OPINION BY
The Commonwealth appeals from an order granting a motion to suppress a handgun. A police officer discovered the handgun during a Terry
As the officers approached the trio, Officer Devlin noticed that one of the two men was possibly rummaging through the unconscious man’s pockets. He tried to speak to the unconscious individual, who was unable to respond. Officer Devlin thought that the unconscious individual may have been beaten by the other two men, though he saw no visible injuries. See id. at 9. He also noticed that an object was weighing down the right breast pocket of Appellee’s jackеt. Officer Devlin approached appellee and began to pat him down. In response, Appellee attempted to swat away Officer Devlin’s hand, and flailed his arms. Officer Devlin immediately recоgnized the object in the jacket pocket as a firearm, and yelled, “gun!” Officers Devlin and Carter restrained Ap-pellee, and secured the gun, which was a Rossi .357 Magnum. Appellee escaped, but only briefly. After a short foot chase, the officers recaptured Appellee and placed him under arrest. The Commonwealth later charged Appellee with two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act and resisting аrrest.
Appellee moved to suppress the firearm as the fruits of an illegal search. At the hearing on the motion, only Officer Devlin testified. The suppression court stated that Appellee “could have been trying to rob the guy, [but] we didn’t see him stab him, kick him, robbing, shooting.” Id. at 21. The suppression court granted the motion, concluding Officer Devlin lacked probable cause sufficient to “get a warrant from a magistrate or judge.” Id. at 18-19. This appeal followed.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the suppression court stated, for the first time, that Officer Devlin lacked reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry frisk. Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 3/4/14, at 9-10. The suppression court concluded that the Commonwealth failed to present specific, articulable facts to support an investigative detention. It noted that Officer Devlin was unsure whether Appellee had harmed the unconscious man and was rifling through his рockets, or was trying to render aid. The suppression court similarly found that the bulge in Appellee’s jacket pocket could not support reasonable suspicion because “a bulge without other evidence of criminal behavior does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 10 n. 4 (citing Commonwealth v. Maxon,
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the suppression court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Dev-lin. It contends Officer Devlin faced an unusual, potentially dangerous situation deserving of investigation. The Commonwealth argues that the Officer’s response was reasonable, and designed to ensure his and his partner’s safety. Appellant’s Brief at 8.
In appeals from orders granting suppression, our scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the suppres: sion hearing. In the Interest of L.J.,
Preliminarily, Appellee was not subject to an investigative detention when Officer Devlin stopped his patrol car, turned on the emergency lights, and got out to check on the condition of the man lying in the street. Rather, the interactiоn at that point was a mere encounter, and mere encounters do not implicate constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Cf. Commonwealth v. Coleman,
Officer Devlin’s action in patting down Appellee’s jacket was a Terry frisk. A Terry frisk is a type of investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity is afoot and that ‘the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.’ ” Commonwealth v. Guess,
The reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a Terry frisk and, in fact, all investigative detentions
is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less rehablе than that required to show probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Fell,
Turning to the facts of this case, at 2:00 a.m. in a high-crime area, Officer Devlin and his partner happened upon Ap-pellee and another individual standing over an unconscious man in the middle of the street. Officer Devlin was concerned that the two men may have beaten up or robbed the third man, and they may have been going through his pockets. Officer Devlin noticed an object weighing down Appellee’s jacket pocket, and began to pat down Appellee for safety. He immediately recognized that the object was a gun, restrained Appellee, and took him into сustody.
We hold the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the suppression motion. The trial court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances, and give Officer Devlin the benefit of the inferences he drew from those circumstances. The record shows that Officer Devlin reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot and that Appellee was armed and potentially dangerous.
The incident ending in Appellee’s arrest did not occur in a vacuum, and the facts of the incident did not occur in isolation. Yet, that is how the suppression court evaluated the incident and facts. Officer Devlin may have been unsure whether Appellee had assaulted or robbed the unconscious man. It could be, as the trial court proposed, that Appellee was merely a Good Samaritan stopping to render аid. See N.T., 11/15/13, at 21. It is possible that the unconscious man suffered a medical emergency, or had been waylaid by someone else. Further, the item weighing down Appellee’s right breast pocket could have been a bоok. “Of course, one can conceive of innocent explanations for each one of these facts.” Rogers,
The suppression court erred as a matter of law in granting Appellee’s suppression motion. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Devlin rеasonably suspected criminal activity and that Appellee was armed and potentially dangerous. His patting down of Appellee’s jacket leading to the discovery of the firearm was not an
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. Terry v. Ohio,
. Unless otherwise noted, we take these facts from the Suppression Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Oрinion, 3/4/14,
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1) (firearms not to be carried without a license), 6108 (carrying firearms on a public street in Philadelphia), and 5104, respectively.
.We have jurisdiction because the Commonwealth certified that the supрression court's order terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth v. James,
. Our Supreme Court in L.J. clarified that the scope of review of orders granting or denying motions to suppress is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. The suppression hearing in this case post-dates L.J., so L.J. is applicable here.