Commonwealth v. DennisCommonwealth v. Dennis
¶ 1 Hеnry Lewis Dennis appeals from the judgment of sentence for rape, claiming
¶ 2 The facts were stipulated at appellant’s bench trial. In July, 1999, appellant was introduced to the victim by her cousin. Appellant was 18 and the victim was 12. After several meetings, the two had consensual sexual intercourse. The victim’s mother became aware of this, and brought her to the hospital for a medical examination, which revealed the victim had contracted gonorrhea.
¶ 3 Appellant was arrested and taken to police headquаrters. He waived his rights and admitted he had sex with the victim on two occasions in July, 1999. He claimed he initially believed she was 16, and that on her second visit to his home she said she was 14. Appellant claimed that had he known she was under 16, he would not have had sex with her.
¶ 4 The trial court found appellant guilty pursuant to
Were Appellant Henry Dennis’ state and federal constitutional rights violated (a) when he was unconstitutionally convicted of and imprisoned for violating the unconstitutional statute18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(6) , to the extent that§ 3121(a)(6) ’s age-of-partner element is a strict liability еlement; (b) when he was unconstitutionally convicted of violating18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(6) at a trial which excluded review of whether he acted with the mens rea required for§ 3121(a)(6) ’s age-of-partner elemеnt, to the extent that element requires a mens rea, and thereafter imprisoned pursuant to that conviction; and/or (c) when his ability to seek appellate relief for the foregoing errors was ineffectively forfeited by trial and prior appellate counsel?
Appellant’s Amended Brief, at 4. Essentially, appellant argues that, to the extent
¶ 5 There is a strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional.
Commonwealth v. Brown,
¶ 6 Prior to the addition of subsection (a)(6) to
¶ 7
¶ 8 At the same time, subsection (a)(6) was added to the rape statute,
Except as otherwise provided, whenever in this chapter the criminality of conduct depends on a child being below the age of 14 years, it is no defense that the defendant did not know the age of the child or reasonably believed the child to be the age of 14 or older.
¶ 9 An identical argument was advanced in
Commonwealth v. Robinson,
Although due process considerations impose some limitations on the absence of a knowledge requirement from the definition of a criminal offense,... due process does nоt require that the appellant be afforded the defense of mistake of the victim’s age in a statutory rape prosecution.
Id., at 966-67 (citation and footnote omitted).
¶ 10 The Robinson Court reasoned that the legislature, in a valid exercise of its police powers,
rationally may require that one eighteen years of age or older who engagеs in sexual intercourse with a child below fourteen years of age does so at his own peril. Such activity may be punished criminally if the child is indeed under fourteen years. In that event, a defendant may be denied the defense as to mistake or misrepresentation as to the child’s age.
The primary consideratiоn in prohibiting unlawful, consensual intercourse with an underage female has been traditionally attributed to the legislative desire to protect those who аre too unsophisticated to protect themselves.
Id., at 966 (citation omitted).
¶ 11 Here, as in
Robinson,
the victim belongs to the class of citizens protected by the statute: persons under the age of 13, who are deemed incapable of protecting their own interests. As the Supreme Court noted in
Commonwealth v. Albert,
¶ 12 Appellant further argues that even if he is guilty, the imposition of a prison sentence for a crime that does not require proof of
scienter
is unconstitutional. Although a culpable mental state is generally required before criminal sanctions may be imposed,
see Morissette v. United States,
¶ 13 The statute prohibits conduct that has long been сondemned by our society. While the relevant ages have changed from time to time, the gap in age has widened, making it certain that a violation involvеs a disparity and a youthfulness that makes any “mistake” more than mere inadvertence. Appellant was fully half-again the victim’s age. The unavailability of mistake of fact as a defense does not alter his culpability.
¶ 14 Because appellant’s arguments are without merit, his claim that counsel was ineffectivе for fading to challenge the constitutionality of subsection (a)(6) also fails; counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to assert a meritless argument.
Commonwealth v. Gaskins,
¶ 15 Judgment of sentence affirmed.