COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Nathan COOLEY, III, Appellant
No. 1588 MDA 2012
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
June 15, 2015
118 A.3d 370
Argued Oct. 8, 2014
John T. Adams, Esq., Christopher Baer Connard, Esq., Alisa Rebecca Hobart, Esq., Melissa Joy Noyes, Esq., Berks County District Attorney‘s Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
OPINION
Justice EAKIN.
This Court granted review to consider whether appellant was subject to custodial interrogation during an encounter
On June 30, 2011, while appellant was on parole following a drug conviction, his parole agent, Agent McCartin, received a voicemail from the father of appellant‘s fiancee, who stated appellant possessed and had been discharging firearms, and may have been selling drugs at his home. Agent McCartin testified he found the voicemail reliable because the caller identified himself and his relationship to appellant, and knew of appellant‘s recent approved vacation to Virginia.
On July 6, 2011, appellant went to the parole office to meet with Agent McCartin. Upon appellant‘s arrival, Agent McCartin handcuffed him and searched him for weapons, finding none. Agent McCartin informed appellant that he and other agents were going to search his home for firearms and drugs based on a “course of action[.]” N.T. Trial, 5/10/12, at 96-97. He asked appellant if contraband would be found in his home; appellant became nervous and said he was unsure what agents would discover. Another parole officer, Agent Heidlebaugh, asked him whether firearms would be found in his home; appellant admitted a gun was in a drawer under the living-room couch. The agents transported appellant, still in handcuffs, to his home.
Four parole agents, including McCartin and Heidlebaugh, conducted the search. They recovered a .40 caliber handgun from the drawer identified by appellant and an empty .22 caliber handgun case from appellant‘s bedroom. They also seized $3,200, one pound of marijuana, and plastic baggies. When confronted with the drugs, appellant admitted they
Appellant was charged with two counts each of persons not to possess firearms,
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court held Miranda warnings were not required because appellant was neither in custody nor interrogated.4 The court determined that appellant was detained at the parole office based on suspected parole violations, but was not subject to an arrest or its functional equivalent. The court primarily relied on
The Superior Court affirmed, holding Miranda warnings were not required during questioning by the parole agents because appellant‘s statements were merely part of a parole interview rather than a custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Cooley, No. 1588 MDA 2012, unpublished memorandum at 12, 83 A.3d 1060 (Pa.Super. filed August 7, 2013). The court stated Miranda warnings are only required when there is custodial interrogation, which is defined as “‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.‘” Id., at 11 (quoting Miranda, at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602). It noted custody is equivalent to “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. (citation omitted). The court reviewed various factors and found the mere fact appellant was handcuffed was insufficient to show he was arrested.
The court also determined there was no custodial interrogation because appellant “was not taken to an unfamiliar or
We granted allocatur to determine “[w]hether there was custodial interrogation, such that the failure to issue Miranda warnings violated [appellant]‘s Fifth Amendment rights, requiring suppression of statements made.” Commonwealth v. Cooley, 624 Pa. 403, 86 A.3d 230 (2014) (per curiam). In reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, our standard of review is well settled: We are bound by the suppression court‘s factual findings if supported by the record; however, we review the suppression court‘s legal rulings de novo. Commonwealth v. James, 620 Pa. 465, 69 A.3d 180, 186 (2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291, 320-21 (2011)).
Appellant contends a parole agent must issue Miranda warnings to a parolee when he is in custody and questioned about new crimes.6 He asserts his status as a parolee does not limit his Fifth Amendment rights, and he retained such rights throughout. Appellant asserts the use of restraints, coupled with the length of detention and the accusations of new crimes, further establishes he was in custody. He argues the agents’ acts constituted custodial interrogation, and there-
Appellant argues both the Superior Court and the trial court improperly relied on United States v. Randolph, 210 F.Supp.2d 586 (E.D.Pa.2002), for the proposition that “[p]arole agents in any event may without Miranda warnings question parolees.” Id., at 589 n. 3. Appellant notes Randolph is not binding on this Court and claims the statement relied on by the courts is dictum, as that case involved the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment. See id., at 589 & n. 3 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984)). Alternatively, appellant alleges Randolph actually supports the notion that Miranda warnings are required when a parolee is interrogated about new crimes.7
Appellant contends Commonwealth v. Knoble, 615 Pa. 285, 42 A.3d 976 (2012), indicated a probationer may invoke Fifth Amendment rights in response to questions about new crimes. See id., at 981-82. He asserts we opined in Knoble that statements made to probation or parole agents concerning new crimes must be suppressed if such statements were compelled by threat of probation or parole revocation. Noting we ultimately held Knoble was not in custody, appellant asserts there is custody in this case.
