271 Mass. 99 | Mass. | 1930
This was an indictment under G. L. c. 265, § 19, in which the defendant was charged with the robbery of John Landowsky on October 17, 1929. No contention is' made that there was not evidence which required the submission of the case to the jury. “The charge was full and complete in relation to the necessary elements for the Commonwealth to establish in order to convict the defendant of the robbery set forth in the indictment.” Upon conviction" the defendant was sentenced to one year in the house of correction.
Counsel for the defendant, while arguing his case to the jury, said: “The crime which the defendant is charged with may be punished with life imprisonment; it is a very serious charge that this defendant is on trial for.” Thereupon the assistant district attorney interrupted the defendant’s counsel and said: “I object to that line of argument.” The judge then said: “You know that is improper and you cannot so argue to.the jury.” The defendant duly excepted to the refusal of the judge to permit a continuance of the argument as above set forth. It is to be noted that the statement of counsel for the defendant as to the serious character of the offense charged and as to the maximum penalty which may be imposed for the crime of robbery was allowed to stand without other comment by the judge than “You know that is improper and you cannot so argue to the jury.” Since Commonwealth V. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185, it has been the settled law in this Commonwealth that the jury in criminal trials have no rightful power to determine questions of law against the instructions of the court. Where the penalty which may be imposed upon the conviction of a crime rests in the discretion of the trial judge within specified limits, it is obvious that knowledge of the possible extent of the punishment cannot reasonably be weighed-by
Exceptions overruled.
