*1
Dissenting
Mb. Justice Nix:
I agree with. Justice Robebts’
conclusion
his dis-
senting
neither of the
opinion
appeals
before us
properly raised the constitutional
only
issue.
add
that it
long
been the rule of this Court
will
attempt
resolve constitutional
issues
unless
specific issue is before
the court
the resolution of
the issue
decision
absolutely
to the
necessary
Binder v.
case.
Triangle Publications,
Pa.
Inc.,
Submitted November 8, Nix and Mander- O’Brien, Egberts, Pom:eroy, Eagen, INO, JJ.
Samuel Kagle, appellant. Mil- James T. and Banney Bose Mary Cunningham, District Bichard A. Attorneys, ton Assistant Stein, M. District and Arlen Attorney, First Assistant Sprague, for Commonwealth, appel- Attorney, District Specter, lee. by Jones, May 1973: Chief Justice Mr. George Dennis, appellant, May
On
to mur
entered
counsel,
by
represented
at
hearing
Following
degree-of-guilt
der generally.
to the court
certified
Attorney
the District
in the
second
crime
higher
rose
crime
found
degree,
six
term of
less than
not
trial court and sentenced
No appeal
more than
years’ imprisonment.
nor
twenty
filed a
1970, appellant
taken. On September 22,
Act1
Post
Hearing
Conviction
under
petition
denied his appellate
that he was
(1)
(PCHA) alleging
introduced at the degree-
the evidence
(2) that
rights,
to raise the crime
was insufficient
hearing
of-guilt
that his
voluntary manslaughter,
above
because it
or
entered
intelligently
knowingly
and derelic
an
involuntary
was based upon
in
trial counsel was
that his
tion
counsel,
court’s
from the lower
appeal
This
competent.
*3
a
at which
following
hearing
appellant
denial
relief
counsel.
was represented
appointed
denied
initial
he was
Appellant’s
allegation
founded.
Although
is
well
rights
his appellate
concerning
appellate
information
appellant
given
he
not prejudiced by any
inadequate,2
rights
It
appeal.
of the
to
is well-established
right
from a second
murder convic
appeal
degree
on direct
on
defendant can
attack
tion based
a
guilty plea,
only
of the
of the sen
the voluntariness
plea,
validity
and the related
whether he introduced
question
tence
the killing
sufficient
reduce
to manslaugh
evidence
can
issues
also be raised in a
ter. Since these
collateral
a denial of a defendant’s
non
right
attack
is
appeal
defendant
where,
case,
is
prejudicial
an
for review
afforded
collateral
opportunity
pro-
1
1966,
1580,
January 25,
P. L.
§§1180-1
Act of
19 P.S.
1972).
seq. (Supp.
et
2
merely
appellant was
The record shows that
told that he had
appeal.
days
Wilson,
forty-five
See Commonwealth v.
(1968).
1,
343 Commonwealth ceeding. Minnick, v. 436 Pa. 258 42, 46, A. 2d 517 Commonwealth 515, (1969) ; v. Culpeper, Pa. 15, 252 A. 2d Common 18-19, 624, (1969); wealth Walters, A. 2d 74, 76, 757, (1968).
Equally lacking
merit
appellant’s conten
tion that
the evidence was insufficient
to raise the
crime above
an
voluntary manslaughter. When
accused
to murder
pleads guilty
he admits that he is
generally,
of second
murder and that
there is
degree
suffi
cient evidence to sustain a conviction for second de
gree murder. Commonwealth v.
Dillinger, 440
A. 2d 823 freely. knowingly He was and made confession was by prescribed rights as of his constitutional advised (1966), he was when 384 U.S. Arizona, Miranda v. police again sta- taken into when advised arrested, formal he made his third time before tion and advised a warnings not Although had the Miranda statement. prior immediately given admission, oral been before his subsequent formal state- not invalidate his would 299, Abrams, 295, ment. held this Court A. 2d duty repeat Miranda prosecution absolute interrogation. stage warnings of an each successive at repeatedly of his appellant informed Here, intelligently freely rights chose and and constitutional appellant’s assuming rights. Even those waive constitutionally not con- we do infirm, confession was primarily motivated clude that his pleaded guilty appellant confession. It seems eyewitness facing order to avoid degree appellant might of first have sufficed to convict colloquy record from a murder. review Further, are convinced the trial court, between and voluntarily intelligently appellant knowingly, pleaded guilty. appellant’s are also unable find
We of advice counsel. was based competency of counsel’s advice does The test retrospective consideration whether involve wrong right ad or but rather whether the advice was range competence normally re within the vice was attorneys. quired of criminal defense McMann v. Rich Our there ardson, concern, 397 U.S. the reasonableness counsel’s assessment is with fore, subsequent including of his client’s case and his advice, entering plea. the effect of Com advice as to Ward, monwealth v. 2d 351, 354, *5 the circumstances (1971). Considering surrounding of a motion to the con- confession, suppress fession and the could estab- eyewitness that lish deliberate conclude defense that coun- killing, sel had a reasonable his client basis advising plead guilty. makes a number
Appellant claims to support final that his trial allegation counsel was incompetent. The only claim that we need that mention is counsel was because he failed to to the trial argue after judge, appellant pleaded generally and Commonwealth certified that crime rose no higher than second that degree murder, case rose higher voluntary manslaughter. ex Commomoealth rel. Washington Maroney, 235 A. 599, 604-5, 2d we stated that “the balance tips finding favor effective assistance as soon it is determined that trial coun basis,” sel’s had any decisions reasonable Upon review of the record counsel’s decision not to argue case rose no higher than voluntary manslaughter was reasonable.
Order affirmed.
Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Mandebino concur in the result.
Concurring
Mr. Justice Nix :
I
continue
disagree with this Court’s determina
tion
order
attack a
ground
it
induced by
an unconstitutionally
obtained
confession the
test
three-pronged
formulated in Com
Marsh,
monwealth v.
Thomas Seaman et al., *7 Eagin, Jones, Before C. J., January 9, 1973. Argued Manderino, Nix and JJ. Pomeroy, Roberts, O’Brien,
