¶ 1 On April 4, 2002, following a bench trial, Attorney Scott Reid was found in contempt of court
¶ 2 Appellant was assigned by his employer, the Defender Association of Philadelphia, to represent Odell Debose before Judge Leslie Fleisher of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Appellant requested a continuance on three occasions, February 4th, 7th, and 10th, 2002; each request was granted. On February 11, 2002, the Commonwealth requested a continuance because it did nоt have a necessary witness. The trial court re-listed the case of Debose for February 13, 2002, and ordered appellant attached for that date. Appellant contends he explained to Judge Fleisher at thе time of this continuance that on the 13th he would be in the courtroom next door before municipal court Judge Martin Bashoff but would appear when the cases in Judge Bashoffs courtroom were completed. He also contends he went to Judge Fleisher’s courtroom the morning of the 13th and told the court crier he would be in Judge Bashoffs courtroom.
¶ 3 When appellant failed to appear as ordered, Judge Fleisher sent the criеr to locate him. Appellant told the crier he had five or six more cases to try and was waiting to be called. The crier ultimately returned to inform appellant the case was continued to the following day, February 14, 2002. After finishing his cases before Judge Bashoff on the 13th, appellant called and told Judge Fleisher’s secretary he was assigned to interview prisoners at a correctional facility on the 14th and would appear when he finished, which he hoped would be between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. Appellant reiterated this information in a fax he sent to Judge Fleisher but which was not received because the judge’s fax machine was malfunctioning.
¶ 4 Between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. on February 14th, during a prisoner interview, appellant received a phone call from a co-worker informing him Judge Fleisher was pursuing sanctions against him. He finished his interviews and upon returning to his office around 1:00 p.m., called Judge Fleisher’s chambers but received no answer. Judge Fleisher had adjourned court at 12:50 p.m. that day because she was scheduled to perform weddings but was scheduled to reconvene at 2:00 p.m. Appellant then called the public defender assigned to Judge Fleisher’s courtroom that day who allegedly told appellant court was adjourned for the day. Appellant called the judge’s chambers again and allegedly was told by the secretary thаt she was unsure whether court was adjourned for the day. Appellant made no further attempts to appear that day.
1Í5 A contempt hearing was held on February 15, 2002. Judge Fleisher initially found appellant guilty of indirect criminal сontempt but on February 20, 2002, vacated her decision because it had been
¶ 6 On appeal, appellant contends the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding of guilt because he lacked the wrongful intent, intentional disobedience or intentional neglect he argues is necessary to support a conviction of criminal contempt. He also contends the trial judge abused her discretion by refusing to recuse where previously she had found appellаnt guilty of contempt and later vacated her own verdict because she had denied appellant an opportunity to testify or present a defense.
¶ 7 “When reviewing a contempt conviction, much reliance is given to the discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, we are confined to a determination of whether the facts support the trial court’s decision.” Williams v. Williams,
¶ 8 Courts in this Commonwealth have the power to impose sanctiоns for contempt of court under three situations only, one of which is applicable here:
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132, Attаchment and summary punishment for contempts, (2).
Under section 4132, it is beyond peradventure that prior to a finding of contempt, where an attorney fails to appear or appears late for a court proceeding set by court order, there must be a showing that the failure to show or appear tardy was intentional.
... [T]he minimum intent required to prove contempt is “a volitional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” However, this Court has established that direct (as well as subjective) intent is not necessary where a reckless disregard for the directions of the court can be proven.
McCusker v. McCusker,
¶ 9 Appellant relies upon Commonwealth v. Giordano,
¶ 11 Our review of the facts in this case reveals appellant did not have the requisite intentional disobedience or intentiоnal neglect with regard to his failure to appear on February 13th. On February 11th, at the Commonwealth’s request, the case was continued until February 13th. Appellant testified that at that time, he notified Judge Fleisher he had multiple cases pending before a municipal court judge on the 13th but would appear when those cases were finished. N.T., Contempt Hearing, 4/4/2002, at 42-43. Appellant testified that on the morning of the 13th, he went to Judge Fleisher’s courtroom and told the crier he would be trying cases before Judge Bashoff in the courtroom next door. Id., at 43-44. The crier located him next door later that morning at which point appellant stated he had five or six cases remaining. Id., at 15-17. Ultimately, the crier told appellant the case was continued to the 14th. Id.
¶ 12 Because we find appellant had conflicting in-court commitments and provided Judge Fleisher with timely and sufficient notice of them, we vacate appellant’s contempt conviction for February 13, 2002.
¶ 13 We find, however, appellant’s conduct with regard to February 14th evidences the requisite intent for a contempt conviction. Appellant reasonably should have known his decision to conduct prisoner interviews rather than appearing before Judge Fleisher was objectionable to the point of being neglectful of a higher duty. At a minimum appellant’s conduct was wrongful аnd evidenced reckless disregard for the directions of the court. Appellant could have rescheduled the prisoner interviews or found a co-worker to substitute for him. In contrast to the prisoner interviews, the case of Commonwealth v. Debose had been continued multiple times at appellant’s request, causing inconvenience to witnesses and unnecessary expense to the Commonwealth. His appearance before Judge Fleisher on Fеbruary 14th should have taken priority over prisoner interviews. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s contempt conviction for February 14th.
¶ 14 Finally, we address appellant’s argument Judge Fleisher abused her discretion by fading to reсuse after previously having found appellant guilty of the contempt charges and subsequently vacating the convictions. “In general, a judge before whom contemptuous conduct occurs has the power to impose punishment for such conduct and appropriate sanctions without recusing himself. However, recu-sal is required if there is a running, bitter controversy between the judge and offender.” In re Adams,
¶ 15 Appellant analogizes this case to those in which an accused withdraws a
¶ 16 Judgment of sentence vacated as to February 13, 2002; judgment of sentence affirmed as to February 14, 2002.
Notes
. 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(2).
. Judge Fleisher contends the absence of the fax had no bearing on her decision.
. Appellee attempts to distinguish Commonwealth v. Giordano,
. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Simmons,
. Moreover, Judge Fleisher stated she did not feel it was necessary to recuse because she felt able to be impartial. Trial court Opinion, 9/5/2002, at 4.