5 Va. 660 | General Court of Virginia | 1827
delivered the opinion of the General Court. He stated the case, and then said:
In answer to the first question, it may be remarked, that the whole system of our judicial polity is founded on the idea that the Inferior Tribunals are bound by the decisions
This brings us to the second question, namely: Whether, under our present act against Mayhems, a free person shall be deemed guilty of felony, who maliciously or unlawfully shoots a slave ?
Dolly Chappie’s Case, 1 Virg. Cases, 184, was decided by the unanimous judgment of the seven Judges who were present, after an argument from the counsel for the pri
it has been supposed, however, that the words “ being free,” in the present act, do shew an intention in the Legislature to exclude slaves from the operation of the act. To give it this effect, however, it is necessary to dislodge the words “ being free,” from their present place in the section, and place them immediately after the word “ whosoever,” in the beginning. Thus transposed, the act would read thus: “ Whosoever being free, shall shoot or stab another:” and it is supposed that the word another, has relation to the words “ being free,” so as to declare that whosoever being free shall shoot or stab another, being free, such offender shall he punished in the way provided for by the act. Wc da not see the necessity for such a violent transposition of the words of the section. Placed as they are by the Legislature, they seem to be as plain as language can be made. There are in this country two classes of offenders, as to whom, the Legislature, from motives of public policy, have thought proper to prescribe different punishments for the same offence: these are the free man, and the slave. The former may be sent to the Penitentiary, the latter may not The Legislature, therefore, thought it necessary in the revisal of 1819, to make a dis
It has also been supposed, that the proviso in the first and second sections proves, that the Legislature did not intend that a free person shall be punished for maiming a slave. This objection, or a similar one, was made in Dolly Chappie’s Case, and overruled. The giving an action to the party grieved, as in case of trespass, was intended as a benefit to him; but, the incapacity of a slave to bring an action, and his consequent inability to receive the benefit, should not exempt the guilty person from the punishment provided by law for the offence. An alien enetny is entitled to protection, whilst he is permitted to remain in the country, yet he cannot maintain an action during the war: it cannot for a moment be supposed that he may be shot, stabbed, disfigured or disabled, without subjecting the offender to the other pains and penalties of the act.
The other proviso is, that the party grieved shall be a competent witness. The case before mentioned explains why this provision was made in the act of 1803. It appears to have been copied into the act of 1819, without any necessity, because the law which gave a part of the fine to the person grieved, being changed, there could not be any interest in him which would render him an incompetent
The distinction between free persons and slaves, was present to the legislative mind: they provided a different punishment for the two classes, when they were offenders. If they had intended to make the same distinction as to the persons offended against, they would have employed the same clear language.
It may further be remarked, that there appears no reason, arising from the relative situation of master and slave, why a free person should not be punished as a felon for maiming a slave. Whatever power our laws may give to a master over his slave, it is as important for the interest of the former, as for the safety of the latter, that a stranger should not be permitted to exercise an unrestrained and lawless authority over him. It is for the benefit of the master, and consoling to his feelings, that a third person should be restrained under the pains and penalties of felony, from maiming and disabling his slave.
The following is to be entered as the judgment of the Court.
This Court is of opinion, and doth decide, 1. That it is true as a general proposition, that in a criminal prosecution, wherein the judgment of the presiding Judge, if given in favor of the prisoner, would acquit him of the offence for which he is indicted, the Judge of the Circuit Court ought to suffer his individual opinion to be overruled by the previous opinion and judgment of the General Court in an analogous case; and particularly, that the decision of the General Court iu Dotty Chappie’s Case, ought to have such controlling influence in this case.