COMMONWEALTH оf Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Jose G. CRUZ, Appellant.
852 A.2d 287
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided June 22, 2004.
Submitted April 23, 2003.
Michael Anthony George, Paul T. Dean, Warren Philip Bladen, for Com. of PA, Appellee.
Before: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.
OPINION
Justice CASTILLE.
In this appeal under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA“),
The factual scenario giving rise to these charges is that in the early morning hours of November 28, 1992, appellant, who was armed with a .45 caliber handgun, broke into the home of his ex-girlfriend, Rebecca Cota, in Franklin Township, Adams County, with the intention of forcibly taking her from the premises. Once inside, however, appellant shot and killed Rebecca Cota, Benjamin Cota, and Roland Dela Cruz, and injured four others, who survived their gunshot wounds. Before surrendering, appellant attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head, but he survived.
On October 13, 1994, aрpellant, who faced multiple charges of first degree murder and a possible death sentence, in addition to other charges, entered a negotiated, counseled plea of nolo contendere to three counts of second-degree murder, thus sparing him the prospect of a death sentence. At the outset of the plea hearing, the court asked appellant‘s trial counsel why he thought a ”nolo contendere plea is appropriate here,” and counsel replied:
[H]ad this case gone to trial . . . the police would have testified that on his way to exiting the building, [appellant] suffered a gunshot wound, which apparently was self inflicted. [Appellant] was hospitalized down in Maryland for quite some time, and I have had him evaluated by Dr. Hostetter, a psychiatrist and medical doctor obviously and in his report Dr. Hostetter indicated to me that what happened during the shooting incident was that [appellant] actually lost part of his brain. Dr. Hostetter described it as
lobotomized and [appellant is] not able to express emotions and really discuss the facts of this case in any sort of sensible way and that‘s the reason that we have offered or requested to plead no contest.
N.T. 10/13/94, at 2-3.1 Despite his representation that appellant was unable to discuss the facts of the case in a sensible way, and that this inability was the reason for the plea, defense counsel did not claim that appellant was incompetent, nor did the court inquire into competency sua sponte. Nor does it definitively appear from the rеcord whether a competency evaluation was ever performed.
After conducting a waiver colloquy with appellant, the court accepted the plea, noting that: “After discussing the circumstances of [appellant‘s] head wound with defense counsel, the Court has determined that a plea of nolo contendere is appropriate and accepts it.” N.T. 10/13/94, at 14-15.2 In conformity with the plea arrangement, appellant was sentenced that same day to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment on the murder charges. Appellant was informed of his appellate rights, but did not file post-sentence motions and did not pursue a direct appeal. Accordingly, his judgment of sentence became final on November 14, 1994.3
Almost six years later, on July 25, 2000, appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, alleging that his constitutionаl rights had been violated and that he had been denied the effective
Mental disorder, at the time of offense, due to head injury; being treated at the time I was prevailed upon and could offer no participation in my defense due to as[:]
- Non-capacity to recognize reality[;]
- Capacity to respond appropriately was grossly impaired[;]
- Paranoid schizophrenic[;]
- Extreme emotional disturbance[.]
Pro Se PCRA Petition, at 3. In an exhibit attached to the petition, appellant elaborated that he “was to[o] grossly impaired, that I could offer no assistance in my defense, at time of trial, with my head injuries, I was suffering from paranoid schizophrenic [sic], under medication and experiencing hallucination. . . .” Exhibit I, at 2. Thereafter, present counsel was appointed.
On August 16, 2000, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the petition without a hearing on the basis that it was untimely, pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA, because it was filed almost six years after the judgment became final. That same day, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the PCRA on grounds of untimeliness.
On September 1, 2000, appellant filed a counseled response to the Commonwealth‘s motion to dismiss, alleging that appellant was suffering from brain damage at the time of the plea hearing due to the gunshot wound to his head. Counsel further quoted plea counsel‘s representations at the plea hearing concerning appellant‘s inability to discuss the facts of the case, as well as the court‘s record acknowledgement of the injury. Counsel then averred that:
6. [Appellant‘s] brain has been slowly recovering its normal functions. [Appellant] has only within the past six months finally returned to the level of literacy and comprehension necessary to filing his pro se P.C.R.A. petition.
