*1
Superior Pennsylvania. Court
Argued May 1996. Filed Oct. 1996. Reargument Denied Jan. *2 Carroll, Daidone, appellant.
Thomas for Philadelphia, C. Martorano, Jr., F. for Fitzpatrick, Philadelphia, Emmett appellant.
Marilyn Murray, Attorney, F. Assistant District Philadel- Commonwealth, for phia, appellee. Emeritus, CIRILLO, DEL Judge
Before President and SOLE, J., CERCONE, Emeritus. Judge and President SOLE, Judge.
DEL Raymond and Martorano were Appellants Albert Daidone degree conspiracy convicted of first murder criminal On McCullough. connection with the death of John direct convictions, finding appeal, this court reversed the that court for a mistrial denying Appellants’ request trial erred retrial, Appel- based misconduct. Prior dismiss, lants motions to would claiming reprosecution filed violate both the state and jeopardy principles the double federal constitutions. trial court denied their motions and The would appeal agree this followed. We retrial constitute double jeopardy under the Pennsylvania Constitution and therefore reverse the order discharge Appellants.
The only Commonwealth’s direct evidence in this case was testimony Moran, of Willard who testified that he killed McCullough Appellants. direction Moran had al- ready been convicted of degree first murder and sentenced to death. The remainder of the trial three-month-long attempts devoted to link Commonwealth’s Moran and Appellants. question now before this court is not whether mistrial; conduct require was such as to already
court has
decided that
prosecu-
on one occasion the
tor’s conduct was so
egregious
the trial court erred when
Martorano,
it refused to grant a mistrial. Commonwealth v.
420 Pa.Super.
question
Under both the federal and state
double
jeopardy
prosecutor’s
bars retrial where the
misconduct was
provoke
intended to
the defendant into moving for a mistrial.
667,
v.
Oregon Kennedy,
2083,
456
102
U.S.
S.Ct.
72 L.Ed.2d
(1982);
Simons,
10,
416
Commonwealth v.
514 Pa.
522 A.2d
(1987).
537
Appellants
Smith,
contend that Commonwealth v.
177,
(1992),
532 Pa.
Recognizing that the standard set forth dy, supra, inadequate protect rights defendant’s Constitution, Pennsylvania Pennsylvania under Su- Smith, supra, v. decided, Commonwealth preme Court Pennsylvania’s jeopardy principles double bar retrial where prejudice undertakes to prosecutor specifically defen- Smith, him a fair In point denying dant trial. physical highly Commonwealth concealed evidence which was *4 not learn exculpatory. Defense counsel did agreed until before second trial.1 The Court with Smith’s misconduct Smith’s contention Commonwealth’s the prosecution intentionally barred his retrial because de- Id. Clearly, him of a fair trial. the misconduct in prived Smith was not into provoke moving intended defendant 1. Smith's first conviction was reversed because inadmissible evidence Smith, 577, v. 523 568 600 admitted. Commonwealth Pa. A.2d (1989).
554 mistrial; rather, for a the Commonwealth intended that Smith would be convicted without ever discovering exculpatory- Thus, supreme evidence.2 court expanded the circum- stances under which prosecutorial misconduct will bar retrial under the jeopardy Pennsylvania double clause of the Consti- tution.
This court has considered the
applicability
the Smith
Moose,
holding
several cases.
In Commonwealth v.
424
579,
(1993),
Pa.Super.
623
A.2d 831
waited until
day
the first
of trial
disclose witness to whom the
allegedly
defendant
made an incriminating statement.
In
270,
v.
421
Rightley,
Commonwealth
Pa.Super.
