56 Pa. Super. 427 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1914
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The indictment charged Henry Clay, John R. Wiggins, Willard H. Walls and Carl Zilenziger with conspiracy to cheat and defraud the city of Philadelphia, and with having, in pursuance of such conspiracy, been
Having carefully examined the voluminous evidence we are convinced that the facts which it discloses are fairly stated by Judge Staples, in his opinion discharging the rulé for a new trial, which will appear in the report of this case, and it is unnecessary that we re-state the facts at length. The most flagrant instance of imposition upon the city disclosed by the evidence arose out of the manner in which the contracts for the erection of the police station, fire station and garage at Third and Race streets were manipulated. The original plans and specifications for that work had been prepared by Mr. Powell, the former city architect, whose health had failed and he had nothing to do with the awarding of these contracts. Those plans and specifications contemplated the erection of the fire station fronting on Race street. The city officers advertised for bids for the erection of the buildings according to those plans and specifications, and in response received three bids,
Within a very few days after this contract had been signed by the mayor of the city and Wiggins & Company, Mr. Clay announced his intention of changing the plans for thé erection of the buildings, so as to shift the garage to the Race street front and locate the fire station at the other end of the lot, fronting on Florist street. The location of the police station, which was the
The first contract provided for the erection of the buildings under expensive specifications and it was awarded to Wiggins & Company upon their bid at the sum of $107,800. The second contract, which ostensibly provided for additions to the work already commenced cheapened the specifications for the entire group of buildings, and this contract was awarded to Wiggins & Company, that corporation being the only bidder, at the sum of $13,890. The first contract, if the proper specifications had been attached, provided for everything in connection with the construction of the three buildings. The second contract also provided for everything in connection with the construction of the three buildings, but substituted other and cheaper materials for those which under the first contract Wiggins & Company would have been required to furnish, and omitted entirely some of the work required by the first contract. Owing to the manner in which the second contract was let, being for additions and alterations to a building for the erection of which Wiggins & Company then had a contract, that corporation had a manifest advantage over
The contracts for the alteration of and additions to truck house No. 5, at Sixteenth and Catherine streets were manipulated in the same manner. After the first contract had been awarded to 'Wiggins & Company it was determined to move back the front wall of the building a distance of five feet, and within a few days after the first contract had been awarded, Mr. Clay advertised for proposals for certain additional alterations at Sixteenth and Catherine streets “to work already underway.” The specifications for this second contract provided not merely for the moving back of the front wall, but in themselves provided for all the alterations which were to be made in the building, and cheapened the work required to be done, some work provided for under the first contract being entirely omitted. The situation thus created made it impossible for any contractor other than Wiggins & Company to bid upon the second contract and it was awarded to that corporation upon its bid. In this instance also a third contract was awarded to Wiggins & Company, on November 1, 1910, for work the greater part of which had been provided for by the specifications of the first contract, but had been omitted from the cheaper specifications of the sec
The testimony clearly established that the amounts paid to Wiggins & Company, and received by Mr. Wiggins and Mr. Walls as officers of that corporation, upon each of these several contracts were grossly excessive. The evidence warranted a finding that when the first contracts for the buildings at Third and Race streets and at Sixteenth and Catherine streets were awarded, that it was not the intention of these defendants that those buildings should be erected and constructed according to the plans and specifications upon which the bidding had taken place, that it was then the intention of the parties that supplemental contracts should be let and new specifications provided, which would be very advantageous to Wiggins & Company who secured the first contract and greatly cheapen the cost of construction; that it was the intention of the parties that Wiggins & Company, through this manipulation of the contracts, should collect from the city of Philadelphia a grossly excessive price, and that the city was defrauded in pursuance of a corrupt combination to which all the defendants were parties. It is, of course, possible that the city officers may have been merely negligent and incompetent, but in view of the number of the blunders involved the court could not declare as matter of law that those officers had been merely negligent or incompetent. The learned judge was, therefore, clearly right in refusing the prayer of each of the defendants that the jury be instructed that they, Respectively, must be ac
The burden was upon the commonwealth in this case to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that there had been a conspiracy, a confederation for the purpose of defrauding the city, between two or more of the defendants or some one of them and a person or persons not named. It was not necessary to prove by direct evidence when and where the corrupt agreement had been made, nor the terms thereof, nor by whom it was originated. The case may be made out by proof of such circumstances and such acts of the several parties as to logically lead the jury to the conclusion that the conduct of the defendants could be rationally explained only on the theory of the existence, however formed, in the minds of the parties of a common, unlawful design, entertained and understood by all of them, in pursuance of a corrupt confederation to defraud; in short, a conspiracy as charged in the indictment: Com. v. Sanderson, 40 Pa. Superior Ct. 416, 473; Com. v. Snyder, 40 Pa. Superior Ct. 485, 523. When the evidence is of this character the inference of conspiracy is permissible, but that inference is to be drawn by the jury, when satisfied of its correctness beyond a reasonable doubt: Com. v. Beard, 48 Pa. Superior Ct. 319, 340. There is no such thing as an inadvertent and negligent conspiracy; there must be intended unity of purpose: Com. v. Tilly, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 35. The charge of the court to the jury in the present case was in most particulars correct and many of the assignments of error are without merit. When, however, the learned judge proceeded to instruct the jury as to the legal principles applicable, under the evidence, to the case of each of the individual defendants, respectively, he failed to discriminate between the functions of the court and those of the jury, and thus fell into error.
