This is а direct appeal from the judgment of sentence of twenty-seven to fifty-four months imprisonment imposed following appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault. Appellant argues that the evidence presented at his nonjury trial was insufficient to sustain his сonviction. We disagree and affirm.
Our standard for. reviewing such a challenge is well-established.
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner and drawing all proper infеrences favorable to the Commonwealth, the [fact-finder] could reasonably have determined all elements of the crime to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Syre,507 Pa. 299 ,489 A.2d 1340 (1985). This standard is equally applicable to eases where the еvidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the *195 combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Sullivan,472 Pa. 129 , 150,371 A.2d 468 , 478 (1977); Commonwealth v. Farquharson,467 Pa. 50 ,354 A.2d 545 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cox,466 Pa. 582 ,353 A.2d 844 (1976).
Commonwealth v. Hardcastle,
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on December 7, 1993, appellant, James Cassidy, and his wife, Cynthia Cassidy, the victim in this case, were arguing in their bedroom in their Plum Borough home. Appellant had been awake most of the night because his back hurt. The victim testified that appellant wanted to smoke marijuana as a sleep aid, and the victim opposed it in their home. She testified that their four children arose to dress for school about that time; in fact, her daughter, Anastasia, already was awake. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 12/14/94, at 8, 16. The victim told appellant, “If you want to smoke it, go outside.” Id. at 8. The victim stated that if appellant refused to smoke it outside, “then I wanted the stuff and I was flushing it down the toilet.” Id.
Appellant refused to give his wife the marijuana and insisted upon smoking it. The victim testified that she then told her husband that if he did not give her the marijuana, she would break his glasses. The victim then shielded appellant’s *196 glаsses in her hand and struck them on a desk adjacent to the bed to make it appear as if she had broken them. Enraged, appellant picked up his wife and threw her with such force that she struck the door frame to the bathroom, ricocheted across thе hall and struck the door frame to Anastasia’s bedroom, and finally landed on the floor. The victim testified that she was “crying for help” and “was in and out of consciousness.” Id. at 9-10.
Anastasia, who is the victim’s natural daughter and appellant’s step-daughter, testified similarly to her mother. While she did not see appellant throw her mother, she heard her mother tell appellant to smoke the marijuana outside or she would flush it down the toilet. Id. at 25. When appellant refused, Anastasia heard the victim say that she would break appellant’s glasses if he did not give her the marijuana. Id. at 24. Anastasia heard “a slam down, and I heard my mom screaming____ So she was laying on the ground. Her head was in my room sort of. So I got up. She kept yelling to call an ambulance, so I did.” Id. at 25.
Plum Borough Police Officer James Makin was the first officer оn the scene. He found the victim “laying on the hallway floor.” Id. at 30. The officer testified, “At that point she was in such a position that — she was laying on her side and kind of curled up, protecting her wrist. Her face was sort of under her. I didn’t move her, but allowed the paramedics in.” Id. The victim was transported to the hospital.
Thе victim was hospitalized for two days. She was placed in a brace that went from the top of her chest down to her thighs and a removable wrist cast, both of which she had to wear for two months. Id. at 11.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court error (sic) in it’s (sic) finding that the Commonwealth proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly attempt to or caused serious bodily injury manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.
Appellant’s argument, in a nutshell, is that the victim did not suffer serious bodily injury as defined in the Crimes Code. *197 Rather, he asserts that she suffered mere bodily injury and therefore he is guilty only of simple assault.
The offense of aggravated assault is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702:
§ 2702. Aggravated assault
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extrеme indifference to the value of human life;
Appellant first contends that this case is controlled by
Commonwealth v. Alexander,
In the instant case, the Commonwealth did not concede that the victim’s injuries were mere bodily injury rather than serious bodily injury. Bodily injury and serious bodily injury are defined in .18 Pa.C.S. § 2301, which provides in pertinent part:
*198 “Bodily injury.” Impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.
“Serious bodily injury.” Bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
The trial court concluded that “the trаuma to the victim’s wrist and back which resulted in both being placed in casts for two months, was a ‘protracted loss or impairment of the function’ of those parts of-the victim’s body and thus constituted ‘serious bodily injury’; ____” Trial court opinion, 3/23/95, at 3. In assailing this conclusion by the trial court, аppellant asserts that the trial court failed to consider that there was a brace, not a cast, on the victim’s back and a “velcro type half a cast” on her wrist. Appellant’s brief at 15. Thus, appellant contends, “Both the brace and the cast were removable at Mrs. Cassidy’s choosing, so that her situation was not such a protracted loss of impairment as would be the case if she had to wear full casts that were not removable at her choosing.” Id.