In all of presented these the issue was whether the principle set forth in applicable Smith was to bar retrial. interpreted This court Smith these cases as “eviscerat[ing] the distinction that was formerly drawn under the v. Oregon Kennedy and Commonwealth v. Simons standards.” Com Rightley, monwealth v. supra, A.2d at 1292-93. In none of these cases was the one question of whether the misconduct was intended to goad the defendant into request- Indeed, typical envisaged this is Dissenting of the situation in the Sole, Simons, Opinion by Del Pa.Super. J. in Commonwealth v. (1985). prosecutorial 492 A.2d gives If the misconduct rise to a mistrial, inquiry prosecution then the goad is whether the intended to moving the defendant into for a mistrial. If the tried court here had granted Appellants’ one requests numerous for a mistrial based on misconduct, prosecutorial might well be the issue in this case. An jeopardy rights hinge accused’s double should not whether trial actually grants court a mistrial because "a trial court when faced with a mistrial, might motion for grant be reluctant same since it would give rise to a double claim while a conviction and new trial p. would p. not.” Id. at 492 A.2d at rely 1132. Because we on the Smith, principles however, set supra, forth in Commonwealth v. we do today decide whether misconduct which is intended provoke a mistrial bars retrial where the trial actually court does not grant a mistrial. *5 Rather, in the instances of misconduct each of ing a mistrial. prosecu- were reviewed to determine whether the these cases Al- the defendant of a fair trial. intentionally deprived tor not, cases, in though the court did the above find that the trial, intentionally deprived the defendant of a fair prosecution of analyzed we the misconduct under the Smith standard whether the intended to the defendant prosecution deprive analyze prosecutorial a fair trial. We will likewise miscon- present duct cases under that standard.3 every
We need not look at
incident of
alleged by Appellants;
just
misconduct
review of
a few of
prosecutor
these incidents is sufficient to convince us that the
deprive Appellants
Fully intending
intended to
a fair trial.
jury
Appellants
orga
to convince the
were members of
crime,
nized
had committed numerous other
and
criminal acts
murder,
prosecutor
therefore should be
convicted
started her misconduct
the first
before
witness took the stand.
voir dire of
first
During
jury panel,
includ
persons
ed three deceased
as
prospective witnesses. One
these,
Bruno,
Angelo
organized
figure.
was
notorious
crime
Bruno
years
obviously
had been dead for several
so he
could
judge
be called as a witness
this case. The trial
had to
argues
supreme
already
3. The Commonwealth
that our
court has
deter
Smith, supra,
apply
mined that Commonwealth v.
does not
to this case
support
argument
law of
that decision is the
the case.
In
of this
Martorano,
178,
the Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v.
535 Pa.
(1993),
appealed
grant
During direct designed in a to elicit questioning cutor line persisted in were involved Appellant that Moran and Daidone testimony 59-61, pp. N.T. at 79. drug together. the business 5/21/84 and objections questions The court sustained to these trial prosecutor try the but she continued to elicit admonished though about a business even was irrelevant testimony drug to the in the trial. issues thereafter, the despite trial court’s continued warn-
Shortly ings prosecutor bring organized the not to references crime, testimony the elicited from Moran which prosecutor (another “Nicky allegedly name Scarfo” notorious included the 98. the organized figure). p. Again, crime N.T. at 5/21/84 the objection again trial sustained the admonished judge prosecutor.
Nevertheless, Moran, redirect examination of the during who, than Appellant asked other Moran and Mar- prosecutor of a torano, grand the restaurant. present opening was at prosecutor question The the three different times and asked was N.T. at Appellants’ objection each time sustained. 6/11/84 thereafter, the Shortly asked another pp. prosecutor 88. question obviously designed was to elicit irrelevant which imply that were of an testimony Appellants part which would time, At crime N.T. at 91. organized group. p. 6/11/84 which trial during an in-chambers conference occurred judge continuously prosecutor admonished about disre- judge At previous rulings. point, his one trial garding intended for prosecutor stated that he believed the to ask objection could prejudicial testimony before an irrelevant argument apply is incor- doctrine does not and the Commonwealth’s rect. be stated4 and thus to the were imply jury Appellants organized figures crime who had committed other crimes. tactic clearly rulings Such a defiance of the court’s such evidence was irrelevant in this trial. prosecutor through carried this tactic trial and into her injected where the names of
closing argument again she court, organized figures though notorious crime even motion, own had counsel to mention forbidden these names in N.T. closing.5 p. 7/30/84 of prosecutorial
Other instances misconduct abound. The to introduce N.T. sought hearsay, inadmissible (conversation Attorneys Moran and p. between 5/29/84 evidence, Tinari), e.g., Daidone and and irrelevant conduct which occurred period alleged conspir- outside time *7 acy, p. (checking bugs N.T. at cars for six months 5/29/84 after the in killing). denigrated rulings She the trial court’s front of the to an jury such extent that the trial court held her (stated in N.T. “I contempt. p. at don’t believe 5/29/84 this” after trial court sustained to objection irrelevant evi- dence).
