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Commonwealth v. Davis
305 A.2d 715
Pa.
1973
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*1 iwoolnntmry rights by termination abandon- parental ment. petitioner court be- However, appellee, the issue of low, parental raised properly as incapacity for a alternative basis decree termina- involuntary tion. The decree and its court, by did not opinion, speak issue. We believe the court below should permit have the appellee opportunity pursue the issue of whether has evidenced a continued and vrremedial parental incapacity would a decree of justify termination involuntary under Sec- tion 311(2) of the Act of Adoption 1970.

Decree vacated and case remanded for action con- sistent with this Each opinion. party pay own costs. Appellant.

Commonwealth v. Davis, *2 reargued November November Argued. 8, 1971; 1972. Before C. Roberts, Jones, J., Eagen, O’Brien, Nix and JJ. Pomeroy, Manderino, W. Donald for appellant. Sparks, Vrarn Wedurian, Assistant District Jr., Attorney, Attorney, B. D’lorio, with him Assistant District Ralph Stephen and J. McEwen, JrDistrict for Attorney, appellee. Commonwealth,

Opinion by Mr. Justice 1973: Roberts, May 23, Curtis arrested in December Appellant, was Davis, of 1968 murder, and with charged man- voluntary A slaughter, involuntary manslaughter robbery. filed timely motion to pre-trial evidence was suppress denied. on September Thereafter, 25, 1969, appellant was adjudged voluntary guilty, by jury, murder, manslaughter robbery. Appellant and two counts of sentenced, on con- by the to death the murder jury, viction, from ten to twenty years imprisonment, on the mo- court, robbery convictions. Post-trial tions in judgment arrest of and for new trial were denied. This appeal direct followed. We now reverse *3 and remand for a new trial.

Appellant contends that the assistant district attor ney committed reversible error by attempting to create an impermissible adverse inference in the minds the of jurors of appellant’s exercise his Fifth regarding Amendment trial.1 rights Appellant alleges this was accomplished by prosecutor’s the persistent references over closing argument, objection, the evidence “uncontro against being verted.” the supports appellant’s Review of record con tention that the use of the prosecution’s repeated words “uncontroverted” fact” “uncontroverted created an inference Fifth by adverse the prohibited Amendment the United States Article the Constitution,2 1, of §9

1 Appellant also contends that additional errors were committed by evidence, allegedly illegally the trial court and certain suppressed. Appellant seized, challenges should been also have the legality However, disposition, of his of arrest view our we need decide these not issues. compelled any person . . . be “No shall criminal case be against . . . ." himself U. S. Const Amend. V. a witness of 23, Act May and the Constitution,3 Pennsylvania 1887. made Fifth Amendment, settled that the is well the Fourteenth Amend through to the states applicable S. Ct. 1, ment, Malloy Hogan, on prosecution either comment by forbids (1964), trial instructions by silence accused’s guilt. of v. Calif that such is evidence court Griffin “Upon 1229 (1965). 85 S. Ct. ornia, 609, com believe that the prosecutorial present record, [we] ment the ‘uncontradicted’ about ‘uncontroverted’] [or afoul directly Commonwealth’s case nature of the runs Allen, prohibition.” Commonwealth Griffin Pa. 281 A. 635 (1971) 2d 156, 159, (Roberts, affirm from an curiam opinionless per J., dissenting joined ance, J.). Eag-en, J., O’Brien, nor neither testified trial where Here, . “. . state defense, offered other . . . himself implied ment ivas] [defendant [s] have denied who could and should only [one] reasonably charges jury against might [him]. statement from [his] [these] [s] inferred failure to do so was evidence Common guilt.” [his] A. wealth v. Pa. Reichard, Superior con patently 2d Such an inference is supra.5 trary Griffin, to the mandate compelled give accused] “[The cannot evidence I, . himself . .” Pa. Const. Art. §9. . actually upon court, “Except defendants *4 trial in a criminal may compelled any competent testify any proceed- be to in witness any may compelled ing, criminal; he not be to civil or but answer which, opinion question judge, trial to would tend may negleet any him; defendant, nor or criminate refusal of actually court, upon trial criminal to offer a himself as a wit- creating presumption against him, be ness treated or ad- be versely during to referred court counsel the trial.” L.P. §10, §631. 19 P.S. 5 Supreme Griffin, presumption stated in “As the Court seriously in a in favor of a defendant criminal case innocence