7. [Appellant] asserts, therefore, that his failure to file within the one-year time limit for filing a P.C.R.A. should fall within the exception found at
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) , “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
Response, at 2.
On November 21, 2000, the PCRA court held a pre-hearing conference on the Commonwealth‘s motion. PCRA counsel reiterated her argument that appellant‘s brain damage rendered him incapable of earlier exercising his PCRA rights and thus qualified him under the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar. Counsel noted that she had spoken to a psychologist who informed her that when a person “become[s] lobotomized that you lose all sense of temporal awareness . . . which might explain why [appellant] didn‘t really have the sense of time that would be necessary to meet this sort of deadline.” N.T. 11/21/00, 2-3. Counsel added that she had a copy of the psychiatrist‘s report which was prepared for plea counsel in 1994. Counsel characterized the report as revealing that:
[appellant] functions as a lobotomized person because of the permanent damage due to thе shot. This went through the frontal portion of his brain. He says that the brain damage he has received has caused serious impairment of his judgment and that he is in a permanent lobotomized state, which has markedly altered his personality function and interferes with his abstract thinking.
Id. at 3. Counsel proffered that she would provide expert testimony on the effect of a lobotomy on the brain and “how it can recover,” and also would offer testimony from appellant regarding his mental state “back in ‘93 and ‘94 and how through time and through the brain‘s ability to repair itself or compensate, he is moving forward in terms of his ability to read and comprehend.” Id. at 3-4. The Commonwealth responded that no proof had been forwarded that appellant‘s brain injury affected his “ability to read or comprehend;” that the 1994 psychiatric report revealed that the part of the brain
The PCRA court then asked counsel what substantive claim she would pursue. Counsel replied that: “if we could get past the timeliness issue, what [appellant] would be asserting is because of his brain injury he was not able to understand the plea colloquy or participate meaningfully in his defense.” Id. at 5. Thе court then suggested that claims premised upon incapacity generally do not toll operation of the time-bar and, thus, that hurdle had to be cleared “before we can decide whether or not you‘re entitled to introduce expert testimony about the effects of [a] gunshot wound to the brain.” Id. at 6. Counsel responded by recognizing that her burden would be twofold, i.e., first to establish the time-bar exception and then the merits of the underlying claim:
[F]irst we would need expert testimony regarding how the brain injury would affect his ability to file a PCRA in any sort of timely manner. . . . [I]f we could get over the timeliness hurdle, then we would need expert testimony regarding what the brain injury would have done to his understanding of the plea colloquy.
Id. at 6. The court, however, rеiterated that it viewed the matter of the time-bar as a predicate legal question and, under the current state of the law, mental incapacity, whatever its source (inebriation, trauma, etc.), was insufficient as a matter of law to toll the time-bar. Id. at 7. The court nevertheless permitted the parties to further brief the question of the time-bar.
In her brief, PCRA counsel reiterated the argument that appellant‘s alleged incapacity was sufficient to avoid the time-bar under the after-discovered evidence exception. Counsel argued that appellant‘s serious brain injury prevented him from knowing the facts upon which his substantive claim would be predicated. Counsel alleged that, as related in a
On February 28, 2001, the court entered an order granting the Commonwealth‘s motion and dismissing appellant‘s PCRA petition on the grounds that it was untimely and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction. In its accompanying opinion, the court posed the question as whether appellant had a right to a hearing and an opportunity to prove that his allegations were sufficient to trigger the after-discovered evidence exception to the time-bar. Slip op. at 4. The court then made a number of “observations,” including that: (1) the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel recited in appellant‘s pro se PCRA petition clearly were time-barred; (2) the plea colloquy demonstrated that appellant‘s plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary; (3) appellant‘s mental impairment (which the PCRA court described as amnesia) at the time of the plea was not such as to “preclude[ ] a trial and conviction;” (4) insanity is not a tolling factor for PCRA purposes; and (5) appellant‘s right to the appointment of an expert was fulfilled when a psychiatric expert was aрpointed before his plea, and he was not entitled to appointment of another expert to aid in the presentation of a PCRA petition. Id. at 5-6. The court then concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the PCRA petition.
Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the PCRA court‘s dismissal of the petition in a memorandum opinion filed on February 13, 2002. The panel rejected appellant‘s claim that his brain injury, and its alleged effect upon his ability to discern the facts upon which his petition was premised, qualified under the “after-discovered” evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar. The panel deemed this question to be controlled by Superior Court‘s previous decision in Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700, 703 (Pa.Super.2001)
This Court granted further review, in part to address the effect, if any, of this Court‘s intervening decision in Haag, 570 Pa. 289, 809 A.2d 271 (2002), upon the analysis of the lower courts.
The exceptions to the PCRA time-bar set forth in Section 9545(b)(1) provide as follows:
Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
This Court has held that the PCRA‘s time restriction is constitutionally valid. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638, 643 (1998) (“the PCRA‘s time limitation upon the filing of PCRA petitions does not unreasonably or unconstitutionally limit [an appellant‘s] constitutional right to habeas corpus relief.“). Furthermore, we have held that the PCRA time limits are jurisdictional in nature, implicating a court‘s very power to adjudicate a controversy. See Common-wealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (1999). Accordingly, the “period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling;” instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only to the extent that the PCRA permits it to be extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. Id. at 222.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157 (2003), we recounted this Court‘s rejection of “various theories devised to avoid the effects of the one-year time limitation” of the PCRA. Id. at 1157 (collecting cases). In Robinson, we reiterated the strictly jurisdictional nature of the PCRA time-bar and that “the PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” Id. at 1161 (quoting Commonwealth v. Eller, 569 Pa. 622, 807 A.2d 838, 845 (2002)).
Appellant does not ask this Court to fashion a non-statutory, ad hoc, exception to the time-bar. Instead, his claim, properly understood, is that his averments entitled him to a hearing to attempt to show that his circumstances satisfy the existing after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar. The question of the proper interpretation and scope of the exceptions to the PCRA time-bar is a matter of statutory interpretation. Such matters are questions of law as to which this Court‘s review is plenary. E.g. Gustine Uniontown Associates, Ltd. v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., L.P., 842 A.2d 334 (Pa.2004).
The essence of appellant‘s claim is that his allegеd mental incapacity rendered the facts upon which his substantive PCRA claims would be based unknowable to him until the point at which he became competent, and thus qualifies him for review under the PCRA‘s after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar. Appellant also claims that he should be permitted to attempt to prove that he filed his pro se PCRA petition within sixty (60) days of the point where he became competent. Although the lower courts are correct
Our jurisprudence in the area of the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception demonstrates this Court‘s plain language, commonsense construction of the provision. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 574 Pa. 724, 833 A.2d 719, 727 (2003) (after-discovered evidence exception did not apply where appellant alleged new evidence of trial judge‘s bias, in form of newly acquired affidavit of court employee, because issue of trial judge‘s bias had been litigated through appellant‘s prior PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 99-100 (2001) (after-discovered evidence exception did not apply where appellant claimed that newly acquired affidavits from jurors showed misunderstanding of meaning of life sentence but did not demonstrate why that “faсt” could not have been ascertained at time of trial by exercise of due diligence); Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (2000) (“conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of after-discovered evidence encompassed by the exception.“); Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 731 A.2d 581, 589-91 (1999) (after-discovered evidence exception not satisfied where appellant failed to demonstrate when alleged after-discovered evidence was actually discovered or why it could not have been ascertained through exercise of due diligence).