The above is not an exhaustive recitation all the incidents of prosecutorial misconduct which tended to deprive Appel- incidents, other, are, lants of a fair trial. These and one however, perhaps examples the most blatant of misconduct during this trial.
Perhaps glaring the most demonstration of the prosecutor’s desire to obtain a any conviction at cost revolves around the fingerprint evidence. The presented Roy Commonwealth Land, technician, Philadelphia a police who testified that he lifted one fingerprint identifiable from the van which was cross-examination, in allegedly killing. involved the On Land Christie, gather, you saying point- 4. THE COURT: I But Miss that are telling you very frankly you blank—and I’m this reason the don’t —that your questions point you want to formulate at this is because intend ofj Bouras, asking questions killing example, about [the Steve for before objection. p. there can be an N.T. at 53. 6/11/84 Appellee incorrectly Appellants object 5. states that did not or move for Appellee's p. a mistrial on this basis. Brief The record shows 28. p. that defense counsel did both. N.T. 7/30/84 FBI that the did report fingerprint
testified that the indicated redirect, the prosecutor not to either On belong Appellant. of the jury the matched one implied fingerprint to the that enough to points comparison but did not bear Appellants positive Again, prosecutor persist the make identification. despite in trial court’s sustain questioning this line of the ed the Appellants’ objections. exasperated with ing Finally, trial rulings, the court’s the ignoring behavior that no testimony reminded counsel that the indicated judge anyone from the van related to connected fingerprints taken prosecutor responded this The that that statement with case. im prosecutor “not correct. Because the thus exactly” have jury to the Commonwealth did indeed plied the van, the court linking Appellants fingerprint immediately recessed to chambers discuss matter. technician, Joseph advised court another prosecutor Grimes, match points comparison found five which would insisted that Appellant fingerprint. repeatedly Daidone’s She orally existed that Technician Grimes had such evidence report it to her. no such wras ever reported Significantly, counsel, though discovery even turned over defense court reports. Ultimately, order included oral and written day ordered to have Grimes court the next made reports Grimes testified that he no questioning. for did nothing report. there was He fingerprint because How specifically discussing prosecutor. recall with *8 ever, he anyone he he not and did not tell that said that would points comparison matching Appellant had four or five of in the van fingerprint print Daidone’s and therefore the found at might belonged Appellant to Daidone.6 N.T. have 5/15/84 seq.; et 28, 90-132; N.T. N.T. pp. pp. 5/16/84 5/17/84 6,22—23. pp. 3— by Our the fact that the Common- ultimate conclusion is reinforced nothing wrong wealth to there was with the continues insist prosecutor's [the conduct in instance because Grimes "had advised prosecutor] comparison points four or five of Daidone’s matched unequivocal testimony fingerprint.” Appellee's p. 21. Brief at Grimes was, course, totally contrary to this assertion. incident,
This particularly when read in its in entirety and prosecutor’s trial, context with the throughout conduct makes clear that the a planned win conviction through any possible means she had no evidence she would —if use innuendo when outright that failed she would use lies.
The Smith precludes standard retrial where the prosecu- tor’s conduct an prejudice evidences intent to so the defendant is, as to A deny course, a fair trial. fair trial perfect not a trial. Errors can judicial and do occur. That is our why system provides for appeal another court which can rectify However, such errors. where the conduct changes from mere error to intentionally subverting the court process, then a fair trial is denied. a Certainly, fair trial cannot be had when the jury exposed is type innuendo, comments, unfair and half-truths which were appar- ent at this trial.
The Commonwealth nevertheless present contends that the case is distinguishable from Smith because Smith involved the Commonwealth’s failure to divulge evidence of innocence. We find it equally abhorrent for the prosecutor to make it appear that there is guilt evidence of which in fact does not exist. That is a large part of what occurred here. The prosecutor made side comments within the hearing jury, denigrat ed the judge’s court, trial rulings open and constantly repeated questions to which objections had been sustained in order to appear make it that the trial court not allowing present Commonwealth to its entire case. recognize We that the prosecutor has a difficult road ahead when the case is based almost entirely on the testimony of a convicted murder However, er. a conviction should not be viewed as another notch on the prosecutor’s belt. prosecutor, as a represen Commonwealth, tative of the obliged is to present the truth uphold Constitution, our if even that means foregoing a conviction. As noted in President Judge McEwen’s concur ring statement the previous appeal, “a fair trial is not simply lofty goal, it is a constitutional mandate.” Common Martorano, wealth v. supra. Where that constitutional man date ignored is and subverted by Commonwealth, we
560 give turn a blind and the Commonwealth simply eye cannot the one now just result is we opportunity. only another preclude jeopardy principles reach. We find that double retrial. discharged. Appellants
Order reversed. CERCONE, Emeritus, concurring files a Judge President opinion. Emeritus,
CERCONE, concurring. Judge President result reached the agree by I with the sound Although that historical majority, separately emphasize write un- majority by of the standard articulated development that Smith only the Commonwealth’s contention dermines misconduct de- prosecutorial bars intentional following retrial through a conviction the concealment signed to secure exculpatory evidence.
