Lead Opinion
Aрpellant, Michael H. Chilquist, appeals from judgment of sentence entered following the acceptance of appellant’s guilty plea to charges of robbery and related offenses. We grant allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of sentence, and affirm judgment of sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 5, 1987, appellant robbed a Hills Department Store in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania. Whilе the robbery was still in progress, an employee outside the manager’s office where the robbery occurred noticed the robbery аnd called the police. The police dispatcher relayed the employees’ description of appellant, his cаr, and his license plate number to officers on patrol in the area. As appellant attempted to flee he was trapped in stopped traffic and boxed in by an alert police officer in a patrol car. When the officer approached аppellant’s vehicle, appellant shifted his car into reverse and attempted to flee. Appellant stated to the officеr that he would not be taken alive, and reached for a bag in the car. Nonetheless, the brave officer was able to thwart appellant’s repeated efforts to flee until other officers arrived and appellant was forcibly removed from his car. During his removal, appellant grabbed one of the officer’s guns and was shot in the leg in the ensuing scuffle. Following appellant’s arrest, police seized from the car a sawed off shotgun and 9 millimeter caliber automatic pistol (both loaded) as well as the bullet proof vest appellаnt had been wearing. A large variety , of other evidence linking appellant to the robbery was also seized.
On May 15, 1987, appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of Robbery, two counts of Violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, one count of Prohibited Offensive Weapon, one count Resisting Arrest, one count Recklessly Endangering Another Person, and three counts of Simple Assault.
Appellant’s sentencing hearing was conducted on July 14, 1987. Appellant’s counsel presented extended argument regarding mitigating factors and was permitted to summarize for the court uncontested mitigation testimony which would otherwise have been presented by defense witnesses. (N.T. 7/14/87 at 2-5). Appellant made a brief expression of his remorse. (N.T. 7/14/87 at 6). The Commonwealth then prеsented argument relating to items in the presentence investigation report and in rebuttal to parts of appellant’s mitigation evidence. (N.T. 7/14/87 at 6-9). Appellant was then given a second opportunity to address the court, during which he denied that he had violent tendencies and thаt he had prepared for a violent conflict before the present robbery. (N.T. 7/14/87 at 9-10).
The trial court then indicated that, in light of great potential for further serious injuries during the commission of the present crime, an aggravated sentence was appropriate. (N.T. 7/14/87 at 11). The court sentenced appellant to a term of imprisonment of ten (10) to twenty (20) years on the Robbery conviction and a consecutive five (5) year term of probation on one of the Violation of the Uniform Firearms Act convictions. In light of the sentence imposed on thе first two convictions, the trial court exercised its discretion to impose no further penalty with respect to the remaining convictions. (N.T. 7/14/87 at 12). A timely motion to modify the sentence imposed was denied, and this timely appeal follows.
I.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing entirely to consider the sentencing guidelines, and by failing to set forth adequate reasons for the
Appellant has complied with the procedural dictates of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki,
II.
Allowance of appeal, however, will be of little solace to apрellant, as we find both his claims to be meritless. First, at the time of sentencing in this case, sentencing guidelines had not validly been adopted. See Commonwealth v. Sessoms,
Judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Notes
In dismissing appellant's claim on this ground, we do not imply that the statement of the reasons for sentencing outside the standard minimum range was inadequate. Appellant conceded the applicability of the five year mandatory minimum sentence provision of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712; thus, a sentence at the upper limit of the standard range would have been the lowest minimum sentence permissible. The trial court, however, found that the danger of serious injury to others caused by appellant was a significant aggravating factor; we agree. Moreover, it is apparent that the trial court considered the related offenses committed as aggravating factors rather than impos
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in my Dissenting Statement in Com. v. Felix,