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Commonwealth v. De Christoforo
277 N.E.2d 100
Mass.
1971
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*1 Christoforo. Commonwealthv. De Benjamin A. De vs. Christoforo. January 4, Middlesex. 1971. December Spiegel, Quirico, Tauro, C.J., Cutter, Reardon, Braucher, Present: Hennessey, & JJ. Criminal, grand jury, Argument Practice, Disclosure of evidence before discretion, Charge by prosecutor, Mistrial, jury, Requests, Judicial Capital case, rulings instructions, trial, Fair Error, and New trial. process Law, harmful. Whether error Constitutional Due of law. inspect grand by Denial motions the defendant in a criminal case alternatively jury testimony police of a officer and minutes inspection minutes was not make an in camera of such “par- must show a under the rule that error where, although grand jury ticularized need” to see the minutes by testimony given at the trial defendant contended that the officer respects prior by was in two inconsistent with statements made him, alleged prior in neither instance inconsistent part grand statement claimed to have been made as of the officer’s jury testimony grand jury and the defendant did not show that the light alleged minutes would cast further as to either of the grand jury testimony might inconsistencies or that the other way be inconsistent with the officer’s at the trial. Tauro, Spiegel, J., [534-536] dissenting. C.J., A required improper mistrial of a murder case was not where remarks prosecutor closing argument, of the when he said .that the counsel, stating they hoped jury defendant and his while the that the guilty, prosecutor’s hoped would find him belief guilty something would find him degree less than first murder, prosecutor personal and when the stated his belief of guilt, by were cured instruction to the specifically covering objectionable general the first remark and a closing arguments admonition that counsel in their “very “closing arguments often became overzealous” and are not your consideration,” evidence for prosecutor and where the remarks of the insignificant and harmless when viewed in the great weight context guilt [536-539]; of evidence of improper closing argument aggravated jury’s was not knowledge Tauro, pleaded guilty [539]. that a codefendant Spiegel, J., dissenting. C.J., Assignments judge’s of error give requested based on the failure to in a instructions criminal case were without substance where the judge’s charge adequately subject covered the matter of the [539-540] requests. v. Commonwealth De Any allowing, error in on cross-examination of a character witness for *2 case, questions the defendant at the trial witness’s aof criminal whether the opinion detrimentally of the defendant would be affected by certain assumed facts about him was harmless where such questions merely prosecution’s theory, stated the with which the already familiar, were charged of the defendant’s role in the gave negative questions. offence and the witness [541] answers to both G. L. c. Statement to the United States Constitution. in murder, is not new trial in a 265, 2, establishing procedure single as to § verdict both violative of the capital judge’s case, functions in and this court’s review of his action. Fifth and [541] and Fourteenth Amendments punishment having dealing with a motion for for first determine degree [542-543] Following degree a conviction of first murder one found shot to death in an automobile in which the defendant and two other men riding, were there was no abuse of in discretion denial of a motion grounded newly for a new trial supported by on discovered evidence and affidavits, containing hearsay, much to the effect that only inwas the automobile because he had been therein, derringer offered a ride home that a in found victim, belonged prospective automobile defence testify call, threatening telephone witnesses did not because of a hiding and that the defendant fled and went into after the crime only riding because he was afraid of one of the men who had been in [541-543] the automobile. Court Superior

Indictments found and returned in the on May 10, 1967.

The cases tried J. were before Sullivan, Manuel Katz for the defendant.

John F. for the Com- Assistant District Mee, Attorney, monwealth. appeal by is an