We are not persuaded of the significance of this fact. First, the trial court was well aware that the back brace and wrist casts were removable. Trial court opinion, 3/23/95, at 2. Second, there was no testimony from the victim that the casts, indeed, were removed. Rather, her testimony supports the inference that they were worn continuously for two months:
Q. After you remained at the hospital for two days, did you have anything done to you? Did they ...
A. What they did was they took x-rays of my back and they took x-rays of my right wrist.
Q. Was anything done?
A. They put a brace on me for my back for two months and also a wrist cast for my wrist, because I couldn’t move it for two months.
N.T., 12/14/94, at 11-12 (emphasis added).
Appellant also makes much of the fact that after he threw the victim into the doorjamb, he did not escalate the attack; *199 rather, he immediate^ apologized. Appellant claims that this fact is noteworthy in examining the surrounding circumstances of the attaсk in order to glean his intent to inflict serious bodily injury. Again, while the victim did state that appellant apologized after attacking her, we note she also stated that she faded in and out of consciousness. N.T., 12/14/94, at 10. Moreover, appellant claimed that he did not intеnd to “shove her at all actually. All [he] wanted to do is get [his] glasses.” Id. at 42^13. Yet, the victim was propelled with a force great enough to bounce her from one doorjamb into another across the hall. Finally, his self-serving claim that he did not intend to hurt his wife is belied by his stepdaughter’s testimony that he “kept saying, ‘No, don’t call [the ambulance].’ ” Id. at 26.
We conclude, as did the trial court, that the evidence supports the finding that the victim sustained serious bodily injury. The wearing of a brace which fits from the top of the chest to the thighs, covering the front and back, and a cast which immobilizes movement of the wrist, both for two months, id. at 11, certainly constitutes impairment of the function of any bodily member.
Moreover, aside from the presence of serious bodily injury itself, there was other evidence herein to establish that aрpellant
intended
to cause serious bodily injury. An intent to cause serious bodily injury may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Rightley,
In the instant case, appellant, who concedes that he is larger and stronger than his wife, see appellant’s brief at 14, picked her up and threw hеr across the room with such force that she bounced from one doorjamb to another, finally coming to rest on the ground. She faded in and out of consciousness, N.T., 12/14/94, at 10, and was hospitalized for two days. Id. Moreover, the events preceding the assault and the fаct that appellant attacked his wife upon observing her hit his glasses on the desk, supports a logical inference that appellant attacked his wife in a fit of rage, and thereby intended to inflict *200 serious bodily injury. We have no difficulty concluding, as did the trial cоurt, that appellant acted intentionally.
In his alternate argument, appellant contends that the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the mens rea of recklessness necessary to establish aggravated assault, citing
Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon,
As we already have concluded, appellant, in the instant case, caused serious bodily injury intentionally; thus, the issue of recklessness neеd not be addressed. However, even if we were required to address this issue, there is nothing in
O’Hanlon
which necessitates reversal herein. The
O’Hanlon
court stated, “[F]or the degree of recklessness contained in the aggravated assault statute to occur, the offensive act must be performed under circumstances which almost assure that injury or death will ensue.”
Id.,
Finally, appellant contends that if we find that the victim sustained serious bodily injury, the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault because it does not show that he manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life. In support, he cites
Commonwealth v.
*201
Magnelli,
As we stated
supra
in reference to the applicability of
O’Hanlon,
since wе have determined that appellant herein acted intentionally, we need not address whether he acted recklessly; therefore,
Magnelli
is inapposite. Moreover, even if we assumed
Magnelli’s
relevance to the present case, it provides appellant with no relief. The trial court in
Magnelli
arrested judgment оn the aggravated assault conviction because it found “that the connection between the officer’s injuries and [the defendant’s] ‘acts is so attenuated that this court feels that the result was in no way within the intent or contemplation of [the defendant].’ ”
Id.,
We could not, and will not, make the same statement in the instant case. The trial court herein determined that while appellant “pushed his wife only one time; ... he lifted her before doing so, and that push was violent enough tо propel her across the hall a second time and into another doorjamb after which she fell to the floor.” Trial court opinion, 3/23/95, at 2. We cannot say that the connection between the victim’s injuries and appellant’s actions was attenuated at all.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.