wounds and bruises of which Lyon instantly died. These counts differed, as will be perceived, as much as those in the case at bar; but a general verdict of guilty was rendered, the prisoners sentenced thereon, and the sentences executed upon them.
We may refer to some English cases illustrative of this point. In Regina v. O' Brian, 1 Denison, 9, where in one count A. B. was indicted for the murder of J. N. by a blow of a stick, and C. D. and E. F. were charged as aiding and abetting; and in a second count it was alleged that C. D. perpetrated the murder by throwing a stone, and A. B. and E. F. were charged as being present aiding and abetting; and a general verdict was given; it was objected to, as it left it uncertain whether the stick or the stone caused the death; but the judges held the conviction good, saying, “ the mode of death in both counts being
It seems to us, in a case like the present, where all the counts are in proper legal form and relate to a single offence, and a conviction on any one requires the same judgment and the same sentence as a conviction on all would, that, if the jury find the prisoner guilty of murder in the form set forth in either of the counts, they may find him guilty generally.
On the part of the defendant, it is denied that each of these counts is in proper legal form, and would be unobjectionable upon a motion in arrest, or upon a writ of error in case such count had been the single count upon which the jury had returned a verdict of guilty. The count most strongly objected to is the second, where it is alleged “ of which said mortal bruises and wounds the said Augustina then and there instantly died.” In the preceding part of this count, the name of the party alleged to have been killed is written “ Augustine,” and it is contended that this is a variance, and that the party alleged to have died of said mortal bruises and wounds is other and different from the party described in the previous parts of this count, and upon whom the assault is alleged to have been made. That
The objection in arrest of judgment, upon the ground that murder in the first degree is not technically charged in the indictment, there being no allegation of the act required by the statute to constitute that offence, is not tenable. The answer to this is that the crime charged in this indictment is murder as known and defined by the common law. That offence is here technically charged. The statute provision has only reference to the extent of the punishment, and for that purpose the jury are required to find the degree. This question is not now for the first time before the court. In connection with other questions raised in the case of Commonwealth v. Gardner, 11 Gray 438, it was directly held by this court that this form of indictment was sufficient, the court in the opinion in that case saying: “ It seems to us to have been the clear intent of the legislature,
It was further objected that the counts in the indictment charge the killing and murder only argumentatively, by alleging “ and so did kill and murder.” But this will be found to be in accordance with approved forms, and to have been properly used.
Nor does any ground exist for arresting the judgment for the misspelling of the name of the town of Chicopee, by adding “k ” to the first syllable. It is clearly a name idem sonans.
As to the minor objections suggested, that of the use of the abbreviation “ sd,” and several interlineations in the indictment, however they might have furnished a proper ground for a motion to the discretion of the court for quashing the indictment, had a motion to that effect been made before the party had pleaded, or perhaps before, he was put on his trial, they furnish no sufficient ground for arresting judgment after a trial and verdict against the prisoner. It is unnecessary perhaps to add that such imperfections are objectionable and to be avoided, and more especially so in indictments for offences of this grade.
In presenting these views upon the case upon the exceptions, we are not to be understood as calling in question the general rule, well known and practised upon, that when there are several counts in an indictment, and a general verdict is taken without objection, upon a motion in arrest, or writ of error, if there be one good count, judgment may be entered upon that. Here the counsel for the defendant objected at the trial to such
The objection relied upon to sustaining this verdict upon the ground of variance between the name of the person alleged to have been murdered, and that shown by the evidence, is wholly untenable. If the name by which the party is usually called and known be stated in the indictment, it is sufficient. The instructions were to this effect, and the jury have found no variance. Upon this point the authorities are quite uniform, and are founded in reason and good sense. In a case of larceny, in which the indictment alleged the stealing of the goods of Mary Johnson, and the evidence was that the original name of the party was Mary Davis, but that she had been called and known by the name of Mary Johnson for the last five years, the court held that there was no misdescription, and the indictment might be maintained. Rex v. Norton, Russ. & Ry. 510. In another case, where the party was indicted for stealing the goods of Richard Pratt, and it appeared that his name was Richard Jeremiah Pratt, but it was shown that he was equally well known by the name of Richard Pratt, it was held to be no case of variance, and the indictment was sustained. Rex v. ——, 6 Car. & P. 408. See also Rosc. Crim. Ev. (2d. ed.) 78.
Upon the whole matter we find no ground to sustain any objections presented by the bill of exceptions, or by the motion in arrest of judgment, although they have been very ably and ingeniously presented for our consideration by the counsel for the prisoner. The result is therefore that the exceptions taken by the prisoner to the rulings of the court upon the trial, as well as the motion in arrest of judgment, be overruled.
Exceptions and motion in arrest overruled.