*1 suspect when with certain classifications dealing evi- producing burden exclusionary zoning, municipality. dence is first on the Notwithstanding my approach somewhat different I view majority’s share the problem presented, totally prohibit which otherwise municipalities evi- legitimate operation business must first introduce dence a reasonable between demonstrating relationship ordinance and the morals public health, safety, general of the community. welfare Pomeroy opin-
Mr. in this joins concurring Justice ion. Appellant, Croft. v.
Commonwealth 1971. Before April Argued Bell, C. J., Jones, Pomeroy Roberts, O’Brien, Eagen, and Barbieri, JJ. *2 Stein, M. Assistant District with Milton Attorney, him Grawford, James D. Attorney, District Deputy First A. Sprague, Attorney, Assistant District Richard for Attorney, District Common- Arlen Specter, and appellant. wealth, Treese, Assistant her K.
Martha Defender, for Ziccardi, J. appellees. Defender, Vincent Opinion December 1971: Mr. Jones, Justice Family Pleas, Division, Court Common adjudged each Philadelphia, Branch, Juvenile on various but charges appellees five permitted them to remain in their respective sub- homes ject to some form of juvenile probation. Timely peti- tions for were filed each appellee alleging only “errors law fact were made and/or time of said hearing that said Order was improvi- made.” dently Each petition was denied subsequently as the juvenile court judge concluded that a rehearing is discretionary when the juvenile is not from removed his home. On appeal, Superior Court two reversed, judges dissenting, held that a was man- datory even with these limited forms probation. Moore Ct. A. 2d 395 (1970). We granted the Commonwealth’s petitions allocatur.
These do not appeals present question of a con stitutional nor is there rehearing; present any *3 question the denial of juvenile’s a right ap peal. “The of action the juvenile court is sub always ject to appellate review and correction for errors of law or abuse of discretion.” Holmes 175 Supe Pa. rior Ct. 137, 146, 103 A. 2d 459 454, (1954); 379 aff’d, Pa. A. 599, 109 2d 523 cert. (1954), denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
The sole of question law presented by these appeals is whether a rehearing, a following probation order, is or mandatory under discretionary Juvenile Court (Act Law of June 2, P. L. 1433, 11 P.S. §15, §257) which provides: twenty-one “Within after (21) days the final order of the any judge juvenile court, or committing plac- any dependent, neglected or ing delinquent such child, as a matter shall, child or right, by his her parent or or next have the friend, to present or petition the court have Ms her case or cases in the reheard, if, and opinion reviewed such parent, next an friend, error of or fact or or law, in. made such been final has both, or proceedings or ifor the order has been improvidently said order, inadvertently made. court the the
“Upon presentation petition matter shall such review as a grant rehearing added.) right.” (Emphasis on our court relied juvenile language judge A. 2d McIntyre,
Com. v. Pa. 96, or as used that, “‘committing placing’ an court juvenile P.S. order the envisions §257 a home or institution.” judge juvenile ‘placing’ Mc- Court, As demonstrated correctly Superior as it whether Intyre is involved issue inapposite court’s mandatory juvenile is following case criminal court. certification Such the juvenile certification does not “commit” “place” final order. and, moreover, certification determina- agree Superior also Court’s We court juvenile allowing tion order form of at home to some to remain juvenile a “final order”. recognize We similarly Court’s conclusion that even Superior approve “constitute some interfer- forms of probation limited civil adjudicated youth’s liberty.” ence with A. 2d at 396. However, Ct. resolve the issue principles pivotal none of these legal order Hoes appeals: these posed to remain at home youth sub- allowing a final form of constitute order ject to some which entitles the placing committing a matter of right? *4 of the entire examination Juvenile Court Prom our was not the legislative it intent conclude Act, we a matter from as this type rehearings grant the Act nowhere de- Although specifically of order. “commit”, such distinction “allow”, “place”, fines of The Juvenile Court (Act Section by Law drawn L. §8, P. amended, 11 P.S. 2, 1933, of June §250) permissible adjudi- which deals with orders after (a) cation. Whereas that statute vests the power court with to “alloio a child to remain supervision its home . . . ... guardianship (emphasis of a officer.” add- ed), remaining refer sections to orders "com- which (emphasis added), mit a child” to the care of an in- dividual, institution or school. a child Thus, is not “committed” on when he is allowed to re- In cer. our “placed” view, is “committed” or supervision main at home under the of a offi- only when the child is taken from the of his or guardian. her important
A second
interpreta
reason for this
great impact
tion
concerns the
Court’s
statutory
juve
construction on the administration of
justice.