175 As th.e First Circuit recently stated United States v. Flannery, 451 F. 2d 881-82 : “. . (1971) . [W]e held that for the government in summa say, [have] tion to the that certain of jury, its evidence ‘un was when contradiction contradicted,’ would required to take the stand, drew attention to his failure to do and hence so, was unconstitutional com ment. Desmond 1 v. United F. States, Cir., 2d 225. We do not adopt reasoning those courts which state, as it seems to us, ingenuously, to say the government’s witnesses’ testimony was uncon tradicted a statement simply of historical fact. There are which many are in themselves. benign ‘facts’ is that difficulty such when reference, the de could have contradicted, clearly calls fendant jury’s mind the that he to testify.”6 (Em- fact failed jeopardized by any concerning Realistically, comment his silence. the defendant’s words and actions will be viewed with critical a eye testify. everyone safely if he chooses to ‘It is not who can though entirely charge venture on the witness stand innocent of the against timidity, him. facing others, Excessive nervousness when attempting explain suspicious character, transactions of a charged against him, and offenses will often confuse and embar degree rass him to such a preju as to increase rather than remove everyone, dices him. It is not honest, would, however who therefore, willingly placed on the witness stand.’ Wilson States, may United A defendant refuse wholly guilt. for reasons unrelated to his innocence or permitting Consequently, upon comment the defendant’s failure to testify subjects testifying the accused to the hard choice of or run ning jury’s guilt risk of unwarranted inference from his Reichard, Superior silence.” Commonwealth 55, 59-60, 211 Pa. (footnotes (1967) omitted). A. 2d The use of the word “uncontroverted” in the clos ing argument reason, error for another since the defendant at affirmatively deny any allegation need not trial at all. There is every always jury question except issue, expressly as to those con government ceded, See, e.g., on which has the burden. Minor States, (8th 1971) ; United F. 2d 637 Cir. United States v. (1st 1971) Alessio, ; F. 2d DeCecco v. 1984). (1st Cir.

176 phasis United added) (Footnotes omitted). Accord, States v. 447 853 Cir. 1971); F. 2d Handman, (7th United ex States rel. Leak v. 418 F. 1266 2d Follette, 90 (2d Cir. cert. 397 S. 1969), U.S. denied, 1050, 2d 409 1388; v. United F. Rodriguez-Sandoval States, 529 Cir. (1st Doty v. United 1969); States, (10th Cir. v. United 1968), Epps vacated sub. nom., United States, (1971); U.S. 91 S. Ct. 1247 1006, States v. F. de Lyon, 397 2d 505 Cir. cert. (7th 1968), nied, sub. United nom., Lysczyk 846, States, F. 601, 89 S. Ct. United 2d 131; States Parisi, (6th 607-09 Cir. sub. O’Brien nom., vacated 1966), United States, 386 U.S. S. Ct. (1967); 345, v. United 341 F. Peeples (5th 2d 64-65 1965), denied, cert. Ct. 1362. S. On and this where did not record, appellant other it would trial, offered no witnesses or evidence to conclude the remarks sophistry act been taken the assistant district could have attorney fact anything ap- other than reference failed rebut the evi- pellant, alone, attempt dence him. with his silence equate appellant’s guilt the jury by implica- Such even improper. trial was comments, also Hand- supra. violative of See tion, Griffin, are man, supra. rights were appellant’s