Reardon, J. This the defendant under 33A-33G, from his conviction for G. L. c. first §§ Superior jury, murder Court. The degree which unammously penalty recommended the death not be guilty illegal posses- also found the defendant imposed, a transcript The case comes to us on of firearms. sion below, summary record, and the the proceedings assignment of errors. undisputed. facts are About 3:55 following a.m 1967, a car which the defendant and three April Commonwealth De riding stopped police Medford two others officers Shortly thereafter the discovered that officers. right dead, hand side the front seat was occupant right side of the having shot once head been in the left side of the chest. The three times officers also derringer an unfired on the floor of car discovered be seat, special and a .38 caliber hind the driver’s Smith & Wesson revolver, which had been once, fired on the rear hand A right seat. pathologist later estimated that deceased, identified as Joseph Lanzi, died in the car some 4 a.m. time between from the wounds described above. head wound had been inflicted & Smith Wesson *3 and revolver the chest aby wounds Harrington & Richardson which was revolver discovered sometime afterward buried vicinity of in the where the car stopped. Before the officers’ were suspicions aroused, however, both the defendant, who sitting had been behind the in driver the back seat, and the driver, Gagliardi, one Carmen had left the scene. The other Frank occupant, Oreto, was by arrested the officers after discovery their that the fourth man in the car was dead. Indictments murder in the first degree and illegal of firearms possession were returned against Gagliardi, and the defendant. Oreto, On October 1967, Oreto, the custody, pleaded one in only guilty to degree second mur- gun charges. and the der The defendant, against whom I. warrant for flight F. B. unlawful lodged was in April, 1967, apprehended by the F. B. I. was in November, 1968, at his house, where he grandmother's had been living continu- Gagliardi the incident. ously since and the defendant were together only to trial but brought the defendant’s case went jury. At the conclusion of all evidence Gagliardi degree to second guilty murder and pleaded the firearms were pleas accepted. and his charges, Commonwealth, conceding that it was the other car who fired occupants the actual shots, two relied evidence connect De circumstantial Christoforo in a with them to kill Lanzi. venture Evidence w-as in- joint De Carr, Officer one of the two through policemen traduced that car, gave a false name stopped who identity. He also allegedly his asked told them they when at first who officers seat, in the front man named “Johnny was asleep, Simeone,” that was thought fight in and olved Revere that they inv been he hospital. The defendant’s him immediate taking subsequent authorities concealment was flight guilt. as evidence of prosecution cited impeach of Of- In addition to efforts only Christoforo called character for De Carr, counsel ficer grandmother. Although he the defendant’s witnesses intended to address he opening in his stated only car because he that the defendant prove Attic,” “The bar which a ride home from being given theory. support no evidence he introduced worked, he many there were closing argument in his repeated He to explain innocence consistent reasons being given ride home. car, including in the presence suggestion substantiated Similarly, no evidence than consciousness other pressures” “certain opening flight and concealment. the defendant's guilt explained defendant. raised issues with several We treat deny his mo- it was error contends 1. The defendant *4 testimony Officer Carr minutes of the inspect to tion inspect grand Two motions grand jury. before indictment, each respect minutes, one jury without preju- at time and were denied before filed of Of- During cross-examination renewal. dice to their respect motions with renewed his defendant Carr, ficer in the alternative testimony moved grand jury to Carr’s in the minutes. inspection an camera judge make that the motions. all the judge denied judge have held that a we decisions a number recent In motions unless the defendant such grant required is not grand jury to see the need” “particularized establishes Commonwealth, Ladetto, 349 Mass. minutes involved. 197, Doherty, 244-245. Commonwealth 237, v. De 141- Carita, 356 Mass. 209-210. Commonwealth 142. Dennis v. U. S. 870. The laid down in in the rule these decisions properly applied Although the defendant’s motions. denying respects testimony given by in two contended that Carr prior inconsistent with at trial was statements made alleged prior instance was the him, neither inconsistent part testimony have been made as statement claimed In one grand jury. instance the before the inconsistency an between out Carr’s pointed testimony at testimony the trial and his at an earlier probable cause hearing in which Oreto was the defendant.1 He made full an inconsistency attempt impeach use Carr’s trial. In testimony at the the other instance the defendant inconsistency between police claimed Carr’s report, shortly incident, after the made and his testimony at the trial. As to the events involved in the testimony, Carr’s testimony point supported by on this the unchallenged testimony Brady of Officer who was with Carr when the occurred. We conclude that events there was no incon- sistency testimony Carr’s report between which he at the trial. The defendant did not clarified show that would cast grand light minutes further as to either of alleged (compare inconsistencies Commonwealth v. or Gordon, 598, 602-603) grand way testimony might be other inconsistent with trial. Carr’s Commonwealth Otero, 356 Mass. circumstances there was these likewise no need inspect for the trial shown minutes camera v. Cook, 351 Mass. 231, himself. Commonwealth 233. Com- Doherty, monwealth v. that we review and urges

The defendant reconsider our cases cited above holdings require in the recent which need” before “particularized being permitted of a showing *5 story At the trial Carr stated that the defendant told him the false about car, probable hearing dead man in the whereas at the cause the the he attributed story to Oreto. v. De Christoforo. testimony of a jury to grand

access the witness who be- trial a at the of indictment by comes witness returned recognize the difficult We grand jury. the burden which seeking to places upon impeach this rule such of inconsistencies between his grand witness on the basis testimony. It may trial testimony and his be jury desirable However, to this consideration rule. give that we further do on so the limited not record of the appropriate is if change, any, might Such ap- case before us.2 more accomplished by for propriately prospective application making of power exercise the rule of this court. this particular seeking defendant is not precluded case the motion for trial at by way hearing relief of a a new the compel he the of may, by action, production which proper jury by for grand testimony Officer Carr’s determination in- testimony any way was in whether such at the trial. Earl Com- consistent with monwealth, Mass. moved for a mistrial the conclusion

2. The defendant closing argument of certain because prosecutor’s also judge’s He claims that the argument. in that remarks adequately jury pre- did not cure the to the instructions of remarks. judicial these effect justified in objecting quite is to certain The defendant closing argument. It prosecutor’s of portions prosecutor state, "They for clearly improper [the defendant, appealing party presenting of has burden prejudiced by appeal that he was which shows an error a record on court Klangos, by court. Commonwealth the trial committed grand portion any no minutes or us contains The record before grand testimony given concerning Carr before the other information jury. any way. incorporated There in the record are minutes the several nothing availed himself indicate produced marking, having open the minutes court methods to him excep incorporation with his in the record in connection identification respect We cannot minutes. his motions with tions speculate denial they anything on whether contain minutes contain or on what has not helpful The defendant might to the defendant. which have been furnishing showing that he us with record sustained prejudiced burden inspect grand judge’s on his motions action judge inspect minutes motion that alternative minutes and his camera. *6 537 360 531 Mass. Commonwealth De Christoforo. they hope you his said find him

defendant and counsel] frankly they you think that quite hope not guilty. something first-degree little less than find him guilty for improper prosecutor It was further to murder.” point personal his belief of state at another Assn. Ethics, Am. Bar Canons Professional accused. Mercier, 257 Mass. 353, Canon Cooper, 264 376-377. Commonwealth F. States, (1st Cir.). 2d 474-475 Greenberg United (D. F. 2d Harris v. 658-659 C. Cir.). argument whole, however, as did The prosecutor’s acted within require judge properly a mistrial. The his and in on denying relying discretion in mistrial curative to instructions erase the error. Commonwealth v. Bellino, 635, 644, cited. cases The judge adequately guarded rights each instance. immediately objected