In support of his argument that claims defaulted through the PCRA petitioner‘s mental incompetence may trigger the after-discovered evidence exception, appellant rеlies primarily upon a footnote in this Court‘s recent opinion in Haag, 570 Pa. 289, 809 A.2d 271. Haag was convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping in February of 1986 and subsequently sentenced to death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. During the pendency of the direct appeal, Haag‘s trial/appellate counsel died, and all files relating to the case were destroyed. In March of 1991, the
On November 28, 1995, Haag‘s new counsel timely filed a PCRA petition on his behalf, alleging that he was incompetent to pursue collateral relief himself and seeking the appointment of Haag‘s mоther as next friend. At hearings in April and May of 1997, a court-ordered, impartial psychiatric expert agreed with the opinions of the defense psychologist that Haag was not able to assist his PCRA counsel in post-conviction litigation due to an inability to rationally understand his present situation and to discuss relevant facts or even respond to the most basic inquiries posed by counsel. Both doctors also opined that Haag was not competent to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to file a collateral attack of his conviction and sentence.
On January 29, 1999, the PCRA court ordered the next friend to proceed with her petition on behalf of Haag. The next friend, in turn, petitioned the court to declare her remediеs inadequate to protect Haag‘s right to challenge his conviction and sentence and therefore to stay the PCRA proceedings until, if and when, Haag regained competence. Following another hearing at which the defense expert again opined that Haag was incompetent and that his condition had not changed since the 1997 hearings, the PCRA court denied the motion to
[I]t is indisputable that Haag is incompetent to waive his right to PCRA relief and that [a]ppellant has standing as next friend to pursue such relief for him. Appellant seeks to suspend PCRA proceedings because Haag cannot aid her and PCRA counsel in an investigation of possible avenues for relief. It appears that, in any situation where a next friend initiates PCRA proceedings, the prisoner will be unwilling or unable to assist in identifying issues to raise on collateral review. A prisoner‘s inability to participate in next friend proceedings due to incompetence is not a reason to halt such proceedings. Requiring a next friend to pursue relief while a prisoner is incompetent ensures that the prisoner promptly reaps the benefits from meritorious claims, rather than suffering delay in relief. . . . We instruct [a]ppellant to proceed on her petition, and if Haag regains competency, he may seek review of any such claims through a second PCRA petition.
Haag, 809 A.2d at 280 (citation omitted).
Appellant contends that the footnote immediately following this holding in Haag, which concerns the availability of further review for claims that could not then be raised due to Haag‘s incompetence, supports his proposition that he may be able to satisfy the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar:
A possible scenаrio may occur in the future. Haag may regain his competence after his next friend and counsel have litigated claims through a PCRA petition. The next friend may be unsuccessful in obtaining relief; and now that he is competent, Haag may wish to raise cognizable PCRA claims of which only he knew and, because of his incompetence, was unable to communicate to his next friend or counsel.
While Appellant [the next friend] asserts that Haag will be time barred from bringing a second petition and raising this class of claims, we disagree. . . .
If Haag files a second petition, that petition would be subject to the requirements for timely filing as found in the current provisions of the PCRA. . . . Because Haag‘s second petition cannot possibly be filed within оne year of the date upon which judgment became final, his second petition will be time barred unless one of three statutory exceptions applies. . . .
Although we have not addressed the issue, arguably, the exception found in
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) seems to apply to the present facts. . . . In this case . . . Haag‘s inability to communicate with counsel because of mental illness, the death of prior counsel, and the destruction of Haag‘s file could satisfy the exception in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) for claims based upon facts not discovered by PCRA counsel through the exercise of due diligence. If Haag filed his second petition within 60 days of regaining his competence, and thereby, his ability to “know” such facts, Haag‘s second petition would not be time barred [pursuant to42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) ].As this issue is not ripe, and may never be, we must leave it for another day. Under our understanding of the current PCRA, which the General Assembly may change before we ever have the opportunity to address this matter, Haag would have the opportunity to seek review of claims otherwise available under the PCRA, but unraisable in his first petition due to his incompetence.
