Lead Opinion
OPINION BY
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the order entered by the Honorable Bradley P. Lunsford, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Pennsylvania, granting Appellee’s Omnibus Pre-trial Motion to Suppress Evidence. At issue is whether a police officer’s safety check of passengers in a vehicle parked legally, after sundown, at a roadside location constitutes a mere encounter or an investigative detention. We find that given the totality of the circumstances, there was a mere encounter. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 On February 22, 2006, Trooper Joshua Walton of the Pennsylvania State Police filed a criminal complaint charging Appel-lee with one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
¶ 3 This Court must review whether the suppression court erroneously determined Appellee’s interaction with the Trooper was an investigative detention, unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
¶ 4 Trooper Walton, of the Pennsylvania State Police Rockview Station, testified on direct examination that he was on routine patrol on February 13, 2006, and at the time, he was with the State Police for approximately nine months. He was traveling southbound on State Route 150, at 7:00 p.m., and observed a vehicle parked at the Bald Eagle State Park overlook. Trooper Wаlton testified that he “always stops for vehicles parked along the roadway.” N.T. 7/11/06 at 4. His reasoning was to “stop and see if they’re all right.” N.T. 7/11/06 at 4.
¶ 5 Trooper Walton explained that the vehicle was not moving when he first saw it, and the vehicle did not attempt to move as he approached. He further noted that he parked his car to the right of the vehicle, and his headlights were shining into the passenger compartment of the vehiсle but he did not block the vehicle from leaving. Trooper Walton testified that he first spoke with the front seat passenger of the vehicle, Appellee, and the Trooper noticed a bong
¶ 6 Trooper Walton used his flashlight when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle because his body blocked the fight from his patrol car’s headlights. After the approach, Trooper Walton returned to his patrol car, turned on the in-car camera and called for backup.
¶ 7 On cross-examination, Troоper Walton testified that the vehicle was parked overlooking the lake, that is, where people park when they chose to park at the overlook and that he has previously seen people parked there. Trooper Walton stated on the record that his reason for approaching this vehicle was because it was too close to the street, he thought it was broken down, and he does not usually see vehicles parked at the overlook after dark. N.T. 9. Trooper Walton testified there is nothing wrong with parking at that particular location after dark. Moreover, he stated the vehicle was not parked in any unusual manner, and no parking violations were present.
¶ 8 Trooper Walton testified that it did not appear to him that there was any outward sign of distress from the occupants of the vehicle and that he did not observe anything that led him to believe that there was something illegal going on at that particular time.
¶ 9 When asked if it is more common to approach the driver of the vehicle first, Trooper Walton replied that no, it was not, and that he routinely approaches the passenger side, especially during traffic stops. He stated that was his practice and that the passenger side in this case was the closеst side to him. Trooper Walton testified that the car window was rolled up when he first approached the vehicle and then, simultaneously as he walked up to the vehicle, Appellee rolled down the window. The interior lights in the subject car were off. When asked about the dialogue between the Trooper and the occupants, Trooper Walton stated that he walked up to the vehicle, asked if everything was okаy, and in response, Appellee blurted out that the occupants had been smoking marijuana. Not until his question was answered did he discover the occupants’ activities and see the bong resting between the car seats. Trooper Walton also stated that he did not see any signs that the occupants were scrambling around trying to get away because a trooper was approaching them. Trooper Wal
In reviewing a Commonwealth appeal from a suppression order: we follow a clearly defined standard of review and cоnsider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted.... The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings.
Commonwealth v. DeHart,
¶ 10 There are three categories of police interactions which classify the level of intensity in which a police officer interacts with a citizen, and such are measured on a case by case basis.
Traditionally, this Court has recognized three categories of encounters between citizens and the police. These categories include (1) a mere encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and (3) custodial detentions. The first of these, a “mere encounter” (or request for information), which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Mendenhall,
¶ 11 The question of law before us is whether the initial interaction between Trooper Walton and Appellee was a mere encounter or an investigative detention. We believe the situation was a classic example of the former.
To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person involved. To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he*1047 or she was not free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry must be whether, considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would have thought he was being restrained had he been in the defendant’s shoes.
Commonwealth v. Reppert,
¶ 12 In the case sub judice, a reasonable person in Appellee’s pоsition would be free to terminate the encounter. The record indicates for example, that Trooper Walton parked twenty feet away from the rear of the vehicle. N.T. 7/11/06 at 15. The record does not indicate that the overhead lights where turned on in the patrol car.
¶ 13 “Because the level of intrusion into a person’s liberty may change during the course of the encounter, we must carefully scrutinize the record for any evidence of such changes.” Commonwealth v. Blair,
¶ 14 We find in the case sub judice that a reasonable person would have interpreted Trooper Walton’s actions as an act of official assistance and not an investigative detention.