Counsel to the first cited statement Although above. at this transcript point clear,3 is not judge pains point was later at out recognized that he argument the time that improper. record judge as suggests, said, that his statement to this effect was not heard over expostulation. defence counsel’s In addition, judge stated explicitly later that he would given immediate have instruction to the jury to disregard if the comment defence counsel asked for one. No such made. In of a. motion was the absence request suitable successfully now argue defendant cannot that an immediate the jury necessary prejudicial instruction erase the remark. suggest, effect of We however, in many may for instances it be more effective the judge give im- instructions. mediate closing arguments the judge

After the declared his willing- general in addition to include charge ness closing specific of both counsel a arguments reference whatever transcript saying shows that was recorded as “No” in what interpret agreement statement, counsel's we argument.” defence “That is not fair

Commonwealth v. De Christoforo. thought were unduly prejudicial. remarks with a compliance request written adequate for instructions objectionable this first remark about submitted counsel specifically covered subject *7 Although charge. language in his the he used was less that requested by than the emphatic defendant, who took it, it was sufficient to exception safeguard to the defendant's rights. Devlin, Commonwealth 335 Mass. 555, 568-569. Gordon, 598, Commonwealth did object for the defendant not Counsel at the time to statement of personal his prosecutor's the in belief the accused. He did it, the mention however, of in his mistrial, and implication for motion least re- instruction on it. quested specific his Nevertheless, ex- judge’s charge were too ceptions vague the to make clear objection judge's the that was there the refusal particular to that in in allude comment accordance wdth request written to this Compare effect.4 Commonwealthv. Cabot, view, of however, our ob- (G. in ligation capital the cases examine whole case L. c. we 33E), have considered the effect this com- § light proceedings (cf. ment the entire Patriarca v. F. 2d particu- Cir.]) [1st light larly judge’s general the admonition that the closing arguments "very counsel often their become Closing arguments are not evidence for your overzealous. this instruction was adequate. consideration.” We feel As reminding out, jury pointed improper what purpose, might no matter tend to remark, em- phasize it. excepted give “to the Court’s for the defendant failure to Counsel jury concerning requested specific instructions to the statements And, closing. alternative, exception Attorney in the in his take an District jury specifically Attorney’s instruct that to the District failure statement, has been discussed with the Court which is the which statement hoped jury part that the effect defence counsel [to made record degree murder], guilty aof little less than first would find the defendant the Instructions, Exception Request proposed is to the refusal to. [sic]

specifically Attorney those statements made the District. instruct disregarded by improper and should be them.” v. De improper argu- has contended here The defence jury’s of the in its because effect aggravated ment pleaded guilty. This the codefendant knowledge guilty plea the codefendant’s valid, because premise presenta- way inconsistent in no Although the defendant jury. to the his defence tion of in his opening and attorney represented testify, did not was in jury that closing statements innocently and was was there but automobile murder jury, upon learn- killing. with the way in no involved that at least then one other oc- knew guilty plea, of the ing criminal responsibility had admitted vehicle of the cupant to conclude logical It is not murder. for the prosecutor that, any implied argument accept would whom the defendant blamed for of the men one because *8 was any defendant pleaded guilty, the less murder the firm in that guilty his assertion he was not any himself of whatsoever. crime must improper argument

The also be relation viewed weight guilt. of the evidence of the to the The an extremely strong was against one. case that probable jury argument It is not drew In suggested by now inferences the defence. subtle prosecutor insignificant were and event, the remarks great weight context of of viewed harmless guilt. of evidence judge’s of on Assignments error based failure instructions are without substance. requested Three

give instructions with the of dealt inference innocence requested which is jury must draw from consistent which the evidence they Although accurately and guilt with both innocence. instruct law, required was not stated relevant He ade- jury urged the terms the defendant. requested of instructions. the substance quately covered 94, 311 Mass. 113. Common- Mannos, 458. Commonwealth Aronson, wealth Mass. instructed the 170-171. He Monahan, Commonwealth v. De Christoforo. and

fully accurately on presumption of and innocence proof which the burden the Commonwealth must sustain. specifically He cautioned them not their base decision suspicion conjecture or and further instructed them on proper treatment of circumstantial as opposed to direct in assessing guilt. evidence requested