Id., at 280 n. 11 (citations omitted).5
In a cogent and able argument, appellant‘s counsel in the case sub judice argues that footnote 11 in Haag opens the window to possible PCRA review for claims which appellant
We appreciate that counsel here does not overstate appellant‘s case. It is undisputed that appellant suffered a
On the other hand, it appears that no challenge to appellant‘s competency was raised at or before the plea proceeding. Moreover, counsel aсknowledges that here, unlike Haag, there is no additional information of record—such as psychiatric records, reports, or testimony—which would establish that appellant in fact was incompetent at the relevant times and that his incompetence, in turn, rendered him unable to discover the facts that would form the basis of his substantive PCRA claims. Indeed, as counsel notes:
Unlike Haag, there is very little information before the Court in this case in terms of psychiatric reports and other mental health records. There has not been a determination that Appellant is incompetent; nor has there been a determination that Appellant regained competency. But it is indisputable that Appellant sustained a serious injury to the brain, that being “lobotomized” impairs cerebral functioning, and that healing takes time.
Appellant‘s Brief at 13. In addition, there currently is no record basis upon which we may definitively determine if and when appellant passed from incompetence to competence, if such is what happened, and thus, whether his pro se petition was timely filed within 60 days of his becoming competent.
We are aware of the Commonwealth‘s argument that, on the current state of the record and pleadings, appellant has failed to prove that he was in fact incompetent (as opposed to merely suffering some lesser degree of mental impairment) at the
We do not speculate on the likelihood that appellant can prove that he was incompetent at the relеvant times, that his incompetence rendered him unable to discover the factual bases for the collateral claims he would raise, and that he acted in a timely fashion once he became competent. Nor do we speculate as to the cognizability of any substantive claims that appellant would bring if he succeeds in proving that he satisfies the elements of the after-discovered evidence exception.6 However, we agree with appellant that, in light of the language of the exception, the unique nature of claims sounding in incompetence, and this Court‘s discussion in Haag, he should be afforded an opportunity to attempt to prove that he was incompetent at the relevаnt times and that that incompetence qualifies under the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar.7
Justice NIGRO files a concurring opinion.
Justice NIGRO concurring.
Despite the fact that I joined the dissent in Commonwealth v. Haag, 570 Pa. 289, 809 A.2d 271 (2002), I am able to join in the result reached by the majority in the instant matter. As the majority here notes, the majority in Haag held that the PCRA court did not err in requiring the next friend of an incompetent PCRA petitioner to proceed with the PCRA petition filed on his behalf, pointing out that the petitioner could always seek review of any previously undiscoverable fact-based claims through a second PCRA petition if he later regained his competеncy. The appellant, also the appointed next friend, in Haag, however, argued that such a procedure
The dissenting opinion authored by then-Chief Justice Zappala, which I joined, took issue with the majority‘s decision to force a next friend to prоceed with a PCRA petition on behalf of an incompetent PCRA petitioner based, at least in part, on a prediction that the after discovered evidence exception would indeed later be found to encompass all potential claims brought by the petitioner should he regain his competence.1 In fact, the dissent opined that this exception would not include “all potential cognizable claims which are presently unidentifiable by the next friend or PCRA counsel due to the inability of PCRA counsel to engage in meaningful consultation with [the incompetent PCRA petitioner] regarding his case, but would be capable of identification and development should [the PCRA petitioner] regain his competеnce and be able to consult with PCRA counsel.” Haag, 809 A.2d at 292 (C.J., Zappala, dissenting). In support of its position, the dissent pointed out that this Court had already established
I continue to believe that Haag was wrongly decided. However, the issue in that case centered on whether a PCRA petitioner, through a next friend, could be forced to proceed with his first PCRA petition while incompetent. The issue of whether such incompetence may later satisfy the requirements оf the after discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time limits was not, as the Haag majority itself stated, properly before the Court in Haag. Now that the issue is squarely before us, I agree with the majority that, for the reasons outlined in its opinion, this exception is applicable if a petitioner can demonstrate that he was and remained incompetent throughout the period during which his right to file a PCRA petition lapsed and that he filed his current petition within 60 days of regaining competence.