point
nile
graphically
This
illustrated
following
dispositions
reference to the
table of
Philadelphia.1
court of
*5
Discounting
majority
miscellaneous cases—the vast
discharged
which are cases that have been dismissed,
open
or held
without further action2—it is evident that
overwhelming
disposition
is the
method
delinquency adjudications by
court of
*6
Philadelphia.
juvenile
probation
If each
on
released
rehearing,
impact
were to demand and
receive a
the
staggering.
the
of
courts
this Commonwealth would
Nothing in our case
The
law or
Juvenile Court Law
requires
meaningless
such a
misallocation of limited
judicial
especially
petitions for re
resources
when the
hearing merely allege
of
that “errors
law
fact
and/or
hearing
were made at the
of
time
said
and that said
improvidently
Order was
made.”
Although
teaching
we earlier
the
concluded that
McIntyre did not cover this
we do achieve
situation,
“
the identical
result
a different context:
‘commit-
ting
placing’
or
§257
as used
11 P.S.
an
envisions
juvenile
juve-
judge ‘placing’
order of the
court
nile in a home or institution.”
Dissenting Opinion Roberts: presented properly The issue framed here, majority Superior of the Court is “whether an order representative Choosing year, 9,408 1970 as a eases were dismissed, discharged pending compared 9,858 or as cases in category of miscellaneous cases. the total placem or of commitment final order adjudicated delinquent grant as to to an so
ent,”1 mandatory right errors where improvident be corrected. or or orders can law fact pur language majority contrary holds, adjudicatory pose order return of the statute,2 ing home to the conditions to his place “final of commitment or not a order grant deny rehearing in can or ment” and Accordingly, affirm I and would dissent its discretion.3 the Order of Court. question reads as follows: “Within
The statute judge twenty-one (21) days any after final order any committing placing or . . . court, right, matter child child, shall, parent or next friend, have his or her petition present Ms the court a to have opin- reheard, if, her cases reviewed case or *7 parent, parents, an error next friend, of or ion such of pro- or has been made such both, or law, fact ceedings been final if the said order has or order, or inadvertently improvidently made.” or §257. 11 P. L. P.S. 1433, §15, Act 1933, of June 2, (Emphasis added.) options gives toas the court numerous statute juve- adjudicating a it fashion after
the final order can delinquent: nile as a 1 395, 208, Appeal, 206, Pa. Ct. 269 2d 217 A. Moore (1970).
896 2 2, 1983, 1433, seq. P. L. P.S. Act et §§243 of June 11 (1954), In Holmes’ 109 A. 2d cert. denied, question Ct. 75 S. 348 U.S. was yet appellant granted facts indicate raised was a rehear adjudication ing delinquency. after Id. A. at 2d way determining is no 524. There whether it was believed or the discretion of the trial court. matter may— “The court or
“(a) home ... in its a child to remain Allow subject, family place home, child in a such suitable guardianship supervision to the and case, either report require may to child such and officer, necessary, as deemed to the officer often may require to the to be returned child appears proceedings the same for further whenever necessary. the court to be guidance
“(b) and con- child to the care, Commit a good reputable character, moral trol of citizen some supervision . . . to the officer. “(c) institution. suitable a child some Commit training “(d) industrial a child to an Commit school. . . . age years any
“(e) sixteen over the child Commit .” Id. any §8, school or home. . . state industrial added). (emphasis §250 P.S. Legislature majority the intent attributes type between the first artificial distinction draw an (a), returning in subsection authorized
of order all other orders of his child to the part including the second order authorized family “placing” (a), “in child a suitable subsection statutory surgery justifies majority this home.” The mandatory granting ground Section placing” “committing rehearing, uses the words possible appear orders of Section in ail the which (a).4 part I except cannot first of subsection adjudicated deprive legislative any intent to discern *8 custody parents delinquent on to the his returned granted right all probation a to other to the delinquents has been made. a “final order” after
4
placing”
“committing
majority’s
or
on which the
The words
completely
in
analysis
are nowhere defined
the
relies
statute.