A final instruction fco the effect necessarily feeling not reflect “[f]light guilt.” does property instructed evidence of the defendant’s scene, flight, actions on the concealment, later “as an guilt.” could admission of be taken He cautioned addition, however, them “common insists fairness you draw guilt before inference of for the crime of should killing, you be satisfied that acts these or words a part least the motive or conscious- cause guilt which acts spoken.” ness caused these or words to be require could not “Having given more. defendant guidance . . judge] correct rules their . [the required go not possible findings further discuss upon fact which a acquitted.” might Com- monwealth v. Greenberg, 557, 585. Common- v. Payne, wealth addition, possi- bility that flight prompted by fear than rather had already suggested in argument been jury by defence counsel. 4. Four alleged other errors now argued were raised *9 in the assignment of errors. It is the upon incumbent de capital fendants in cases, as in kind of any case, to other adequate file assignments according pro of error the provided cedures G. L. c. 278, 33A-33G. Section 33E §§ that chapter of does not of applicability affect the the other in capital sections only cases but us to order empowers trial “‘if new that law satisfied’ because of error of or of fact the verdict is miscarriage justice, of or where because newly jus discovered evidence or for some other reason requires tice trial.” v. Bellino, new Commonwealth briefly We with three of deal these De injustice None of them demonstrates contentions. 33E. 'by us under action § corrective require which would for the witness a character put questions were (a) Four were ex- questions Two cross-examination. on defendant by not conceded allowed are questions The two cluded. Any error, improper. to have been the Commonwealth whether the questions the however, was harmless because detrimentally would be opinion of the defendant witness’s merely him stated facts about assumed certain affected mur- in the role theory of the defendant’s prosecution’s the addition, already familiar. which with were der, negative questions. to both answered the witness clearly hearsay testi- excluded judge properly (b) The what the de- grandmother about mony by the defendant’s several at her house said to her when he arrived fendant murder. hours after the pro- is no merit to the contention

(c) There de- having in G. L. c. for 265, 2, provided cedure § punishment in a verdict both single termine Fifth and Fourteenth degree first murder violates the The United States Constitution. Amendments recently resolved Supreme Court has United States Crampton California, in McGautha decided issue sustained in which the court 183, 208-220, 402 U. S. Ohio, statute. constitutionality a similar Ohio denial final from argument stems defendant’s some motion, trial. amended for a his motion new filed, originally it was months after six and one-half outlined newly discovered evidence allegedly based on to the effect affidavits. Three these four be- murder night car “The home him ride had offered Gagliardi cause father, also three, Attic.” One suggest would which account of an incident contained belonged car in the back of the derringer found witnesses also defence That affidavit asserted Lanzi. *10 360 Mass. 531 Commonwealth v. De Christoforo. of affi- testify caned to the substance

who to be a testifying at trial threaten- prevented davits were during call made to father ing telephone the defendant’s affidavit, by trial. fourth counsel for the defendant The of a Medford stated the substance police officer, on behalf a with father before the of conversation was that the apprehended to the effect defendant Gagliardi. was hiding only frightened because he

If in the evidence described affidavits been at jury, trial form and offered admissible believed this might information have led to different result. well opening for indicates that statement did in fact defence intend to introduce such evidence. The hardly newly discovered, although thus was evidence it was why affidavits advance reason much of not offered however, trial. threatening telephone call, does explain why who stated in father, neither the defendant’s testify pleaded his affidavit he others to de- call, police nor Medford officer called spite delay testify. any explanation Nor there over six presented and one-half months counsel before defence Much of information information to the court. not have hearsay and would stated the affidavits was in that event. form been admissible newly dis- ground of for a trial on the The motion new sound discretion evidence was covered addressed 246 Mass. Dascalakis, 12, v. judge. Commonwealth 449. Com- 369, Mass. Sacco, 32-33. Commonwealth Common- 394-395. Devereaux, 391, monwealth 248, v. Chin 283 Mass. Kee, wealth v. Sheppard, 304 Mass. 680. Commonwealth Wallace, Coggins, 611. Commonwealth 555. Commonwealth v. Robertson, survey reversed unless disposition His "is not reversed, decision, that his unless case shows the whole if nature "Even injustice.” will result manifest if it had been justify is such as to belief the evidence *11 543 531 360 Mass. Commonwealth v. Christoforo. De trial would have been at trial of the introduced the result motion.” required grant is not different, Mass. 444-445. Common- 441, Sharpe, petitioner, The 1966 amendment 562. at supra, Robertson, wealth v. aof granting new to allow the 278, 29, of G. L. c. (c. 301) § may that “justice trial judge trial it to the appears where of our has not the nature re- been done” altered have 237, 356 Mass. Stout, v. of his action. Commonwealth view 242. were weight of the affidavits submitted import v. judge’s for the trial discretion. Commonwealth

likewise accept not have to Heffernan, 48, 350 Mass. 53. He did undisputed. Common- though they them as true even v. 369, wealth v. 450. Commonwealth Sacco, v. Doyle, Mass. 410. Commonwealth Millen, 406, 633, 552, Mass. 637. Commonwealth v. Coggins, In weighing presented the new evidence he was en- knowledge place titled make use of his of what had taken (Commonwealth Sacco, supra, 451; at the at Com- monwealth v. Kee, 248, 257), Chin and he was not required give reasons for his action. Commonwealth requirement was no Finally, there Sacco, at 450. supra, affi- support in hear oral by he procedure which was free to choose davits; he Millen, supra, motion. Commonwealth would consider the Coggins, supra, 556-557. at 410. Commonwealth cir- at 54. these supra, v. Heffernan, of dis- not disclose abuse does cumstances the record followed motion, of the which in denial judge’s cretion four and the submission argument by oral sides both the motion. support affidavits 33E, through as amended L. c. under G. Acting § evidence. carefully reviewed the have we St. c. testing view particularly We have done evidence and re- contention unsupported defendant’s unsworn statement principally ferred to process in the motor vehicle in a that he was 360 Commonwealth v. De caught situation being up home when he was driven not involved. Our personally murder which he re- jury open view return indicates did, justice require does not they verdict which degree than that entry of verdict of lesser re- a new trial. turned or there be

