55 Pa. Super. 510 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1914
Opinion by
The right of the jury to render a special verdict in a criminal case, wherein the facts are found and the legal inference of guilt or innocence is referred to the court, is not questioned by counsel and is recognized by the authorities: 4 Bl. Com. 361; 1 Archbold’s Crim. Pl. & Ev. (1877) 570; 12 Cyc. of Law & Pr. 688; Com. v. Chathams, 50 Pa. 181; Com. v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa.
It is stated in the special verdict under consideration, that at the instance and request of the Vesta Coal Company the defendant was commissioned by the governor a coal and iron policeman for the term of three years, and duly qualified as such; that he received as compensation “for his services as such coal and iron policeman” $80.00 a month, which sum was paid him by the Vesta Coal Company; and that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense his term had not expired. It is also stated in the special verdict, and is shown by the acts under which he was commissioned, that he was authorized to exercise within the county of Washington “all the powers of policemen of the city of Philadelphia:” Act of February 27, 1865, P. L. 225, and Act of April 11, 1866, P. L. 99. According to the doctrine of Com. v. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. 554, he was not an officer of the commonwealth, within the meaning of sec. 12 of the act of March 31, 1860; but he was such an officer as could be indicted for common-law extortion. This is the offense of which it is claimed he was guilty, and, therefore, it is highly important that the findings of the jury as to the acts he committed be very carefully scrutinized, and that in pronouncing judgment it be assumed that these findings embrace “the specific, exact, and complete facts” which determine the nature of his act. As to- this subject, the verdict states that, during the term for which the defendant was commissioned
Is the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged the inevitable legal conclusion from these facts? We are of opihion that it is not. To extort, in the ordinary meaning of the word, is to obtain by violence, threats, compulsion, or the subjection of another to some necessity; but at common law the offense denominated extortion does not necessarily involve actual duress of that sort, and nothing of that kind is alleged or shown in the present case. “Extortion signifies in a strict sense the taking of money by any officer by color of his office either where none at all is due, or more than is due, or where it is not yet due:” 1 Hawkins’ P. C. 418. Blackstone defines it to be, “an abuse of public justice, which consists in any officer’s unlawfully taking, by color of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due:” 4 Bl. Com. 141. This definition, without substantial change of phraseology, has been adopted in the Pennsylvania decisions. An essential element of the offense, and one to which particular attention should be directed in this case, is that the fee or reward must be taken by the officer by color of his office. Here, the allegation of the indictment is that the defendant took it “by color of his office as such coal and iron police,” and this is the allegation that it was incumbent on the commonwealth to prove. Amongst the judicially recognized definitions of color of office, applying to the differing states of facts that may arise, are: a pretense of official right to do an act, made by one who has no such right; the use of official authority as a pretext or cover for the commission of some corrupt or vicious act; an
The judgment is reversed and the defendant is discharged.