14 Pa. Super. 435 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1900
Opinion by
The 1st section of the Act of June 4, 1897, P. L. 116, provides as follows: “ That if any officer, agent or employee of any corporation chartered under the laws of the commonwealth, or any foreign corporation doing business in this commonwealth, (shall coerce or attempt to coerce any employee of such corporation by discharging them or threatening to discharge them from employment of such corporation, because of their connection with any lawful labor organization which such employee may have formed, joined or belonged to,) or if any such officer, agent or employee shall' exact from any applicant for employment in such corporation any promise or agreement not to form, join or belong to such lawful labor organization, or not to continue a member of such lawful labor organization, or if any such officer, agent or employee shall in any way prevent or endeavor to prevent any employee from forming, joining or belonging to such lawful labor organization, or shall interfere or attempt to interfere by any other means whatsoever, direct or indirect, with any employee’s free and untrammeled connection with such lawful labor organization, he or they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be liable to a fine of not more than $2,000 or less than $1,000 and imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or either or both, in the discretion of the court.”
The particular offense with which the defendant was charged in the indictment is that defined in the first clause of the section, which, for convenience, we have put in parenthesis. The things condemned are the coercion and the attempted coercion of an employeebut as the act declares what acts shall constitute coercion and attempted coercion, it is plain to be seen that it forbids under penalty the discharge of an employee because of his connection with any lawful labor organization. The fact that by the terms of the contract of employment, either party is at liberty to terminate the relation at any time and for any cause that may seem to him good, and even without cause except his mere pleasure, cannot affect the question of the defendant’s guilt, if it be shown to the satisfaction of a jury by direct or circumstantial evidence that it was because of his connection with a lawful labor organization that the employee was discharged or threatened with discharge. Even if he were em
The court below, whilst commenting upon the questions above suggested, quashed the indictment upon the distinct ground that the clause of the act under consideration is in violation of article 3, section 7 of our state constitution, which provides, that “ the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law .... regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing.”
First, is this a law regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing ?
It would seem clear that a law which provides that one
Second, is this a special law ?
The only employers affected by the act are corporations, and the only employees affected are the employees of corporations. It is unquestionably class legislation, but class legislation is not necessarily special legislation within the meaning of the prohibitory provisions of our state constitution. Not only may there be separate legislation for or concerning a class into which individuals and objects are naturally collected, but it is also well settled, that the legislature is not absolutely prohibited to determine and declare the classes to which the objects of legislation belong, and then legislate for or concerning each of those classes separately and differently. The difficulty is in determining when the constitutional limitations upon this power have been exceeded; for, although it is primarily a legislative question, it is the plain duty of the courts to.interfere where, no matter what the pretext, the constitutional prohibition of local and special legislation has been violated.
In Ayars’s Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 281, Chief Justice Stebjrett declared that the underlying principle of all the cases is, “ that classification, with the view of legislation for either class separately, is essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefor exists, a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to the others.
In Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, Mr. Justice Mitchell said: “ It is the settled law since Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338, that classification based on genuine and substantial distinctions is within the constitutional power of the legislature, and an act which applies to all the members of the class is general and not special.”
In Seabolt v. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318, it was said that “ classification is a legislative question, subject to judicial revision only so far as to see that it is founded on real distinctions in the subjects classified, and not on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of evading the constitutional prohibition.”
In the late cases of Com. v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504, and Clark’s Estate, 195 Pa. 520, it is declared: “ It may, therefore, be taken as settled law that in cases of this character the courts will look beyond the mere form of the act, and examine its true intent and effect, in the light of the purpose of the constitutional restrictions.”
It is unnecessary to cite other cases. With these authoritative rulings to guide us, it ought not to be difficult to determine whether or not this is a special law. As its title indicates it is an act to protect certain employees in their right to form, join or belong to labor organizations, and in providing protection for them it restricts the rights of their employers with respect to the selection and discharge of employees. To be more explicit, it extends protection to the employees of corporations in their right to form or join labor organizations, whilst denying the same protection to the employees of individuals, firms and limited partnerships; it deprives corporations of the right to discharge employees for a certain cause, even though this right be expressly reserved in the contract of employment: whilst leaving individuals, firms and limited partnerships free to discharge their employees for the same cause or at will, provided no contract or law against conspiracy be violated. As has been well said arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. “ While
Whether the test to be applied to the classification adopted by the legislature in the present instance be necessity — using that term in the sense of great or urgent public convenience— or be the genuineness and substantial nature of the distinctions between employees of corporations and the employees of individuals, firms and limited partnerships with respect to the particular subject of legislation, we are all of opinion that this must be declared to be a special law within the true intent and meaning of the constitution.
Judgment affirmed.