Judgments affirmed. *12 After a careful review of (dissenting). C. J. Tauro, majority opinion I agree entire record am unable to with right to a fair trial constitutional has I of the preserved. which, been will discuss several factors to this combination, lead me decision.1 objection, was tried defendant, jointly The over his with a pleaded guilty (in codefendant.2 The codefendant jury) degree absence of the to murder the second at the The trial then conclusion the evidence. resumed with only present. judge The the defendant De Christoforo jury. “Mr. stated, Foreman, gentlemen madam and Gagliardi You will is notice [co]defendant pleaded ‘guilty,’ the dock. has and his case has been He will, therefore, go forward disposed of. We argu- The of the case of De Commonwealth vs. at two o’clock this afternoon.” ments will be held closing arguments During prosecutor’s the course conceded jury to the he made certain remarks which are An these remarks improper.3 have been issue raised majority concerning ruling right disagree 1 I also with the jury inspect grand minutes. I make no further comment on this issue J., viewpoint Spiegel, except express my concurrence with the in his dis senting opinion. in the denial of the defendant’s There was no abuse of discretion motion separate a trial. prosecutor: reaching you am will have at all “I sure no trouble The you by way know what want to do verdict in this case. verdict. I don't they you guilty. quite frankly They they hope that find him not said guilty something they hope you will find him little less think that object first-degree “I to that.” than murder.” Defendant’s counsel: argu- jud/he: fair “I don’t think —.” Defendant’s is not “That counsel:

Commonwealth v. De Christoforo. they whether prejudicial so in nature in circum- stances of the require case trial. new There are two subdivisions to this issue: Should im- have mediately jury instructed the at the time the remarks were made? Were given by the instructions jury during general charge sufficient to overcome the prejudicial harm to the If defendant? there exists a reason- able doubt as to the resolution of questions these must be resolved in favor of the defendant.

In accordance with our statutory authority respon- sibilities we must examine improper remarks of prose- cution in the context of the entire case. G. L. c. 278, 33E. § should have given been explicit instructions they were to draw no inference as to De Christoforo’s innocence or from the elimination of the codefendant from the case. Announcing to merely that codefendant pleaded guilty, without more, had the probable effect of leading to *13 speculation surmise and in its deliberation. In such failing circumstances give explicit to instructions diminished significantly the defendant’s right ato fair impartial and verdict. Christoforo,

De left as the sole defendant, and without appropriate instruction jury, to the found himself in a precarious position. It inwas this setting prose- that cutor improper made remarks in his closing argument to the jury.

As Supreme Court of the United stated, States has prosecuting attorney “is representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation govern to impartially is as compelling as its ob- judge: “No.” Defendant’s ment.” counsel: “That isn’t so.” The prosecutor: degree.” “Let’s talk about murder in the first hearing At on the motion for mistrial the maintained that ir- respective of its transcription, stated, absence in the official he had at the improper remarks, response time of the objection, to “No. improper argument.” However, This is appear this statement does not in the transcript official of the evidence. L. stenogra- See G. c. 80. If the court § pher jury fact judge’s did not hear the statement it is reasonable to assume that Moreover, urged later, did not. as it will be if these instructions were in given they adequate. far from

Commonwealth v. De interest, therefore, in a govern all; at whose ligation case, it shall win a but prosecution criminal is not that . may prosecute . . He justice shall be done. — But, so. indeed, he should do vigor earnestness blows, liberty he is not at to strike may while he strike hard improper duty It as much his to refrain foul ones. is wrongful conviction as produce methods calculated just one.” every legitimate bring means about is use S. 88. See Smith Berger States, United 295 U. Talle, 585, 591; People Cal. Commonwealth, App. 650, 678-679. prejudicial nature emphasized highly

It must that the be jury can fully prosecutor’s statement jury already with the fact only context assessed pleaded guilty. had knew the codefendant this turn of instructions clarifying had received no prosecutor’s argument circumstances, events. that both defend with the may left have inference than first charge ato lesser plead guilty ants had offered to attorney accepted had and that the district degree murder, offer. rejected De Christoforo’s codefendant’s offer but offence, plead if had offered to to lesser Even ad its Indeed, fact inadmissible. would have been Kercheval v. fatal error. See mission would constitute Abel, 320 Mo. 445. 220; 274 U. S. State nothing suggest present case, however, In the there nego time attorney the defendant or guilt. guilty plea tiated for a or conceded improper first making Furthermore, shortly after *14 original attorney compounded statement, prosecuting of guilt as to his belief stating personal impropriety by rule established course, It of well is, the accused.4 his belief personal state attorney may properly not Mass. 264 v. Cooper, Commonwealth argument jury. to the ease, none honestly sincerely is no doubt in believe that there “I and way.” sincerely you people feel honestly believe that whatsoever. Mass. De Christoforo. v.