The learned judge charged the jury, in that part of the charge embraced by the twenty-first specification of
The court fell into the same error in those parts of the charge which dealt with the cases of Walls and Wiggins, respectively. The learned judge said referring to the defendant Walls, in that part of the charge which is the subject of the twenty-eighth specification of error: “Did he know? You remember his testimony, gentlemen of the jury. He said seeing the second contract and thinking no one else would bid upon it, they gave a flyer, they.did not make an estimate of what it was actually or reasonably worth to do this work; they gave a flyer; they took it on the jump. Did he know? Do you believe he knew? If he took any money from the city of Philadelphia, knowing that his firm had taken an unfair advantage, we say to you, gentlemen of the jury, that he was guilty of conspiracy to cheat and defraud, if you find that any other person had entered into this arrangement with him.” This instruction left entirely out of view, so far as Walls was concerned, any question of the good faith of the city officers in the awarding of the first and second contracts. The jury
The court permitted the commonwealth to prove that during a period of about four years prior to the finding of the indictment the defendant Clay, as director of the department of public safety, had awarded to the corporation of John R. Wiggins & Company forty-two contracts for the construction of buildings, while only fifteen of such contracts had during the same period been awarded to other parties. The fifty-fourth specification of error is founded upon an exception taken to the' admission of this evidence. The witness who testified to these facts had been called by the. commonwealth and cross-examined by the defendants, and upon such cross-
The sixty-third specification of error is not sustained by an exception taken in the court below and must be dismissed. The remaining specifications of error refer to the action of the court in the proceedings upon the motion of the defendants for a new trial. One of the reasons assigned for a new trial was the reading, during the trial, by the jurors of newspapers which contained accounts of and comments upon the proceedings prejudicial to the defense. In support of this reason the defendant Henry Clay filed an affidavit and petition to which were attached copies of the newspaper articles complained of and which the affidavit alleged had been read by the jurors. Some of these articles contained attacks upon certain individual members of the jury and alleged that those particular jurors were friends of the defendant Clay, and if the defendants, when they
The defendants urged as another reason for a new trial that certain of the jurors had been guilty of misconduct during the course of the trial. The affidavit of Mr. Clay stated that the commonwealth had employed detectives to shadow the individual jurors and that the reports of such detectives, in possession of the district attorney, showed that one juror not only talked to the detectives during the course of the trial, but on the fifth day of the trial, two weeks before the closing of the
The defendants having entered a rule to take depositions in support of their motion and reasons for a new trial, the district attorney moved to vacate that rule. The court upon hearing this motion made the following order: “Under the rule heretofore taken by the defendants, they are hereby permitted to take the depositions of witnesses in support of a motion for a new trial, but no juror may be examined as one of such witnesses. To this extent the rule heretofore entered by the defendants is modified.” The defendants, under the rule as modified, called as witnesses, before a notary public agreed upon between counsel for the commonwealth and the defendants, Robert D. Cameron, captain of detectives, and James Tate, Junior, lieutenant of detectives. These witnesses, respectively, after having stated their official position, were among other questions asked: “What were the names of the detectives or special officers that were assigned by your department, to watch the jurors?” Each of the witnesses, after having been told by the district attorney that he could not be required to answer any question, declined to answer this question, or to give any information whatever as to the names of the detectives who had shadowed the members of the jury during the trial. The defendant Walls thereupon presented to the court his petition, praying the court to order and direct said witnesses to answer the questions
The judgments against the several defendants Henry Clay, John R. Wiggins and Willard H. Walls are reversed, and a new venire is ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
With all due respect for the action of the majority of this court, I am unable to assent to the soundness of the conclusion reached. I therefore deem it my duty to at least indicate the reasons that impel me to dissent. The judgment of the learned court below is reversed and a new trial ordered because of (a) certain portions of the charge of the trial judge declared to be harmful misstatements of the law; (b) the admission, against the objections of' the defendants, of an item of evidence, which, it is held, should have been rejected.