Appellant also claims the Superior Court erred in relying on
The Commonwealth concedes parolees and probationers do not lose Fifth Amendment rights merely because of their status, but contends appellant was not in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Commonwealth notes appellant had been on parole for 17 months without incident and was aware of the rules regarding his supervision; no weapons or other show of force was utilized, and the search was executed without undue delay. The Commonwealth contends the totality of the circumstances overcomes any inference of custody solely from the use of handcuffs.
The Commonwealth claims
The Commonwealth claims this case is similar to Murphy, which held because a probation interview is non-custodial, a probationer‘s failure to invoke the Fifth Amendment during a probation interview makes his statements admissible. See Murphy, at 429-34, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The Commonwealth notes the apparent difference between Murphy and this case—the fact appellant was handcuffed upon his arrival at the parole office—but argues such a distinction is not dispositive because:
The Fifth Amendment provides “no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]”
With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue presented. A parolee does not lose the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination merely because of convic-
An individual is in custody if he is “physically denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 556 Pa. 216, 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 (1999) (citations omitted). Regarding custody, the United States Supreme Court has further held the “ultimate inquiry is ... whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (citation omitted). The standard for determining whether an encounter is custodial is an objective one, focusing on the totality of the circumstances with due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the individual being questioned. Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143, 148 (1998) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court) (citation omitted).
In Murphy, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether “a statement made by a probationer to his probation officer without prior warnings is admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding.” Murphy, at 425, 104 S.Ct. 1136. As part of Murphy‘s probation, he was obligated to participate in a sex-offender treatment program, report to his probation officer as required, and be completely honest with the officer. Id., at 422, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The probation officer was notified that during his treatment, Murphy admitted to a previous rape and murder. Id., at 423, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The probation officer arranged a meeting with Murphy and told him about
The Supreme Court indicated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not preclude voluntary incriminatory statements, and a probationer must claim the privilege if he desires its protection; otherwise, his statement will not be considered “compelled.” Id., at 427, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943)). The Court noted “the general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in itself convert Murphy‘s otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones ... unless he invokes the privilege and shows that he faces a realistic threat of self-incrimination.” Id. The Court pointed out that while there are well-known exceptions to this general rule, such exceptions contain “some identifiable factor ... deny[ing] the individual a ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.‘” Id., at 429, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976)).
The Court concluded Murphy‘s meeting with his probation officer did not amount to custody for Miranda purposes, as there was no formal arrest or its functional equivalent. Id., at 429-30, 104 S.Ct. 1136. In finding no custody, the Court “emphasize[d] that Murphy was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at the end of the meeting[,]” and opined that “[a] different question would be presented if he had been interviewed by his probation officer while being held in police custody or by the police themselves in a custodial setting.” Id., at 429 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 1136. As Murphy was not in custody and did not assert the privilege, the Court held his incriminating statements were admissible. Id., at 440, 104 S.Ct. 1136.
This Court addressed a factually similar case in Knoble. Knoble was on probation and was required to complete a sex-offender program, but was terminated from the program for
The trial court and the Superior Court relied on Randolph in holding a parole interview is not the equivalent of custodial interrogation, such that agents may question parolees without Miranda warnings. Cooley, at 12 (citing Randolph, at 589 n. 3); Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/12, at 11 (same); Suppression Court Opinion, 3/26/12, at 5 (same). The opinion in Randolph only dealt with the Fourth Amendment and a motion to suppress physical evidence; the opinion noted “[a]t the oral argument today, Randolph withdrew his request to suppress statements[.]” See Randolph, at 588 & 589 n. 3. Yet, after determining the Fifth Amendment was not at issue, the court further opined that “[p]arole agents in any event may without Miranda warnings question parolees.” Id. In support of its determination, the court quoted a footnote from Murphy:
“Just as there is no right to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination available to a probationer. It follows that whether or not the answer to a question about a residential requirement is compelled by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used in revocation proceedings. Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding[] and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.”
