Commonwealth v. CincottaCommonwealth v. Cincotta
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Kaplan
The defendant Cincotta, indicted for armed robbery with “features artificially distorted” (
Like the Appeals Court, we accept the motion judge’s subsidiary findings as warranted by the evidence. And we owe respect to his conclusions of law although we are not bound by them. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 375 Mass. 349, 354 (1978). Our references to the facts in this opinion draw on the findings, amplified by some recourse to the detailed evidence. An armed man with face and hair blackened 2 entered the Quincy branch of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association on July 19, 1976, about 10:40 a.m. Cindy Carmusin, a teller, was at her station. Helen Sands, the branch manager, was in the ladies room. No one else was in the bank at the time. The robber vaulted over the counter and pointed a gun at Carmusin and ordered her to lie down on the floor. Emerging from the rear of the bank, Sands was grasped by the robber and also forced to lie down. Nevertheless both women were able to make observations of the robber at close range. 3 The robber remained in the bank for four or five minutes. According to the findings, the witnesses “had ample opportunity . . . to view [the robber’s] stature and facial characteristics.”
Detectives Thomas Casey and Thomas Healy arrived quickly on the scene and Sands and Carmusin separately
The two women appeared at Quincy District Court under subpoena on July 29, the occasion of the probable cause hearing. They sat in the front row of the court room. Seated by himself, on a bench at right angle to the spectators’ benches, was the defendant. Sands, upon seeing the defendant, immediately said to one of the detectives sitting near her, “That’s him.” Carmusin also promptly and separately identified the defendant as the robber. At the probable cause hearing which then occurred, Sands took the stand and testified; Carmusin, sequestered on motion of the defendant’s counsel, was not called.
With respect to the photographic identifications at the bank, it is argued that, as the detectives presented only ten pictures, they were implicitly suggesting that they had themselves reduced the field and believed the guilty man was in this gallery. Some possible implication that the police thought they might be closing in on the culprit was unavoidable, but the showing was part of “an ongoing proc
As to the live identifications at the District Court six days after the photographic identifications and just before the commencement of the probable cause hearing, the contention is that undue suggestiveness followed from the fact that the defendant, sitting alone, was a natural cynosure of the women’s eyes. This, however, was not a situation like that envisioned in
Martin
v.
Donnelly,
391 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Mass. 1974), and thought unduly suggestive: a contrived confrontation in a court room prior to the arraignment of a suspect, calculated artificially to renew and improve a
The motion judge did not say expressly that there was no impermissible suggestiveness in the live identifications — or rather that the defendant failed to establish that there was such suggestiveness — although he probably intended to convey that conclusion.
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The Appeals Court, taking account of the judge’s subsidiary findings on this phase of the case, called the situation “somewhat suggestive.” To cancel any doubts, the court then went into the matter of the “reliability” of the identifications, applying the doctrine of
Manson
v.
Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98 (1977), and reached an affirmative conclusion. The Appeals Court had some warrant in this court’s opinions for assuming that we were favorably disposed toward the
Manson
doctrine and prepared to accept and apply it — the question left open in
Identification and alibi were the main issues that developed at trial, and there is no serious claim before us that any of the judge’s instructions was deficient. We agree with the Appeals Court that the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Commonwealth’s case, and the renewed motion when all the evidence was in, were correctly denied, as was the defendant’s motion after verdict for a new trial. Those motions went to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. To that question the “reliability” of the identifications in the Mamón sense was pertinent, and therefore we add that we think the Appeals Court’s discussion of “reliability” was sound, and although addressed to the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, also applied to the similar evidence produced before the jury.
Judgment of the Superior Court affirmed.
Notes
He was sentenced to five to seven years’ imprisonment at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole.
Which accounts for the indictment under the statute for robbery with features artificially distorted.
Sands said she had three chances to see the robber’s face; Carmusin probably had the same number.
Sands’s description was quite full, Carmusin’s somewhat less so. Although the detectives first spoke briefly to the two women together, descriptions were apparently elicited from them separately.
It is indicated that Carmusin was emotionally upset when asked to assist with the composite. Carmusin did not see the composite until after the probable cause hearing, and then only by accident.
Apparently the detectives did not inform the women that their identifications tallied.
Perched on her teller’s chair nearby, Carmusin could have seen Sands poring over the pictures, but it appears unlikely that she could discern which picture Sands had chosen. Indeed Detective Casey had the impression that Carmusin was engaged in dealing with customers while Sands was examining the pictures. (Of course, the fact that two witnesses jointly view an array of pictures does not necessarily render invalid an ensuing identification. See Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 476 [1978].)
The granting or denial of such requests rests in the sound discretion of the judge. See Commonwealth v. Pearsall, 370 Mass. 413, 415 (1976); Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 501 (1972).
In the present case, the defendant has claimed that he was deprived of the benefits of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because he was not informed that prosecution witnesses would be on hand at the hearing. The Appeals Court properly held that counsel should have been aware of the likelihood, see 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 820, and cases cited. As noted, counsel did request sequestration of witnesses. On the facts of the case it is unlikely that the defendant would have benefited materially, had the earlier precaution been requested and taken.
Sands was thirty-six years old, Carmusin eighteen. Sands said she saw the defendant being led into the court room, Carmusin said she first saw the defendant as he was sitting on the bench. (The defendant was wearing ordinary civilian clothes.)
The judge denied the entire motion to suppress, including the live identifications, and, in saying that those identifications rested on the witnesses’ independent recollections of the man who robbed the bank, he was likely indicating that any suggestiveness at the District Court was minimal or nonexistent. The judge did not mention “reliability” and several times during the suppression hearing indicated that he was interested in suggestiveness, not in the strength or weight of the identifications.