Traditionally, reviewing courts asked determine whether prohibits jeopardy re-trial on double prosecutorial misconduct prosecutorial have on the distinction between grounds focused overreaching. Conduct constitut- prosecutorial error and implicate jeopardy not double prosecutorial ed mere error did constituted over- principles; prosecutorial conduct contrast, protections by triggered jeopardy double reaching, Dinitz, v. 600, United States See retrial. U.S. barred (1976); 609, 1075, 1082, 47 L.Ed.2d 96 S.Ct. Simons, 10, 13, Commonwealth v. 514 Pa. 522 A.2d (1987) (“Administrative thing; error is one by prosecutor triggers jeopardy is prosecutorial overreaching which double another”). error and prosecutorial This distinction between role overreaching on the of the prosecutorial premised was sovereign’s representative: as error, is overreaching not an In contrast prosecutorial be the trial and cannot condoned. part process inevitable integrity judicial It signals breakdown of tactic proceeding, represents type designed protect which the clause double against.... justice, only are to seek “[P]rosecutors *10 convictions.”
Commonwealth v. Starks, 336, 341, 498, 490 Pa. 416 A.2d 500 (1980) Cherry, Commonwealth v. 295, 301, (quoting 474 Pa. (1977)). 800, 378 A.2d 803 Starks,
In Commonwealth v.
our Supreme Court identified
(1)
types
prosecutorial
two
of
overreaching:
prosecutorial
designed
second,
misconduct
to provoke a mistrial to secure a
favorable,
perhaps more
opportunity to convict the defendant
(2) prosecutorial
misconduct undertaken
bad faith to
Id. 341,
prejudice or harass the defendant.
duct fair point of the denial of a trial. decided, had
Since Smith courts have not another our misconduct to bar occasion retrial basis a of a fair trial. defendant intentionally deprive undertaken See, Moose, v. 424 623 Commonwealth Pa.Super. e.g., denied, (1993), Pa. 1317 appeal A.2d A.2d 831 — denied, (1994), cert. U.S. -, 130 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (1994) despite the (superior court did not bar retrial violation; the Common prosecutor’s discovery specifically, of main until failed to statement its witness wealth disclose plea its with that day agreement the first of trial and witness Rightley, Commonwealth v. conviction); securing until after *11 (1992) (a 1289, panel 421 617 Pa.Super. A.2d double rejected the defendant’s claim that court retrial; the defendant a granted the trial court had barred a implied gave new the that witness prosecutor trial because prosecutor the made three testimony and because inconsistent during closing Neverthe argument). statements his improper less, to evaluate misconduct under prosecutorial we continue end, Smith. reject To the articulated we standard the to demean or subvert designed misconduct seeking process: truth the judge prosecu- trial is to evaluate when
The role the advocacy an tor has the bounds of zealous into overstepped of a fair trial. Unless deprives area which defendant conduct, actually is de- perhaps reprehensible, while seeking or process, to demean subvert truth signed Smith will to bar a retrial. apply Rightley, A.2d at 1294. Pa.Super. an majority
I that this case illustra- agree presents with the designed tion to demean or prosecutorial overreaching agree I seeking process. subvert the truth further any attempt of this obviates on our voluminous record case odious part prosecutor’s itemize each instance of the behav- Nevertheless, emphasize ior. I feel the atmo- compelled to the sphere provide guidance the courtroom to pervading end, bench and bar. To that I stress the perver- sion the fingerprint by quoting from length notes of testimony as previously by panel summarized of this court: (Ms.