Indeed, our expectation as a society is that a police officer’s duty to serve and protect the community he or she patrols extends beyond enforcement of the Crimes Code or Motor Vehicle Code and includes helping citizens.... Given this*1048 expectation, a citizen whose vehicle sits apparently disabled along a highway would justifiably experience disbelief or even outrage if a law enforcement officer not otherwise engaged in official response drove by without pulling over and offering assistance.
Commonwealth v. Conte,
¶ 15 Reversed; Remanded; Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 311(d) wherein the Commonwealth certified in its Notice of Appeal that the trial court's July 11, 2006, Order terminated or substantially handicapped the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth v. D.S.,
.The lower court took judicial notice that a bong is a type of water pipe used for smoking marijuana.
. The plain view doctrine permits the war-rantless seizure of an object in plain view when: (1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object. Commonwealth v. McCree,
. It is evident from the facts presented that once the dialogue between Trooper Walton and Appellee occurred, whеrein Appellee blurted out that he was smoking marijuana, the mere encounter rose to the level of an investigative detention, which was supported by reasonable suspicion.
. Notably, circumstances to consider include but are not limited to, the following: the number of officers present during the interaction; whether the officer informs the citizen they are suspected of criminal activity; the officer’s demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing of the interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; and the questions asked. Otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. Commonwealth v. Beasley,
. Relevant case law from this Court has held that even in situations where a patrol vehicle’s overhead lights were оn when a State Trooper approached a parked vehicle the interaction between the occupant and the trooper was a mere encounter. See Commonwealth v. Conte,
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
¶ 1 Our standard of review in cases where the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order is to ascertain whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court and then to determine whether the suppressiоn court’s inferences and legal conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable. Commonwealth v. Tucker,
¶ 2 The majority correctly identifies the issue before us as the classificatiоn of the initial interaction between Trooper Walton and the Appellee Christopher Collins (“Collins”) as either a mere encounter or an investigative detention
¶ 3 Trooper Walton testified that he had no information to suggest that there was any illegal activity occurring in the vehicle in which Collins was a passenger. N.T., 7/11/06, at 11. To the contrary, the vehicle was merely parked at a scenic overlook specifically designed for such use. N.T., 7/11/06, at 9. It was not damaged or in disrepair, and it was not parked unusually, illegally, or on a roadway. N.T., 7/11/06, at 10-11. Trooper Walton positioned his vehicle so that his headlights would shine directly into the passenger compartment of
¶4 Based on these faсts, and as the suppression court found, a reasonable person in Collins’ position would not, as the majority’s concludes, have considered himself “free to terminate the encounter.” Trooper Walton, in uniform, got out of a marked vehicle and, while shining multiple lights into the passenger compartment, began asking Collins questions. A reasonable person would not think that he/she was free to simply ignore the trooper and to insteаd back out of the parking space and leave. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mulholland,
¶ 5 The majority likewise lacks any support in the evidentiary record for its conclusion that a reasonable person “would have interpreted Trooper Walton’s actions as an act of official assistance and not an investigative detention”. Trooper Walton freely admitted that he did not observe anything to indicate that the car in which Collins was a passenger was in any distress or disrepair, or that its occupants otherwise required any assistance. N.T., 7/11/06, at 10-11. As such, the majority’s rebanee on Judge Stevens’ prior opinion in Commonwealth v. Conte,
¶ 6 In other cases, this Court has routinely held that a police approach to a vehicle to lend assistance may form the basis for a “mere encounter” only where the occupants of the vehicle would reasonably expect the officer to be rendering assistance. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller,
¶ 7 The issue in this case is not whether police officers should be allowed to lend assistance to the occupants of parked vehicles or people in general. Such safety checks are laudable and appropriate. Instead, the issue here is whether evidence of crimes must be suppressed when pobce encounters with citizens proceed without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As a result, I would affirm the well-researched and eminently reasonable decision of the suppression court below.
. I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s unnecessary discussion of the much debated "limited automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of Art. I § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Indeed, the Majority’s disputable interpretation of the status of the law in Pennsylvania concerning warrantless seizures of articles from motor vehicles in general and the "lawful right of access” prong of the analysis in particular is entirely gratuitous. The sole issue on appeal is “[whether] the lower court err[ed] in finding that the officer did not have the requisite suspicion necessary to approach Appellee's vehicle and ask to speak to the occupants.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Given the ongoing debate in our Supreme Court on the proper application of the plain view doctrine to automobile searches and seizures, see Commonwealth v. McCree,