Commonwealth Commonwealth v. 294 Mass. Sherman, 379, 368, Levine, 441, Doherty See Betts Randle, 444; First for the Appeals 419. As of the Court per- to bis express Circuit has stated, permit “To counsel as to phrased if so (even sonal in the belief suggest not known knowledge of additional evidence him a not even accorded jury), privilege would afford cross-examination. subject witnesses oath and under credi- Worse, reliability creates the-false issue if bility of This is one of peculiarly counsel. unfortunate Greenberg v. advantage backing.” them has the of official United States, 280 F. (1st Cir.). 2d 472, 475 See Harris United States, 402 2d 656, (D. F. 657-659 C. Hall v. Cir.); United States, 2d (5th 419 F. 582, 586 Cir.). The statement prosecutor his personal belief the defendant’s guilt compounded the harm serious resulting prosecutor’s improper earlier statement, for the statements taken together might lead to an inference prosecutor had personal knowledge of by reason of the defendant’s attempt unsuccessful plead to a lesser crime. The cumulative effect prose- remarks cutor with no adequate and instructions, corrective coupled jury’s knowledge without clarifying instructions that the codefendant pleaded guilty at the close evidence, seriously prejudiced the right a fair trial.

Moreover, in his final instructions failed to correct the harmful effect the improper argument. It is the rule of this jurors generally are expected follow instructions with- disregard matters drawn from their consideration. Commonwealth v. Bellino, 645. Commonwealth v. Crehan, 609, 613. there have been However, persuasive opinions that correcting instructions cannot preju- overcome serious dicial effect. What stated Justice Jackson concurring opinion in Krulewitch United States, 336 U. S. practical 453, constitutes and realistic appraisal *15 531 548 360 Mass. Commonwealth v. De assumption situation. naive that prejudicial the “The can to ... all jury be overcome instructions effects the unmitigated know to practicing lawyers be fiction.” There in which is such prejudicial are the circumstances effect to it cannot corrected instructions proportions be 123, 135, v. 391 the In Bruton U. S. jury.5 some contexts in which the “QTjhere the court stated: are cannot, or jury not, risk that will follow instructions the consequences and of failure vital to so the so the great, and human defendant, practical limitations in- ignored.” jury system Moreover, cannot be corrective sufficiently strong accomplish structions must counteracting prejudicial effect of purpose adverse Inc. Broadway Heina v. Fruit Mkt. or evidence. remarks v. See Crehan, 304 Mass. 611. Commonwealth infra. 485-486; 231 Mass. Ry. London v. St. Bay State 283 Mass. 14-15. Strieker Scott, judge jury did not instruct case, In the instant call argument was made nor did he improper the time the v. Cabot, an retraction. Commonwealth immediate See In his final instructions 241 Mass. 131. arguments routine observation that made the though as no not evidence: “Consider case

counsel are made.” In the circumstances of such statement was far from sufficient to overcome case the instructions duty was the damage done. “It the serious im- grossly fact that argument been emphasize point plain, language out in unmistakable proper;- instruct it was unwarranted which particulars the improper con- cast in their deliberations aside such presented them, using that had been siderations obviously correct the cogent language would clear (that Cabot, 241 Mass. defendant’s was found in Error Commonwealth Domanski, one), and in Commonwealth defence was 66, technical (that be drawn should from the inference 69-70 unfavorable defendant had theie was no evidence where failure to call witnesses n witnesses Telegram Gazette, call). v. Common & Inc. Worcester he could Gordon, 598, 603-604. wealth,

Commonwealth v. De Com- This was not done.” argument. harmful effect of the Bay London v. 131, 241 Mass. 150-151. Cabot, monwealth Ry. State St. had majority notes that if defence counsel opinion

The improper immediate instructions the time the requested given “[Tjn them and that judge remarks the would have a defendant cannot now request suitable the the absence an instruction to successfully argue that immediate necessary prejudicial to erase the effect the remark.” may stake, a be at capital In a case where man’s life (as G. L. c. 33E requirements view of the amended § majority of the is un- through 453), c. this view St. responsibility (as the ultimate tenable. The has the defendant a fair review) guaranteeing we have trial. In of this case it was judge’s the circumstances immediately, with clear and lan- obligation unmistakable guage, prosecutor’s arguments to instruct that the Moreover, grossly improper. he should have ordered by prosecutor. though their retraction Even defence may counsel have moved for immediate corrective in- structions, objections his to the remarks were sufficient to judge. action require prosecutor’s immediate prejudicial were so in nature that the judge comments should sponte. acted sua the total have circumstances of case could nothing less have safeguarded the defendant’s to a fair right constitutional trial. of the in this far prosecution

The remarks case were more newspaper publicity than the prejudicial prosecutor’s criminal in the Crehan case.6 The argu- record or permitted perhaps sug- ment in the instant case even gested an conceded inference Crehan, 609, during In Commonwealth v. the trial certain news paper assumption implied articles that each had a criminal record. “On this required some action possibility to overcome the prejudice. judge recognized and, rejecting argument for mistrial, general stated, required immediate instructions decided were not and that charge adequate.” in the would be caution This court further “Postponing charge, however, instruction until risked an Judgments adverse effect in the interval.” were reversed. 360 Mass. 531

Commonwealth v. De Christoforo. merely hoping something and was for a little less than a degree. verdict of murder the first This diminished his greater degree to a far chance for a fair trial than would have of his publication newspaper in a criminal background. prosecutor newspaper, ostensibly speaks Unlike of his authority office. The prosecutor’s “personal spokesman status and his role as government . . . give ring what he of authen- tend[ed] [said] . . . ticity impart implicit tend[ing]. stamp of be- *17 States, Hall v. 419 F. lievability.” United 2d 583-584 remarks (5th Cir.). prosecutor’s probably for a called In any judge’s mistrial. event the failure to instruct the with sufficient jury adequately and force to eliminate the to the defendant fatal prejudice serious constitutes error. final Moreover, judge's the routine instructions to the far from to the By were sufficient correct error. then the position had so deteriorated his chances for a fair his fate virtually deliberation of the eliminated. I