The following exchange involving Christie), (Mr. appellant Martorano’s counsel Fitzpatrick), witness, and the place court took during cross-examina- tion by Mr. Fitzpatrick:
Q: search, And as a your result of you found one finger- print?
A: Yes sir.
Q: you Do know whether that fingerprint was ever compared? was,
A: I believe it sir. Q: you And do know whose fingerprint was? to, MS. CHRISTIE: Objected Your Honor. This witness would be Honor, testifying hearsay, Your in that he would be testifying to an performed examination by an- witness, other sir.
THE COURT: I’m going to objection. overrule the Q (by Mr. Fitzpatrick): fingerprint Whose was it? A: know, do not sir.
Q: Nobody ever told you? No,
A: sir. *12 Q: Okay. But there was one fingerprint that was com- pared, and you think it was identified as belonging to a living individual; is right? that You just don’t know the identity of that living Right? individual?
A: Living deceased, or that’s correct. N.T., 5/15/84, at 234-35. During cross-examination by Mr. Brown, counsel Daidone, for appellant Officer Land indicat- ed that he knew the results of the fingerprint comparison:
Q: What was the result? A: It negative your to client and several other people that were listed.
Q: anybody? as to positive Was No, A: sir. identify any- ... but it didn’t
Q: just my client So body. Right? correct,
A: That’s sir. point N.T., 5/16/84, During redirect examination by the court: was clarified Land, words, is no In there
THE other Officer COURT: that were related being today prints alive those human Is way. right? that any correct, A: That’s sir. contin-
N.T., 5/16/84, redirect then at 91. The examination ued: Land, regard to the with
Q Ms. Officer [by Christie]: indicated, lift, have answer you one identifiable cross-examination, that certain indi- questions defense fingerprints case—that their connected to this viduals lift. Is correct? as one compared against were I Your Honor. object, MR. BROWN: objection. I’ll The witness THE sustain COURT: up to be hooked these were not able prints testified that anybody. cross-examination you were asked on Q: I believe lift to up FBI that one identifiable whether the hooked correct, Is that with this case. any individual connected Officer Land? so, I That’s not sir. object.
MR. BROWN: are why you question- understand THE COURT: don’t that he cannot ing this, The witness said Miss Christie. anybody any prints name whom give you the you testified that van relates. Isn’t that what taken from to, Land? Officer Yes,
A: sir. All That’s it. right. THE COURT: *13 Christie): Q And (by Ms. was that answer counsel on upon your knowledge cross-examination based FBI concerning particular conclusion print? Yes,
A: ma’am. THE prints So the these ... COURT: answer is that up could not case? anybody be hooked this Correct, A: sir.
THE That’s it. COURT: Land,
Q: print, on that one Officer identifiable were comparison there individual any points any connect- ed with this case? object.
MR. I BROWN: THE objection. COURT: I’ll sustain the The officer has very knowledge they testified that to the best of his were any not able to prints anybody relate these connect- ed or anybody with this case And that’s it. I am period. sustaining objection. Very
MS. well. I to argue CHRISTIE: don’t wish with your Honor. Christie):
Q (by Ms. Does print that one identifiable any any points bear of comparison? —contain object MR. I sir. BROWN:
THE I’ll sustain objection. COURT: MR. was asked times. thirty-five BROWN: It I thought any MS. CHRISTIE: it was terms of asked connecting to case. Honor,
MR. Your BROWN: don’t believe— it, THE COURT: Hold hold it. don’t need any We sustaining] objection comments. I am to that ques- tion. *14 Christie): if lift Do know that identifiable
Q (by you Ms. was also on the card marked C-18-G now contained Grimes, an Mr. Joseph to Grimes [Officer submitted to review? technician] Yes, A: ma’am. knowledge Grimes’ any And if is of Mr.
Q: your what lift? concerning conclusion that one that, I object your to Honor. MR. BROWN: objection question. I’ll sustain to that THE COURT: Christie): lift that one identifiable bear Q (by Ms. Does anyone or connected eight points comparison nine this case? I object, sir.
MR. BROWN: I’ll objection. THE sustain the COURT: answered, gone and over. Asked and over MR. BROWN: objection. I think the THE I’ll sustain the COURT: testimony clearly if I’m tell me— wrong, reflects —and fingerprints no were taken from any counsel—that anybody case. connected with this van relate right? statement to make? Is that a safe Is Yes, sir. MR. BROWN: exactly, Not sir.