Not under rights but also his under violated, Constitution States Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, §9 it. implements 1887 which It is well May 23, Act by prosecution comment or the settled if of 1887 it “. . . atten the Act draws violates court one focuses on no except fact tion to .” can rebut Commonwealth’s case. . . defendant supra. 3 and See notes supra A. at 604. Reichard, 2d obvious, on this record, prosecutor’s comments clearly did that which is prohibited the Act. “We think the assistant district too attorney went both under far, *6 the Act of 1887 under the Fifth Amendment pro- in Griffin.” scription as enunciated Commonwealth v. 443 Pa. 2d Camm, 268, 277 A. 333 253, 325, (1971). We hold that the comments were error, and also that were they error, necessitating the harmful On grant of a new trial. this record, prosecution’s comments cannot be held to be “harmless a rea- beyond sonable doubt.” analysis

Our impact gravity error is guided by two general precepts. . . before First, “. a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, court be must able to declare a belief that was harm it less a reasonable beyond doubt.” v. Chapman Cali 386 87 U.S. S. Ct. 828 fornia, 18, 24, 824, See (1967). v. California, 395 89 Harrington U.S. S. Ct. 250, 251, 1727 v. 1726, (1969); Schneble Florida, 405 U.S. 427, S. Ct. This (1972). reasonable doubt standard reflects fundamental belief a that once constitutional error been far has it is worse established, to conclude the error was incorrectly harmless than it is the error incorrectly conclude was reversible. Cf. In Re 397 U.S. Winship, S. Ct. 1068 358, (1970). general precept approach second with which we of whether particular the determination constitu- harmless is tional error was the burden is on the to establish that error harm- Commonwealth was Chapman California, supra less. at 24, S. Ct. 26, v. California, Fontaine 829; at 828, U.S. 593, Ct. It should S. be noted that burden on Commonwealth placing accord- “the original common-law ance with harmless-error the burden on the put beneficiary rule of [that] injury error there ivas no prove either judg obtained erroneously suffer a reversal at 18,20- Chapman California, supra, ment.” Ct. 828 (citing Wigmore, Evidence, §21 S. 1940).8 ed. (3d determine we precepts mind, these must

Keeping con possibility” a reasonable that the “there is whether con “might have contributed to the stitutional error Chapman California, supra, viction.” a possibility, 828. If there is such S. no there is reversible. But if constitutional error error constitutional possibility reasonable average jury”9 minds have moved “the might it can said that the error toward then conviction, harmless. one Chapman have established subsequent Cases if there is *7 general proposition that exception the constitutional error that possibility reasonable can the error conviction, contributed to might have That presented by be is those exception not harmless. is guilt admitted evidence “properly cases where of the . . . and the effect prejudicial so overwhelming, insignificant by compari is so error] [constitutional a reasonable doubt beyond that it is clear that son, error.” harmless . . . error] [constitutional 1059; v. Ct. at Florida, supra 430, S. Schneble Ct. v. 395 U.S. S. California, 250, Harrington see 1726 (1969). a that emphasized

It conclusion should and overwhelming,” is admitted evidence “so properly error “so effect of the constitutional is prejudicial govern be noted that federal standards what also should Chapman prejudicial. be considered v. error must constitutional 21, (1967). California, Ct. 87 S. 826-27 U.S. 250, 254, Harrington California, S. Ct. v. insignificant” by comparison, it is clear beyond reasonable doubt the error is harmless, is not be arrived at For lightly. the effect of a conclu such sion to affirm a conviction where it is conceded an error of constitutional proportions contributed some In degree to the conviction. such a con addition, clusion operates to undermine “the deterrent effect such v. cases as Mapp v. Ohio; California; Griffin Miranda United States v. Arizona; Wade; Bruton on the actions of both police not trial . .” prosecutors, speak of courts. . Harrington California, 89 S. supra, (citations omit J., dissenting) (Brennan, ted).