I am in entire harmony with the conclusion, so clearly demonstrated by the majority opinion, that there was evidence to warrant findings by the jury that the city
The opening portions of the charge were devoted to an explanation of the offense of conspiracy generally. Carefully, accurately and in language not easily misunderstood, the learned judge laid before the jury the nature and essential ingredients of the crime as well as the quality and character of the evidence which must be produced to warrant a finding that the defendants or some of them had entered into a conspiracy. They were pointedly told that no man, acting alone, could be guilty of that offense no matter how criminal in other respects his acts might be. They were instructed that no amount of blundering, incompetence or neglect of duty merely, would support a verdict of guilty. In a word, in these and like aspects of the case the general instructions to the jury furnish no ground for just criticism.
The trial judge then proceeded to take up the case of each defendant separately. He drew the attention of the jury to the evidence tending to prove the acts done by that particular person and the manner in which they should be considered by the jfiry in the light of the respective contentions of the Commonwealth and
In dealing with the case of the defendant, Clay, the trial judge, after placing before the jury the various considerations urged by the defense., to convince them the acts of the defendant were innocent; and then stating the contention of the commonwealth, used the language 'quoted in the majority opinion sustaining the twenty-first specification of error.
From the use of the language quoted the opinion predicates this conclusion, viz.: “Under this instruction the jury must have understood that it was their duty to find a verdict of guilty, as to Clay, if they were satisfied of the following facts, without more, viz.: that Clay had discovered, before the last money was paid upon any one of the contracts, that he had been deceived by his subordinate, the city architect; that the city was being cheated and defrauded, and that, after the discovery he, Clay, took no steps to prevent the payment of the last money upon the contract.” Why “must the jury have understood” that this was their duty? Is the conclusion as sound as its expression is forcible? Even if the utterance complained of be read in the light only of what had been just previously said respecting the defense advanced by that defendant, ignoring all that had been so clearly explained in the earlier portions of the charge, its just interpretation seems to me to be widely different from that accorded to it. It was but another way of saying that if the jury attached to the evidence referred to the significance ascribed to it by the commonwealth, the defense set up for this defendant, adverted to already and by the trial judge,
Still further, the record shows that the trial judge affirmed a series of prayers. for special instructions presented by counsel for defendants. They covered almost every material phase of the case. .They again and finally directed the attention of the jury to the same considerations laid before them in the earlier portions of the charge. Adopting the language of defendant’s counsel the judge again told the jury that no defendant could be convicted unless they could find he had entered into a combination or agreement with others to cheat and defraud the city. That the receipt by some of the defendants of “excessive, even unwarranted profits,” would not support a verdict of guilty, unless there was a previous combination to bring about that result. In the light of these instructions, general and special, I am wholly unable to agree that th'e trial, judge misled the jury to the conclusion stated in the majority opinion. I would dismiss all of the assignments of error complaining of the charge to the jury.
I would also dismiss the fifty-fourth specification of error sustained by the majority opinion. John R. Wig-gens, defended largely on the ground that he signed the contracts simply as the executive officer of his firm
But the commonwealth, as I view it, clearly had the right to offer evidence that would tend to weaken or break down that line of defense. It was permitted to prove, that the defendant had been awarded most of the city contracts within the past two years. Why was that fact irrelevant? It at once showed this particular defendant was no novice in city contracts and was not likely to be ignorant of anything materially affecting such a large branch of his business. But it is said the evidence failed to show any taint of wrongdoing in these past and completed contracts and presumably they were lawfully awarded. I grant it. All the more likely then would the unusual and illegal features of the contracts here involved have invited the attention of the experienced contractor who was to profit so largely because of them. The evidence objected to was therefore, as I think, clearly competent and if so it is not important to discuss or consider the particular reasons urged to persuade the trial judge to receive it.
There remain the assignments of error complaining of the manner in which the court in banc disposed of the motion for a new trial. They rest on matters outside the record of the trial. They have been fully discussed in the majority opinion. As the case must be tried again I have no desire to express my own views further than to say that I think the defendants should have been permitted to have the sworn testimony of those who had made reports to the district attorney concerning the conduct of the jurors during the trial. That testimony would furnish a more satisfactory basis for action by the court below and for the review of that
If I could control the disposition of this case I would hold that the record discloses no reversible trial errors; that the verdict was supported by the evidence, but that the motion for a new trial was not properly disposed of.
I would set aside the sentence; reinstate the motion for a new trial and remit the record to the court below with direction to hear the evidence which the learned district attorney felt his duty required him to suppress, and then dispose of the motion.
President Judge R,ice joins in this dissent.
For concurring opinion in this case sec 57 Pa. Superior Ct. 128.