For believe that the defendant did not these reasons re- I fair trial. a new trial. grant ceive a would I am in (dissenting). complete J. accord with Spiegel, dissenting opinion. Nevertheless the Chief Justice’s feel my disagreement majority's with to also state the impelled requiring to rule the defendant to show a adherence the inspect grand jury “particularized need” minutes grand who testified of witnesses before the testimony at trial. subsequently testified who jury and imposes rule the defendant a well- current and is thus out of burden, touch intolerable nigh disclosure, rather than suppres realization “growing ordinarily promotes materials proper sion, of relevant Dennis United justice.” administration of criminal instance, at bar for States, 384 U. S. In the case entitled to majority hold that grand jury disclosure “did not show because he De Christoforo. Commonwealth v. alleged

minutes light would cast to either further testimony might grand jury inconsistencies ... or testimony be in with Carr's at way other inconsistent trial.'' How could such a showing, the defendant make (see, e.g. of an witness absence admission Com- monwealth v. Carita, 132, 141-142), without first inspecting It task confronting the minutes? is a formidable need,” show unless "particularized per- chance he is possessed of supernatural powers. the case 657, 667-668, of Jencks involving U. S. request defendant's reports written inspection of F. I. agents B. concerning they as which events testified trial, pointed the court out: first "Requiring accused to show reports conflict between actually deny the accused evidence relevant and ma- terial his defense. determining The occasion for a con- flict cannot until arise after has the witness testified, unless he admits conflict . . is helpless . the accused know or discover conflict without inspecting reports. A requirement of a showing conflict would in- clearly *18 compatible our standards for the administration of justice criminal in the federal courts must therefore be rejected.”

This court in Commonwealth v. Cook, 231, 233, Pittsburgh citing Plate Glass v. States, Co. United 360 U. S. 395, Dennis v. States, United 855, 384 U. S. has said that a requiring our rule "particular- defendant to show a ized need” appears to be the same as the Federal rule. We recognize, should that however, many Federal Courts of Appeals have interpreted the Dennis as implicitly case re- pudiating "particularized need” standard.1 One court in Cargill v. the case United States, 381 F. 849, 2d 851- 1 Supreme upon Court in the Dennis case Since based its decision its supervisory powers upon over Federal District. Courts and not a con Connor, right accused, compelled we are not to follow it. stitutional Picard, Supp. (D. Mass.). 843, 308 F. 846 case and other Federal This they controlling cases noted in this dissent are cited not because are be but they represent cause believe that a rule of reason. 360

552 Mass. 531 Commonwealth v. De Christoforo.

852 (10th Cir.) opinion, has to' said relative Dennis requirement case: “The Court retains the ‘particularized need’ secrecy be shown order is but such need shown holds lifted, may effect when the defense that it transcript states wishes to use the purpose for the impeaching witness, to refresh recol- as far as lection, credibility. or to test his Thus the Court if most, is has cross-examination concerned removed require- particularized of the substance from the need all, opin- it has term. this ment, although Under retained ion, appears grand is the defense entitled transcript jury's func- of the witness’s when ended, during are request tions and when the made necessary purpose trial that it is of cross- for the course examining purposes. such witness the above mentioned Supreme Court mentions and to some extent relies . 657 . . Jencks United 353 U. S. States, rationale of it is rarely ‘that ... point. The Court also states on this prosecution have access to for the exclusive justifiable justifiable Exceptions fact. are of relevant storehouse ” consideration.’ compelling and most only by the clearest govern- Appeals have held that once Three Courts has a trial, has at testified witness ment the'subjects testimony on grand jury to examine his right trial, the government unless which he testified about justifying protective show circumstances exist special can 365, F. 2d Youngblood, States United order. F. United States v. 2d Cir.). Amabile, (2d United 433 F. 2d Harris v. Cir.). States, (7th Cir.). Court, C. The First Circuit (D. 1128-1129 F. 2d (1st Cir.), Schlinsky *19 “the Dennis light opinion, of the that, has said very easily met. ‘particularized need’ requirement Dennis for cross-examina- [[case], as in ¡[the] Here, (1st F. 2d 436 v. cf. Walsh United 371 But tian.” Cir.). Relating (Standards Association Bar

The American 360 531

Commonwealth v. De Christoforo. 2.1 Discovery Trial, and Procedure Before [iii], p. § [a] Draft has [Approved 1970]) prose recommended required grand portions cutor be disclose those containing testimony persons minutes relevant whom call he intends to as witnesses at the trial. Several State grant statutes similar inspection defendants rights of advance of trial. Cal. E.g. Penal Code Code 938.1; Iowa § Ann., 772.4; Ky. Rev. § Rules Criminal Stat., Procedure, Rule 5.16 (2); Minn. Stat. Okla. Stat. Ann., 628.04; § Tit. Ann., 22, §

