COMMONWEALTH оf Pennsylvania, Appellee v. CORBAN CORPORATION, d/b/a Encor Coatings, Inc., Appellant. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. William R. Condosta, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
October 23, 2008
957 A.2d 274
Submitted March 18, 2008.
Roy A. Manwaring, Bethlehem, John Michael Morganelli, for the Com. of PA.
Douglas J. Tkacik, Sara Jane Hogan, Law Offices of Douglas J. Tkacik, Bethlehem, for William R. Condosta.
Thomas Joseph Kuzma, Harrisburg, Eric G. Preputnick, for Dept. of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Worker‘s Compensation, appellee amicus curiae.
Jennifer Ann Buck, PA Office of Atty. Gen., for Attorney General‘s Office, appellee amicus curiae.
BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY and GREENSPAN, JJ.
OPINION
Justice EAKIN.
Elmer Kennedy worked for Corban Corporation as a forklift operator. In December, 2000, he sustained work-related burns to his back. He sought workers’ compensation benefits for thе injuries; however, Corban Corporation‘s workers’ compensation insurance carrier denied the claim due to a lack of insurance coverage.
As a result, on September 21, 2004, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint asserting six counts of third degree felony charges against Corban Corporation and William Condosta, a corporate officer of the company (collectively appellants), for failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance pursuant to § 305 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 The Commonwealth alleged appellants failed to maintain insurance coverage during the following periods: November 1 through November 30, 2000; December 1 through December 22, 2000; June 18 through June 30, 2002; July 1 through July 31, 2002; August 1 through August 31, 2002; and September 1 through September 9, 2002.2
Appellants filed separate omnibus pretrial motions, objecting to the criminal complaint‘s timeliness. They argued the violations occurred more than two years before the Commonwealth filed charges, and that the applicable statute of limitations was the default provisions of the Judicial Code,
The Superior Court reversed, holding the five-year statute of limitations under
We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the statute of limitations provided in
Appellants assert there is no provision in the Act setting forth a specific statute of limitations for failing to provide workers’ compensation insurance; in the absence of a specific provision, the default limitations period of § 5552 applies. Appellants maintain the five-year limitations in
“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
The Statutory Construction Act provides that headings prefixed to titles, parts, articles, chapters, sections, and other divisions of a statute shall not be considered to control the manner in which the statute is to be interpreted.
Here, the Act‘s language is free from ambiguity. Section 1039.12 specifies “[a] prosecution for an offense under this act must be commenced within five years after commission of the offense.”
A review of the language within Article XI of the Act reveals the General Assembly took great care in choosing among the words “clause,” “section,” “article,” and “act.” Cf.
We agree with the Superior Court‘s apt observation that application of the two-year limitations period would be at odds with the Act‘s three-year limitations period regarding the filing of claim petitions. Section 315 of the Act,
We find the five-year statute of limitations applies to prosecutions for an employer‘s failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance pursuant to
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justice SAYLOR and Justice GREENSPAN join the opinion.
Justice BAER files a concurring opinion in which Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY join.
Justice BAER concurring.
I fully concur with the Majority‘s conclusion that the five-year statute of limitations, set forth in § 1112 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA),
The WCA was first passed in 1915, and has since been amended many times, including an amendment in 1993, inter alia adding Article XI relating to insurance fraud, and an omnibus amendment in 1996, modifying multiple sections of the WCA, including, but not limited to, Article XI. See Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 190, No. 44; Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, No. 57 (hereinafter “Act 57“). It is uncontested, however, that until Act 57, the WCA never contained a statute of limitations. See Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, No. 57, § 27, as amended,
Appellants Corban Corporation and William Condosta‘s argument that the Act 57 five-year statute of limitations does not apply to this case centers upon the meaning of the term “this act” as used in the statute:
A prosecution for an offense under this act must be commenced within five years after commission of the offense.