Applying these standards do present we case, not believe that the Commonwealth be has established yond a reasonable doubt the constitutional error present this case was harmless. The Commonwealth, its during closing address to the jury, ex thoroughly ploited appellant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment not to right take the witness stand. prosecutor The argued that “'under the uncontroverted the Com facts proved monwealth has beyond reasonable doubt that this defendant of murder guilty in the first degree and robbery.” (Emphasis al added.) prosecutor so used the term repeatedly “un “uncontroverted” controverted facts” at least three other times in re portions of ferring Commonwealth’s evidence.10 *8 prosecutor point At one in the summation stated: “It is also paper bag uncontroverted that Curtis Davis received a Mr. from something, Darlak and said I can’t word, remember the exact but something give you like, going this, it I is am to or words to that quick effect, and then two shots in succession. fired from facts, “You can find this series of uncontroverted mem- jury, Davis, here, that Mr. bers of the was in fact time, robbing Clearly, .” Mr. Darlak at the . . these statements to move obviously calculated was

This argument persistence the very “Indeed, conviction: toward jury remarks making proof these of the government Rodri much to them.” importance it attached that that at 581. We must conclude supra guez-Bandoval, possibility is a reasonable there have contributed “might argument unconstitutional the conviction.”11 ap- evidence against not believe

We also do characterized as “overwhelm- case can be in this pellant identify who could definitely The witness ing.” only ap- unable at had been to identify the trial appellant One other witness was lineup. a pre-trial pellant all. The murder identify appellant unable to by showing that appellant only linked to was weapon to a woman belonging at an apartment it found was as by appellant’s girl friend, one witness described a and near key which had apartment observed some two and one- car was which appellant’s shooting. Ownership weapon after the half hours only the Commonwealth. by proved was never a tan hood and appellant was against other evidence the same found which apartment, jacket, dark but which were similar unique no means by were eyewitnesses jacket which two described hood and the case wearing. Although ap- perpetrator it cer- reasonably strong, nevertheless was pellant “honest, jurors in which case fair-minded tainly brought not guilty well verdicts.” very might by prosecutor hope made have been could by appellant, failing testify, admitting jury infer would guilt. unwilling government are we a case allow “In such unprovable improperly then avoid reversal asser to act probably prejudice grievous Rodriguez- did not result.” tion (1st 1969). val v. Sando *9 386 U.S. at 87 S. Ct. Chapman California, supra, 829. sentence a new judgment is reversed and trial granted. Eagsn

Mr. Justice concurs in the result.

Mr. Chief Justice Jones dissents.

Concurring Opinion Pomeroy J ustice Mr. : I cannot agree that the prosecutor’s use of the word “uneontroverfced” in argument his closing jury constituted upon appellant’s adverse comment exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights, interpreted Grif- California, L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965). fin

For the remarks of im- a prosecuting attorney to be permissible for it this must reason, appear that “the language used intended manifestly or was of such character the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be comment on the failure of the accused to Knowles v. United testify.”

(10th Cir. 1955). The question, therefore, is whether the jury would so understand the use “un- word controverted”. The word “controvert” means “to dis- or pute oppose by reasoning; to deny; contradict.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of English 2d Ed. Language, “Uncontroverted” means, obviously, is something not disputed or opposed by or reasoning, is not or not denied, contradicted. the most natural thing the world any for lawyer his summation to point out that salient points of his client’s case not been disputed or or denied, important testimony has not been contradicted. This ais fact of the case as then it stands; the lawyer is but giving emphasis what already known to the fact finder.

To hold this kind of remark, without more, and particularly without any reference to the refusal indication defendant is an ad- could do the controverting, Fifth on the exercise of comment defendant’s

verse things to me right stretching Amendment seems *10 of a factual, The converts the use holding unduly. commentary. into a adverse pejorative colorless word the farther and as does the go declare, Court, To of a lengthy use “uncontroverted” in repeated thrice ex- the argument “thoroughly exploited” summation to defendant’s not seems right ercise of the to extravagance. the If, to insupportable me to the uncontro- opinion view word states, Court’s of so be is an “act innocently sophistry”, thus vei*ted it. opin of the implication majority