It is that in true certain it may instances be advisable to maintain grand jury secrecy in trial protect advance of safety (See, v. e.g. Posey witnesses. United States, F. 2d 545 the case Cir.], involving murder [5th civil rights three workers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, in June, 1964.) But as courts and commentators have pointed often out, once witness has testified trial, the reasons for preserving grand jury secrecy simply fade away. Mead, Gray, 167, 170. State Faux, 9 Utah 2d Plate Co. 350, 353. Glass Pittsburgh United States, 360 U. S. 395, 405-406 (dissenting opinion). Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule Secrecy, Va. L. Rev. Grand Calkins, Jury Secrecy, Mich L. Rev. 476-477. As Dean Wigmore (Wigmore, Evidence [McNaughton rev. 1961] 2362, at p. 736) has said concerning grand jury § wit “If ness: he the truth tells and the truth is the same he grand testified jury, before the the disclosure of the former testimony cannot him possibly bring to harm (in the shape of corporal injury or ill personal will) which his open equally does not pro- tend to duce.” On the other “if hand, grand jury testimony is testimony given inconsistent at trial, then fair play seems to dictate the defendant be allowed use of the grand jury impeachment purposes, minutes for unless there is a compelling secrecy protect need for individuals or in security.” the aid of national States Barson, Cir.). 434 F. 2d (5th 127,129-130 *20 554 360 Mass. 531 v. De Christoforo. holding “particularized need”

Our decisions stan- origin. I comparatively not, are of recent do however, dard to follow a persuasive this a reason rule which does find not light logical analysis. principal stand the stare no not court is infallible. decisis is absolute because There no to overrule a should be reluctance decision which is it was not wrong, originally either because sound when subsequent prove or because events promulgated to be wrong.2 majority opinion if 2 indicates that

Footnote grand jury had included minutes defendant could have appeal, this court then record determined prejudiced by had been the judge’s whether defendant the right inspect them, denying action in I himself “in do refusing or to read them camera.” not appellate or an court a trial should con- believe not that a defendant would have been able clude under- credibility by grand jury use min- a witness’s mine privilege should the sole the defendant. This be utes. enough adversary judges it is for system, judge. “In our may of what be useful to the defense determination effectively only by be made an can advocate” properly Dennis v. U. supplied). United 384 S. (emphasis vastly is different the situation This where in direct examination an has been excluded question In this court. such instance, before proof offer An court could determine that the evidence con- course, would have proof the offer of benefited the tained using grand jury cross-examination defendant. of knowing questions no what just we have means minutes, might ask, or what the answers counsel 2 abrupt argued impact may of an that the reversal is lessened It longer from a in the future a court date will no follow the assertion that rule 527; See, Colby Carney e.g. Hosp. originally enunciated. United (2d Youngblood, Cir.); 2d States v. States v. Amabile, of theory 379 F. (7th validity Although appreciate Cir.). 2d F. prospective holding case, I see such in a civil no merit whatever in such liberty is at when defendant’s life or stake.

Commonwealth v. De *21 or might be, what benefit the might derive there- from.

I am of firm opinion that we should hold that at has testified trial or at Commonwealth, after witness any preliminary hearing, required or voir turn dire portion grand jury over to the defendant the relevant can testimony, unless the Commonwealth demonstrate testimony compelling keep need to such secret. Disclosure secrecy only finding process; facilitates the fact inhibits it. 2. Officer that told a Carr testified false story about the dead man in car. The Commonwealth introduced tins of guilt. evidence to consciousness show Cross-examination of showed that had pre- the officer he viously hearing testified at a cause probable it was Oreto who I told this Even if falsehood. were inclined to follow by majority the rationale employed would feel obliged “particularized to hold that requisite need” was established and would be consequently unable to conclude the judgment should be this case affirmed. See Commonwealthv. Carita, 132, 141-142; Common- wealth v. Doherty, 353 215-216 (dissenting opin- ion). Compare Kiernan, Commonwealthv. 348 Mass. 29, 36.

The Commonwealth should have interest no convict ing testimony accused on which the basis has not been so impeached as the thoroughly evidence I see permits. no basis for apparent assumption majority, with out having grand jury minutes, seen the that De Christoforo could not benefit from an examination of them because he had full . . inconsistency “made use of . an earlier [an] [at probable ... hearing] impeach cause Carr’s testimony trial.” of grand jury this area of disclosure testi mony, Supreme Court of the United States has said: justification relying upon is no ‘assumption.’” “There Dennis v. States, 384 U. S. United In a Court has held situation, similar Federal a crucial prin- issue “[inconsistent cipal particularized ‘a prosecution witness demonstrated v. De Christoforo. Plate Glass required by Pittsburgh

need’ as Co. United States, produce pertinent ... U. S. grand jury Harrell v. 317 F. minutes.” 2d (D. fn. There the officer Cir.), arresting C. 580, 581, of his given several different versions seizure nar cotics taxicab. The refused to allow the defendant grand jury examine officer’s testimony, or to in camera, apparently do the same himself theory any possible on the material inconsistencies merely quite would be cumulative. The court rightly pointed having grand jury out that seen the “[njot testi *22 mony, position speculate no even to its on might what effect disclosure have had Hutcherson’s credibility, with him or with jury. We cannot assume that Hutcherson was so discredited the disclosed incon discrediting impossible.” sistencies further Id. at 581. pretence determining

3. make no I am guilt. However, innocence or convinced that he did a fair thus I judg- not receive trial and would reverse the and set ment aside verdict.

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. De Christoforo
Court Name: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Date Published: Dec 7, 1971
Citation: 277 N.E.2d 100
Court Abbreviation: Mass.
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