Noting that the term “this act” is not defined in the WCA or anywhere else in Pennsylvania statutory law, Appellants look to the legislative context of the WCA arguing that the term “this act” in the provision was intended to establish a five-year limitations period only for insurance fraud, and was not intended to be applicable to the entirety of the WCA. They extract meaning from the General Assembly‘s numbering of the statute of limitations as § 1112 in Article XI, which relates exclusively to insurance fraud. They additionally assert that “this act” refers to “Act 57,” which included revisions to Article XI‘s insurance fraud provisions.1 It is
Moreover, Appellants observe that if the General Assembly intended the five-year provision to govern the entirety of the WCA, it could have placed the five-year limitations period in Article V of the WCA, entitled “General Provisions” rather than in Article XI, relating to “Insurance Fraud.” Appellants further assert that if the General Assembly intended the five-year limitations period to apply to the entire WCA, and not just Article XI, it could have used the term “prosecutions under the Workers’ Compensation Act,” not “prosecutions under this act.”
(a) GENERAL RULE—Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a prosecution for an offense must be commenced within two years after it is committed.
The trial court agreed with Appellants that the two-year limitations period was applicable in the instant case based on an analysis of the interplay between the Crimes Code, the Judicial Code, and other statutes outlining criminal offenses. The trial court concluded that the function of Part I of the Crimes Code is to establish norms to govern criminal proceedings. The court observed that the Crimes Code referenced the Judicial Code‘s default two-year limitations period, which applies to all offenses defined by any statute. See
While the Majority concludes that § 1112 is explicit and that “this act” plainly means the WCA, I respectfully conclude that § 1112 is unclеar on its face, but I nonetheless reject Appellants’ argument after application of the Rules of Statutory Construction. “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
Although the meaning of the term “this act” is disputable as it appears in the statute, its meaning is clear from the legislation actually passed by the General Assembly. Enacted to amend the existing WCA, Act 57 provides in relevant part: Section 27. The act is amended by adding a section to read:
Section 1112. A prosecution for an offense under this act must be commenced within five years after the commission of the offense.
Act of June 24, 1996 P.L. 350, § 27. Utilizing Appellants’ interpretation would require us to hold that the legislaturе used the term “act” in the introductory language of § 27 to refer to the WCA and then employed the same term in § 1112 to refer to Act 57. It strains common sense, however, to contend that the legislature, in an attempt to restrict the statute of limitations to insurance fraud offenses in Article XI, used the term “this act” to mean Act 57, when, in fact, Act 57 was an omnibus act amending many parts of the WCA.3 As noted above, Act 57 is not idеntical to Article XI, indeed both contain provisions not included in the other.
Moreover, as well demonstrated by the Majority, a review of other Article XI provisions amended by Act 57 reveals that the General Assembly was capable of limiting the reach of its provisions to Article XI or even specific clauses or sections when it desired. So, it employed the term “this section” to apply tо the relevant statutory section, “this article” to apply to Article XI, and “this act” to apply to Workers’ Compensation Act. See Maj. Op. at 464, 957 A.2d at 277. Thus, the best interpretation of the language used herein is that the word “act” in both § 27‘s introductory phrase and in § 1112 refers not to a chapter or section of the WCA, but to the “act” itself.4
Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY join.
Notes
Id. As discussed infra, the flaw in Appellant‘s argument is that Act 57 and Article XI are not identical. Accordingly, despite Appellant‘s argument, a reference to Act 57 does not necessarily implicate only insurаnce fraud provisions.(a)(1) Every employer liable under this act to pay compensation shall insure the payment of compensation in the State Workmen‘s Insurance Fund, or in any insurance company, or mutual association or company, authorized to insure such liability in this Commonwealth....
* * *
(b) Any employer who fails to comply with the provisions of this section for every such failure, shall, upon conviction in the court of common pleas, be guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. If the failure to comply with this seсtion is found by the court to be intentional, the employer shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree.
Act 57.further providing for definitions, for recovery, for liability for compensation, for financial responsibility, for compensation schedules and for wages; providing for reporting; further providing for notices, for examinations, for commutation of compensation, for exclusions, for the Workmen‘s Compensation Appeal Board and for procedure; providing for informal conferences; further providing for processing claims, for commutation petitions, for modifications and reversals, for pleadings, for investigations, for evidence, for appeals, for regulations, for costs and attorney fees, for the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation advisory council and for insurance policies; providing for settlements and for collective bargaining; further providing for ratings organizations, for rating procedures and for shared liability; providing for employer association groups; further providing for safety committees, for penalties, for prosecutions and for collection of penalties; providing for limitation of actions; further providing for assessments; providing for Workers’ Compensation judges and for transfer of administrative functions; transferring provisions relating to the state Workmen‘s Insurance Fund and broadening its permissible coverages; and making a repeal.