MS. CHRISTIE: your see Honor at side- May MR. FITZPATRICK: we bar? me
THE Let see counsel. COURT: right Let’s it out now. He said MR. have BROWN: any hookup anybody. there wasn’t comment, I don’t further Mr. Brown. THE COURT: need eight I or nine points MS. CHRISTIE: asked about Honor— comparison, your Christie, anything I THE Miss do want COURT: confer- jury. further in front of the Let’s have a stated ence on this.
N.T., 5/16/84, 92-99. chambers, ensuing prosecu-
During conference is that five tor stated that “what am show prepared print compared as to that identifiable points comparison (N.T., 5/16/84, at to a known of Albert Daidone” fingerprint 100). maintained that have not Fitzpatrick “[w]e When Mr. Grimes,” report prosecu- received a of a from Mr. copy didn’t, counsel, oral ... replied, tor “You because was found, FBI, then it was submitted to the who then [b]ecause sir, conclude it to be Daidone’s because print, We couldn’t ” (N.T., comparison’ or nine require eight points we 102). mistrial, 5/16/84, Fitzpatrick Mr. then moved for arguing comply that the had failed to with the judge court’s order. The trial indicated that he discovery clarify jury. following would the matter for the discus- *15 sion then took place: here, Christie,
THE problem you COURT: Miss is [T]he have an that placed jury implication somebody before the in this is into this van a verifiable by fingerprint. case tied Now, moment, I no up from what know to this there is way no ... that in this testimony, anybody such there is can to that van.... are up you case be tied What to is that implying jury you fingerprint have identi- fication that indicates that case somebody involved this you just was that van. And don’t have it. You don’t have it. I jury
MS. CHRISTIE: indicated to the that we don’t eight have or nine points comparison. Honor,
MR. BROWN: Your this is the most rotten drivel I have ever heard.
N.T., 5/16/84,at 113-14. following day Officer Grimes was interviewed outside In jury’s hearing. response question- of the to the court’s ing, reports lifting he indicated that he had no on the van, fingerprints specifically from the he could not recall talking subject, to the on that and he neither reports concerning prints looked over FBI nor knew by about the conclusions drawn the FBI.... anything print they Mr. When submitted Q [by Fitzpatrick]: awhy prepared is there reason wasn’t you, any report to on it? value. And knowledge, had little I prints, my
A: The unless there’s a report anything do not make a usually to be conclusion obtained. you that print they I So that submitted
Q: see. any print opinion ... did not come you correct, human is that being; to an belonged identifiable sir? Well, human being. it to an identifiable belong
A: did saying. I That’s what I am identify. But couldn’t two or four or five identify by You it or three Q: couldn’t comparison?. points
A: That’s correct. comparisons; find five is points You didn’t even
Q: that correct? five, But know. might
A: There have been don’t definitely insufficient. Brown, N.T., 5/17/84, appellant for at 5-6. Mr. counsel Daidone, questioning: continued Grimes, you somebody, Mr. have ever said
Q:
would
compare to
points
... “I have four or five
here which
this indicates Daidone?” You
print,
Albert Daidone’s
so
*16
that,
you?
could
possibly say
couldn’t
say
you
And I
not
that. Because
would
A: No.
did
fifty
say
thousand or
have to
that about seven-hundred
people.
million
5/17/84,
N.T.,
at 22-23.
Martorano,
Commonwealth
Daidone,
(1992)
Pa.Super.
v.
and Commonwealth
6-16).
(1992)(slip
opinion
A.2d 63
link
attempts
appellant,
to
prosecutor’s persistent
The
innuendo,
unequivocal
through
fingerprint
despite
could
be
testimony
partial fingerprint
expert
being
part
human
“were
belonging
any living
identified as
impression
that the
give
jury
of an overall scheme
excluding
prosecution.”
evidence beneficial
to the
court
instance and
Id.
use of innuendo
truth-determining
process
the trial to
throughout
pervert
integrity
the breakdown of the
undeniably “signalled]
prosecutori-
judicial
represented]
type
proceeding,
designed
clause was
al tactic which the double
Starks,
supra.
Accordingly,
agree
protect against.”
appellants discharged.
the order should be reversed and
v. COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL INSURANCE Harleysville Company, Appellees. Insurance (Three Cases.) Superior Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Sept. 22, 1996. Filed Oct.