Aрpellant was indicted on three counts of delivery of heroin in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act 1 and two counts of criminal conspiracy. 2 A jury found appellant guilty on all counts. Post-verdict motions were denied, and aрpellant was sentenced to pay a fine of $100.00 and to serve a two to five year term of imprisonment on the first delivery count, concurrent two to five year periods for each remaining delivery count, аnd concurrent two year probationary terms for each conspiracy count.
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the crimes charged. “When testing the sufficienсy of the evidence, we must review the testimony in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
Commonwealth
v.
Blevins,
On Marсh 6, 1975, Officers Richard Smith and Carlos Aquino of the Philadelphia Police Narcotics Unit were assigned, for thirty days, to the Lancaster City Police Department as undercover narcotics policemen. During this period, thе two officers attempted to locate narcotic suppliers by posing as heroin addicts. Appellant became their middleman for the five transactions involved in this case.
While driving around Lancaster оn March 7, 1975, Officer Smith and his associate became suspicious that appellant was selling drugs. They first observed appellant on Chester *438 Street, leaning into a car and conversing with its occupants. The officеrs drove around the block and approached the appellant. During a short conversation, the officers explained that they had just arrived from Philadelphia and were in need of a supply of heroin. As a result of this conversation, the parties met at approximately 1:00 a. m. on March 8, and appellant led the officers to a house at 238 Howard Street where they purchased two packets of heroin from the occupants, Heriberto Cintron and Jose Rojas. The sale was consummated when Rojas passed the heroin packets to appellant who passed them to Officer Smith. Smith gave the money directly to Rojas.
The second incident occurred the same day, March 8, at 9:05 p. m., when appellant took the officers to the apartment of Felix Negron at 145 Chester Street. Negron was hesitant to sell beсause he did not know the buyers. During the conversation, Negron stated that appellant “was going to have all the police coming down here,” because he was “always bringing [unknown] people around here.” Aрpellant assured Negron that “[h]e’s alright, I know him.” The transaction was completed when Negron’s associate Nelson Rojas, who was Jose’s brother, and Officer Smith exchanged the money and drugs.
The third transaction took place on March 10. Appellant took Smith to 238 Howard Street where Smith purchased heroin directly from Jose Rojas. Although appellant was present he did not handle the drugs or the money.
On March 13, Smith again followed appellant to 238 Howard Street. This time a woman occupant, Rosa Soldana answered the door. While the two men remained outside, Miss Soldana went back into the house. In a few minutes she returned and hаnded three packets of heroin to appellant who gave them to Officer Smith. Appellant also transferred the money from Smith to Soldana.
The final purchase, on March 15, was from Felix Negron at 145 Chester Street. Remembering the problems encountered during the first purchase from Negron, appellant and Smith agreed that Smith should wait in the car. Using *439 Smith’s money, appellant purchased two packets of heroin and delivеred them to Smith.
Appellant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the two counts of conspiracy to deliver heroin.
3
Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more parties tо do an unlawful act.
Commonwealth v. Stephens,
“Although more than mere association must be shown, ‘[a] conspiracy may be inferentially established by showing the relаtion, conduct, or circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts on the part of co-conspirators have uniformly been held competent to prove that a corrupt confederаtion has in fact been formed . . .’” (citations omitted) Commonwealth v. Eiland,450 Pa. 566 , 570,301 A.2d 651 , 652 (1973).
One of the circumstances which can inferentially establish a conspiratorial agreement is proof of prior dealings. Commonwealth v. Stephens, supra.
In the instant case, appellant personally assisted in each transaction. Moreover, it is clear that he functioned in a much greater capacity than that of a mere guide to potential drug suppliers. Without appellant’s aid, Officer Smith had virtually no chance of consummating any of the transactions. In reaching its verdict, the jury was required to find an agreement sufficient to sustain both conspiracy counts. In regard to the March 8 transaction with Felix Nеgron and Nelson Rojas, the jury inferred either a single agreement to transfer the drugs once the negotiations were completed or a continuing agreement to procure purchasers based on *440 Negron’s statements chastising appellant for continually bringing unknown purchasers to the apartment. As to the March 10 transfer, the jury inferred either a single agreement based on appellant’s participation in the sаle or an agreement with Jose Rojas based on the prior dealings of March 8. In any case, the inferences were proper and the evidence was, therefore, sufficient to convict appellant on both conspiracy counts.
Appellant also argues that the evidence failed to show a “delivery” as defined by The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. Appellant cites
Commonwealth v. Simione,
In the instant case, appellant is charged with delivery. Delivery is defined as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance . . . whether or not there is an agency relationship.”
4
Transfer is not defined in the Act; however, taking the commonly accepted meaning of the word, as we must,
Commonwealth v. Bristow,
Appellant’s third contention is that his entrapment defense
5
established a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law.
*441
Conflicting tеstimony was presented on the subject of inducement, and, therefore the matter properly was left for the jury to resolve.
E. g., Commonwealth v. Berrigan,
After the Commonwealth presented its case, appellant’s counsel demurred to the evidence. Aftеr the court denied the demurrer, counsel moved to strike the testimony of Harold A. Freed, criminalist for the Pennsylvania State Police, on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to include Mr. Freed in the list of witnesses presеnted in a Bill of Particulars.
6
Appellant’s counsel, however, accepted Mr. Freed as an expert witness and permitted him to testify without objection. Appellant cannot now object. Irrespective of the merits of the argument, which are dubious at best,
Commonwealth v. Mcrvin,
For his fifth assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court improperly expressed its opinion as to the appellant’s guilt and, in effect, directed the jury to render a verdict of guilty. In
Commonwealth v. Archambault,
Finally, appellant claims that the lower court erred when it refused two requested points for charge. The first request was that “it is the Jury’s determination to find whether or not the Defendant’s action in passing along the substance constitutes delivery as defined by the Drug Act.” The lower court acted properly in refusing an instruction which invited the jury to make its own legal intеrpretation of the applicable statute.
United States v. Lanni,
The judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Notes
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 13(a)(30) (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) (Supp. 1976-77».
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
. The conspiracy counts were based on the March 8, 9:05 p. m. and March 10 transactions in which appellant never possessed the heroin.
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 2 (35 P.S. § 780-102(b)), as amended.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 313.
. Appellant’s counsel apparently requested the names of the chemists who performed tests on the heroin. Although the docket entries indicate that a request for a Bill of Particulars was filed May 13, 1975, and that the Bill, itself, was filed May 15, 1975, these documents are not contained in the record certified to this court. Because of our disposition, there is no need to review the actual documents.