Id. (quoting Murphy, at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136).
This quotation concerned the Supreme Court‘s inquiry whether a probationer‘s failure to assert his privilege against self-incrimination would be excused when a probation officer “either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation[.]” Murphy, at 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The footnote pertained to the use of a probationer‘s statements in revocation proceedings and addressed whether Murphy was deterred from asserting the privilege by a reasonably perceived threat of probation revocation. See id., at 435 & n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136; see also Randolph, at 589 n. 3.
Appellant‘s challenges to application of Randolph are well taken. The case is not binding precedent, the language was dictum, and the Fifth Amendment was not at issue there. Further, Randolph involved a threat of parole revocation, which is not present here. Thus, we find that both the trial court‘s and the Superior Court‘s reliance on Randolph was misplaced.
While Murphy and Knoble are factually distinguishable because neither involved actual custody, we find portions of Murphy‘s reasoning particularly instructive. The Murphy Court “emphasize[d] that Murphy was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at the end of the [probation] meeting[,]” and it noted “[a] different question would be presented if he had been interviewed by his probation officer
A state may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.
Id., at 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (emphasis added).
The Murphy Court also addressed the difference between custodial interrogation and a routine probation interview, determining a probationer must invoke his privilege against self-incrimination when questioned during the latter, as the privilege is not self-executing, and a probation requirement to appear at the meeting and be completely honest does not violate a probationer‘s Fifth Amendment rights. See id., at 429-37, 104 S.Ct. 1136. The Supreme Court noted a prearranged probation meeting in an atmosphere familiar to the probationer does not involve the psychological ploys of custodial arrest. Id., at 433, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (citing Miranda, at 456-57, 86 S.Ct. 1602). The Court determined “Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the office,” and any compulsion he may have perceived from ending the probation meeting “was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.” Id.
It is beyond cavil that no mere parole interview took place here. Appellant had been on parole for 17 months without incident, and just returned from an approved out-of-state vacation. There is no evidence any prior meeting involved handcuffing, but appellant was immediately restrained upon arrival. This may be understandable and legal, but that
After handcuffing, appellant was searched; nothing was found. There is no evidence the agents felt threatened after that, but the restraints were not removed. No one told appellant he was not under arrest or that he was restrained pursuant to routine policy. Instead, the parole agents stated he was being investigated for new crimes; their interrogation and search was unquestionably aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole. At that point, the parole agents’ conduct was the functional equivalent of that of police officers.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find a reasonable parolee would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave the parole office.11 Therefore, we hold appellant was subject to custodial interrogation, and because the privilege was self-executing, the parole agents’ failure to administer Miranda warnings violated appellant‘s Fifth Amendment
In determining whether this error requires the grant of a new trial, we must consider whether the error was harmless. Appellant claims the admission of his incriminating statements substantially prejudiced him because an essential element of his crimes was possession, and his statements identified the location of the firearms and admitted possession of the firearms and drugs. “An error is harmless if it could not have contributed to the verdict. In other words, an error cannot be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility the error might have contributed to the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 961 A.2d 119, 143 (2008) (citation omitted). It is the Commonwealth‘s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Id. (citation omitted). The Commonwealth does not argue the physical evidence was sufficient to support the convictions or that the verdict would be the same if appellant‘s statements were suppressed. The Commonwealth makes no argument concerning harmless error; thus, it has failed to meet its burden. For these reasons, we find this error was not harmless, as we cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict.
In sum, we hold appellant was subject to custodial interrogation such that his parole agents’ failure to issue Miranda warnings violated his Fifth Amendment rights, the courts
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Former Chief Justice CASTILLE and former Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the decision of this case.
