71 Ky. 220 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1871
delivered the opinion oe the court.
At the February term, 1868, of the Franlrlin Circuit Court, upon'a proceeding by motion, the commonwealth recovered a judgment against James B. Cook, sheriff of Trimble County, and the sureties on the bond executed by him, for the collection of the state revenue due from the tax-payers of that county for the year 1867, for the sum of $4,004.41, with interest, and also a further judgment for twenty per centum damages, as allowed by law in such cases. An execution was sued out on this judgment on the 5th of November, 1868, and placed in the hands of .the sheriff of Henry County for collection; and a levy having been made upon the lands of Cook’s sureties, they instituted this suit to enjoin further proceedings under the execution, basing their right to the relief sought upon these two grounds:
First, that Cook, their principal, failed to execute his official bond as sheriff, and to take the oath of office within a month after the time his election ought to have taken effect, as required by section 12, chapter 71, of the Revised Statutes; and that by reason of such failure he vacated his office, and rendered himself ineligible thereto for two years next thereafter, and hence that the County Court of Trimble County had no power to permit him to qualify as sheriff at the time
The second ground is that the lands taken under the execution are exempt from levy and sale under, the provisions of an act of the General Assembly, approved February 10, 1866, and generally known as the “Homestead Law.”
The attorney-general demurred specially to each paragraph of the petition. His demurrer was sustained as to the first and overruled as to the second paragraph. The appellees failing to amend, judgment was rendered in conformity with the principles indicated by the court in its action upon the demurrers. From this judgment the commonwealth has appealed, and the sureties have prosecuted a cross-appeal.
The petition alleges that Cook’s election as sheriff ought to have gone into effect on the first Monday in January, 1867, and that he did not qualify and execute his official bond until the 11th of February, more than one month thereafter. It does not state that he was elected at the regular August election, 1866; nor does it mention the date of his election at all; nor is there any light thrown upon this question by the order of the county court, made an exhibit by the petition. This order merely recites that on the 11th of February, 1867, “James B. Cook produced his certificate of election as sheriff of Trimble County, and moved the court to permit him' to enter into bond and qualify as such.” No' such state of facts is set out by the petition as will necessarily imply that he was elected at such time as rendered it necessary that he should execute his bond, and take the oath of office as early as the
The question raised by the demurrer to the second paragraph of the petition is one upon which there has been no adjudication by this court, and we confess that we have been unable to find a decision by any English or American court upon a proposition exactly analogous. If the contract or undertaking upon which the judgment was rendered had been executed to any individual or private corporation, there could be no doubt entertained but that a court of equity would interfere to prevent the sale in satisfaction of such judgment of property exempt from levy and sale under the provisions of the “homestead law.” But in this case the undertaking is to the commonwealth, and to secure the payment of the public revenues. As the government of the state is established for the good of the whole, and can only be supported by means of its revenues, courts in the construction of
“In Bacon’s Abridgment, title ‘Prerogative,’ 3-5, it is said that the general rule is that where an act of parliament is made for the public good, the advancement of religion and justice, and to prevent injury and wrong, the king shall be bound by such an act, though not particularly named therein. But where a statute is general, and thereby any prerogative," right, title, or interest is divested or taken from the king, he shall not be bound unless the statute is made by express words to extend to him.........The doctrine that the government should not unless named be bound by an act of limitation is in accordance with that just cited from Bacon, because if bound it would be barred of a right; and in all such cases is not to be construed to be embraced unless named, or what would be equivalent, unless the language is such as to
The first section of the homestead act under which the exemptions in this case are claimed provides “ that in addition to the personal property now exempt from execution on all debts and liabilities created or incurred after the 1st day of June, 1866, there shall be exempt from sale under execution, attachment, or judgment of any court, except to foreclose a mortgage given by the owner of a homestead, or for purchase-money due therefor, so much land, including the dwelling-house and appurtenances owned by the debtor, as shall not exceed in value one thousand dollars.” This section, which is the only one in the act relating to the exemption, is general in its application, and is evidently intended to operate in transactions between individuals, and it nowhere refers directly or indirectly to the state. It is insisted, however, by the learned counsel representing the appellees that the act regulates proceedings under writs of execution, and prescribes that certain property shall not be taken and sold under the same; that no exemption is made in favor of the state; and that if she chooses to resort to this writ, she must take it with all the limitations and restrictions imposed upon it by law when issued upon judgments in favor of individuals. But the act applies as well to property sought to be sold under attachment and judgments of courts as to that taken under execution; and if it applies to the state at all, the exemption is as comprehensive as to an individual, no matter what character of proceeding she may select.
Nor can the- act be made to apply to the state by impli
This extraordinary right is peculiar to the state; no other creditor has it. In other personal judgments the lien exists only by virtue of an execution in full force, or of a levy made thereunder; but the lien in favor of the commonwealth attaches to the estate, both legal and equitable, of all the defendants, and binds it from the beginning of the suit till the judgment is satisfied. It binds all their estate except such as is exempted from the payment of debts by some provision of the Revised Statutes enacted contemporaneously with the section under consideration. (Harlan v. Lumsden, 1 Duvall, 88.)
Public policy seems to require that this exceptional right shall continue to exist, in order that the public revenues may be speedily and certainly collected. And as we perceive nothing in the "homestead law” necessarily indicating an intention upon the part of the General Assembly to divest the commonwealth of a right so important and so long enjoyed, we do not feel that we are warranted in so construing said law as to make it operate as a repeal of a statute to which it does not allude either directly or incidentally, and with which it can not be said, when properly considered, to conflict. We have been referred to the case of Doe ex dem Gladney and another v. Deavors (11 Georgia Reports, 81) as bearing upon this case and militating against the foregoing conclusions.
We therefore conclude that the circuit court erred in overruling the demurrer to the second paragraph to the appellees’
The cause is remanded, with instructions to dismiss the petition and dissolve the injunction.