Contrary in are far from uanimous find the federal courts ion, comments on the un prosecutor error the where ing de the the nature of evidence controverted contradicted it. The opposite, fendant could has expressed been at some my better, in mind view rel. Friendly in States ex Judge length 418 F. (2d 1969), 2d Leak v. Follette, the “Neither 397 U.S. 1050: the language, cert. denied, of self-incrimination clause nor the the policy history, in for the surprising proposition support affords compelled ‘shall be in person declaring no au against himself,’ to be witness the case criminal intended Rights prohibit proper Bill the of thors of strength of concerning prosecution’s the the advocacy different from on specific comment quite This is case. The re failure to take the stand. defendant’s the judge and the Griffin were prosecutor marks of the California privilege because rule to violate held ‘in substance a rule of evidence them permitting privilege tendering to the State allows failure accused consideration for its jury 380 U.S. at 85 S. testify.’ Ct. at 1232. thought was that ‘when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence id. at against him,’ 85 S. Ct. at the state is in exer effect practical cising compulsion Fifth Amendment forbids. As one this, presumably no would argue the self-incrimination clause in inhibits the any way state’s no production evidence which evidence, even one but the defendant can If contradict. successfully the state is free to do en this, it must also be free to gage normal so as it advocacy long does not point at the finger accused’s remaining silent the court room. It is thing one prevent state from making capital defendant’s invocation of the constitu tional privilege but quite another an ac say that cused who avails himself of it is entitled to on impose *11 the prosecution shackles that would be unavailable to a man who in testifies his own The Fifth defense. was not aimed at the kind of ‘compulsion’ Amendment generated by evidence and fair argument it. about Indeed it was a recognition plight of the defend ant who was unable to take the stand that led to the enactment of statutes by almost every state, beginning with Maine in 1864, and by the United States, Act March 20 18 Stat. now U.S.C. §3481, him making competent on his request; gen these statutes erally, also in the provided, language of the federal act, ‘his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him.’ See Reeder, Comment on Failure of Accused to 31 Testify, Mich. L. Rev. (1932).” Accord, United v. States Lipton, (2d Cir. cert. 1972), denied, 410 U.S. 927; United States v. Cox, F. 2d 683 (7th Cir. cert. 1970), denied, 400 U.S. 881; Doty United States, 416 F. 2d 887 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated sub. v. United nom.; Epps States, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971); 1965), Cir. 2d 60 (5th F. States, Peeples States, v. United 988; 380 U.S. Jordan cert. denied, v. United 1963); F. 2d 178 Cir. Garcia (5th 855. cert. 1963), denied, F. 2d 133 (5th and cited 3d cases 14 A.L.E. See generally Anno., therein.1 mean- evil given no donbt, can,

Innocent words facial and said, gestures are they the way ings by in- their utterance, accompany expressions speaking. surrounding setting entire deed the commit theoretically possible I at least suppose, is, there would in but way, such violation Griffin beyond circumstance some evidence have to be Here there none. word. innocent spoken the Court’s disagreement with normally my While opinion would cause this above expressed, as opinion, there is another issue to be labelled as a dissent, trial that a agree causes me to new this case which intro Appellant challenges be awarded. should caliber jacket of a .32 hooded duction into evidence girlfriend’s apartment pur seized at his both revolver, trial warrant and identified suant to a search Dar murdered Chester gunman who belonging of sworn was issued on basis lak. warrant testimony presented police oral and unrecorded length my For reasons set out at to the magistrate. dissenting opinion Milliken, Commonwealth belief my A. it is (1973), 2d Pa. 310, *12 violative of both the Fourth procedure such a Follette, supra, ex Leak v. in United States rel. even noted As today by purporting the rule announced ma to follow courts very thinking persons jority other than resourceful have been prosecution’s contradicted the evi who could have present case, alibi been called witnesses could have So in dence. elsewhere at time Chester Darlak grocery store. See United States v. killed in Mc was shot (3d 1972). Clain, F. 2d 68 Fourteenth Amendments. See also my opin dissenting ion in Commonwealth v. & Pa. Hughes, Bedford 304 A. 2d 453 (1973). On ground this alone X concur in the grant Court’s of a new trial. Appellant.

Commonwealth v. Schmidt,

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Davis
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: May 23, 1973
Citation: 305 A.2d 715
Docket Number: Appeal, 9
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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