See
1433, §1,
§243.
L.
P.S.
P.
of June
Act
“[i]f,
a hearing
statute also
to
grants
right
court
time
final
any
any
after
order
delinquent
child,
or
.
.
.
placing
any
committing
in the
which,
taken place
circumstances has
change
or next friend
such
of the
or
opinion
parent
parents
or modification
warrants
revocation
child,
258.
section
final order.
. .
11 P.S.
This
Id. §16,
under
the revocation of probation
authorizes
clearly
Holmes’ Appeal,
circumstances. See
appropriate
2d
cert. denied,
109 A.
the right
U.S.
589
ly
subject
juveniles
to condi
unfounded.
Both
will
probation.
majority
even
of
that
concedes
tions
“limited forms of
constitute a restraint
liberty”.
specifically
recognized
is
We
unquestionably
“.
on
. .
a restriction
the defendant’s
liberty
deprivation
freedom and
of his
within
meaning of
Common
the Fourteenth Amendment.”
305
301,
wealth v.
426
231 A. 2d
Vivian,
192, 200,
(1967);
Cunningham,
U.S.
242-43,
Jones v.
371
83
236,
(1963).
condi
S.
377
authorizes
Ct.
The statute
373,
juve
probation equally
whether the
tions
restrictive
parents or
nile
his
is committed
“placed”
family
in a
home or “committed” to
suitable
good
reputable
of a
citizen of
moral character.
the care
§250.
P. L.
11
of June
P.S.
2,
1433, §8,
Act
1933,
rehearing
right
grants
as a matter
The statute
“an
law” and
correct
error
orders
fact,
inadvertently
“improvidently
made”. Id.
§15,
adjudication
§257.
The likelihood that the
P.S. at
delinquency
one or more
defi-
is
of these
returned
ciencies is
same whether
family,
another
or committed
his
with
institution. As we observed Commonwealth v.
(1969),
McIntyre,
5'90 possible
Section 257’s
to correct
completely
errors
fact or law
in accord
Supreme
deci
mandate of recent
United States
juveniles
recognizing
process rights
sions
the due
delinquency proceedings.
Winship,
In
U.S.
re
(1970); Application Gault,
to an institution.
frequently
Supreme
“. . .
observed:
it is
said
Court
protected by
process
juveniles are
from dis-
that
deviational
. . This claim
of their
behavior.
closure
reality.
secrecy,
rhetoric
more
than
Disclo-
however,
discretionary
judge
with the
court records
sure
Supreme
Pennsyl
in
Court
McKeiver
States
v.
The United
process
that
vania,
S. Ct. 1976
held
did
due
U.S.
juvenile
jury
proceedings, affirming
opin
require
in
trial
Terry
265 A.
this Court
2d 350
ion of
Supreme
say
stated:
“But one
(1970).
cannot
jury
necessary
component
system
is a
legal
accurate
our
528, 543,
91 S. Ct.
finding”.
U.S.
1985.
fact
jurisdictions. Statutory
in-
most
restrictions almost
apply
variably
only to the court
and
as
records,
even
routinely
many
those
evidence is that
courts
military,
furnish information to
FBI
and
and the
request
government agencies
private
and even to
employers.
importance
police
Of more
In
are
records.
police keep complete
juvenile
most States the
file of
‘police
complete
contacts’ and
have
discretion
departments
disclosure of
re-
records. Police
requests for
ceive
FBI
information from the
other
agencies,
law-enforcement
the Armed
and social
Forces,
agencies,
comply.
generally
service
and most
them
employers
application
pro-
Private
word their
forms
concerning
duce information
arrests and court
proceedings,
jurisdictions
some
con-
information
cerning
police
private
contacts is furnished
government
employers
agencies.”
as well as
I would therefore Branch Family Court Juvenile Division, Pleas, Common a rehearing guaranteed record for remand the 257. O’Brien in this dissent. joins Justice Mr. et Appellants. et v. Philadelphia al., al.
Walker *12 1971. Before January Argued Jones, Eagen, Pomeroy JJ. Roberts, Barbieri, O’Brien,