Lead Opinion
OPINION
James Crompton (Crompton) appeals from an Order of the Superior Court affirming his conviction for possession of marijuana
Our analysis of the question before us is twofold; whether the police complied with the knock and announce rule, and if they did not, whether the evidence seized during the sеarch should be suppressed.
On August 26, 1992, Pennsylvania State Troopers arrived at Crompton’s home to execute a search warrant. The facts
The trial court denied Crompton’s Omnibus Pre-trial Motion seeking to suppress the evidеnce obtained during the search. Following a bench trial, Crompton was convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Crompton filed post-trial motions asserting that the search of his home violated the “knock and announce rule” mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 2007. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the police lawfully entered Crompton’s home because evidence was going to be destroyed and no occupant responded to their announcement.
On appeal, the Superior Court disagreed and held that the police viоlated the knock and announce rule. However, the Superior Court refused to suppress the seized evidence, holding the troopers sufficiently respected Crompton’s privacy interests during the search and, therefore, suppression was unwarranted. We agree with the Superior Court’s сonclusion that the police violated the knock and announce rule, but hold that the seized evidence must be suppressed.
The standard of review of an appeal from a suppression ruling is limited to determining whether the findings of
The purpose of the knock and announce rule is to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect an occupant’s privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry of unknown persons, and to prevent property damage resulting from forced entry during the execution of a search warrant. Commonwealth v. McDonnell,
RULE 2007. MANNER OF ENTRY INTO PREMISES
(a) A law enforcement officer exеcuting a search warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable effort to give notice of his identity, authority and purpose to any occupant of the premises specified in the warrant, unless exigent circumstances require his immediate forcible entry.
(b) Such officer shall awаit a response for a reasonable period of time after his announcement of identity, authority and purpose, unless exigent circumstances require his immediate forcible entry.
(c) If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable period, he may forcibly enter the premises аnd may use as much physical force to effect entry therein as is necessary to execute the search.
Consequently, even with a search warrant, police officers must knock, announce their identity and purpose and then wait a reasonable amount of time for the ocсupants to respond before entering any private premises.
1. the occupants remain silent after repeated knocking and announcing;
2. the police arе virtually certain that the occupants of the premises already know their purpose;
3. the police have reason to believe that an announcement prior to entry would imperil their safety; and
4. the police have reason to believe that evidence is about to bе destroyed.
Commonwealth v. Means,
During a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the police seized evidence in a way that did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. Pa. R.Crim.P. 323(h); Commonwealth v. Silo,
Regarding the instant matter, the Commonwealth sought to establish that the police entered Crompton’s home under an exception to the knock and announce rule.
The trooper provided contradictory accounts of his entry into Crompton’s home. First, on direct examination, the
However, later during cross-examination, the trooper gave a different description of Homar’s conduct in response to the doorbell. The trooрer testified that Homar moved from the sofa toward the kitchen after the doorbell rang. The trooper explained that the officers entered Crompton’s home because Homar was moving away from them.
Thus, our review of the trooper’s testimony reveals that he testified that Homar did not react, which is consistent with the first exception, and then testified that Homar fled, which is consistеnt with the fourth exception. Homar, however, could not have simultaneously remained seated and fled.
The trooper’s versions of his entry are mutually exclusive. Either no one responded to the doorbell, so the trooper entered the hallway and saw Homar get up from the sofa, or the trooper saw Homar move to the kitchen from his vantage point outside the house and then entered to prevent Homar from destroying evidence. The Commonwealth produced no testimony to explain this inconsistency. The trial court held the testimony established both the first and the fourth exception to the knock and announce rule. The Superior Court held that the Commоnwealth, as a result of this mutually exclusive testimony, failed to establish either exception.
However, the Superior Court erred when it found that although the police search violated the knock and announce rule, it was not required to suppress the evidence seized. We held in Chambers and Means, and we reаffirm today, that the appropriate remedy for a violation of the knock and announce rule is to exclude the evidence discovered during an unconstitutional search.
In Chambers, this Court held “[t]he fundamental constitutional concern implicated by the police officers’ failure to comply with the knock and announce rule is the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Chambers, 528 Pa. at
Instead here, the Superior Court concluded,
[w]hen a visitor comes to a house in August and encounters an open front door and unlocked screen door, it is not unusual to knock аt the door, announce one’s presence and enter____ But by leaving the front door open, Crompton evidenced less of a concern for keeping out those with a license or right to enter. We therefore hold that while the troopers did violate the knock and announce rulе, their entry into Crompton’s home showed sufficient regard for his constitutionally protected privacy interests. Since the troopers acted in good faith and otherwise conducted themselves properly, suppression is not justified.
Commonwealth v. Crompton,
Accordingly, we reverse the Order of the Superior Court, vacate the judgment of sentence, and grant Crompton a new trial.
CASTILLE, J., files a dissenting opinion.
Notes
. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101— 780-144.
. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees that people shall be secure from unreasonable searches of their houses. As this was Crompton’s house, despite the open front door and unlocked screen door, Crompton was fully protected from an unlawful sеarch. It is the nature of the premises, not the door to the premises, that triggers the protections of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
. In its brief, the Commonwealth acknowledges that the period of time between the initial announcement and the police entry is unclear. Therefore, the Commonwealth argues that an immediate entry would have in fact been legal because it would have fallen within an exception to the knock and announce rule.
. The trial court concluded that the police presumed Homar was heading to the kitchen to destroy evidence. However, our review of the transcript does not reveal that the trooper testified that he or any other trooper suspected Homar was heading to the kitchen to destroy evidence.
. Albeit that neither party argued that the second exception applies to this case, the dissenting opinion states, “[a]lthough the record is not well developed, it appears that the second exception to the knock and announce rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Means,
. We do not hold here that the first and fourth exceptions to the knock and announce rule are mutually exclusive, rather that the Commonwealth’s evidence in this case is mutually exclusive and cannоt sustain either exception.
. Due to the Commonwealth’s failure to produce consistent evidence in this case, we are precluded from considering whether the trooper's conduct here in fact satisfies the knock and announce rule or any of the four exceptions to thаt rule.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although the record is not well developed, it appears that the second exception to the knock and announce rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Means,