Chief Justice SAYLOR, Justice BAER and Justice TODD join the opinion.
Justice STEVENS files a dissenting opinion.
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
I differ with the majority‘s conclusion that the use of handcuffs transformed Appellant‘s interaction with parole agents at his pre-arranged meeting into the functional equivalent of an arrest for Miranda1 purposes, and thus, I respectfully dissent.
Preliminarily, as the majority acknowledges, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of Fifth Amendment application to probationers in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). As part of his probation, Murphy was required to, inter alia, participate in a sex offender treatment program, report to his probation officer as required, and honestly answer questions posed to him by his probation officer. Id., at 422, 104 S.Ct. 1136. At some point, the probation officer was advised that during a counseling treatment session, Murphy admitted to committing a previous rape and murder. Id., at 423, 104 S.Ct.
In analyzing whether, in the absence of Miranda warnings, Murphy‘s statements to the probation officer were admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court relevantly concluded Murphy was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Id., at 430, 104 S.Ct. 1136.
In so holding, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to discuss why Murphy (a probationer who attended a prearranged meeting with his probation officer) was not in custody. Specifically, the Supreme Court emphasized that:
Not only is custodial interrogation ordinarily conducted by officers who are ‘acutely aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought,’ ... but also the custodial setting is thought to contain ‘inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual‘s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.’ To dissipate ‘the overbearing compulsion ... caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody,’ the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect falls to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the consequences of his failure to assert it. We have consistently held, however, that this extraordinary safeguard ‘does not apply outside the context of the inher-
ently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed.’ *
*
*
Even a cursory comparison of custodial interrogation and probation interviews reveals the inaptness of the Minnesota Supreme Court‘s analogy to Miranda. Custodial arrest is said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the officers’ will and to confess. It is unlikely that a probation interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time, would give rise to a similar impression. Moreover, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into ‘an unfamiliar atmosphere’ or ‘an interrogation environment ... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.’ Many of the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the suspect‘s unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment.
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-433, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quotations and citations omitted).
Thus, the Supreme Court pointed to the following factors in rejecting the claim Murphy was in custody: (1) Murphy‘s regular meetings with his probation officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation that might overbear his desire to claim the privilege; (2) the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation deriving in large part from an interrogator‘s insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained was lacking; and (3) Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the office such that any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator. Id., at 433, 104 S.Ct. 1136.
In distinguishing Murphy from the instant case, and thus concluding Appellant was in custody when he was handcuffed at the parole office, the majority concludes “no mere parole
Additionally, the majority points to the fact Appellant was handcuffed at the parole office. Majority Opinion at 134-35, 118 A.3d at 378-79. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority that the parole agent‘s use of handcuffs removed the instant parole interview out of the realm of Murphy and transformed it into the functional equivalent of an arrest for which Miranda safeguards were warranted. This Court has held that the use of handcuffs on an individual is not dispositive of whether the individual is in custody, and as indicated supra, in Murphy the absence of handcuffs was just one factor considered by the Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 247 n. 2, 643 A.2d 61, 68 n. 2 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005 (1995).
In the instant case, Appellant voluntarily arrived for a prearranged meeting at the parole office, where had had been on many occasions. He met with the parole agent, who had been supervising Appellant for approximately eighteen months. The supervision of Appellant during this time period included, inter alia, urine screens, office visits, and searches of Appellant‘s approved residence. Appellant had been on parole for this period without incident and had recently returned from an out-of-state travel pass. Upon arriving at the parole office, the agent handcuffed Appellant, told him he had received information Appellant was in possession of firearms, and informed Appellant his approved residence would be searched. When asked if firearms would be found in his home, Appellant admitted there was a gun in a drawer under the living-room couch.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, I find Appellant was not in custody at the parole office. Similar to the
Notes
(d) Grounds for personal search of offender.—
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(5) The offender may be detained if he is present during a property search. If the offender is not present during a property search, the agent in charge of the search shall make a reasonable effort to provide the offender with notice of the search, including a list of the items seized, after the search is completed.
Id.,