Appellant contends that two of his character witnesses could not be impeached through the use of his prior arrests not resulting in convictions. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
On February 25, 1979, appellant and his mother entered a tavern in West Philadelphia. Some time later, the mother took a gun from her purse аnd threatened to shoot a female patron. The mother pointed the gun and pulled the trigger, but the gun misfired. As the patron faintеd and fell to the floor, the mother fired again, fatally wounding a barmaid who had been standing behind the intended victim. Appellant stoоd by the doorway throughout the encounter. At trial, one Commonwealth witness testified that appellant had importuned his mother tо shoot the patron, while the remaining witnesses testified that appellant had said nothing. Appellant’s defense rested exсlusively upon the testimony of four character witnesses. The Commonwealth cross-examined two of them concerning appellant’s two prior arrests that did not result in convictions. The jury found *485 appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. 1 Following the denial of post-trial motions, the lower court imрosed the mandatory life sentence. Appellant was appointed new counsel and this appeal followed.
“It is a well established general rule that evidence of a criminal defendant’s prior arrests is inadmissible as tending to prove his disрosition to commit crimes generally, or his commission of the specific crime for which he is then standing trial.”
Commonwealth
v.
Little,
Despite any cautionary instructions that the court may have given the jury, the undue prejudice to [the defеndant] is obvious. On the one hand, the jury would have heard that [the defendant] had a reputation for being peaceful while on the other hand, the jury would also have heard that [the defendant] had been arrested on [other] charges.
The Commonwealth argues first that appellant waived any objection to thе impeachment by failing to object specifically. We disagree. The issue first arose during the cross-examination of aрpellant’s third witness:
[District Attorney]: Among those people with whom you discussed [appellant’s] reputation, have you ever hеard them say that he had been arrested two times prior to this incident?
[Witness]: No.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
[The Court]: Objection noted on the record. Objection overruled.
(N.T. October 31, 1979, at 3.30). The issue recurred during cross-examination of appellant’s last witness:
[District Attorney]: Okay. Among those pеople with whom you discussed his reputation, have you ever heard them say that he had been arrested for aggravated assault in 1976?
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
[The Court]: Objection sustained.
[District Attorney]: May I see you at sidebar, Judge?
(id. at 3.38). During the lengthy sidebar conference, appellant’s counsel explained that his objection was based, in pаrt, upon the fact that appellant “doesn’t have a record[ ] [because] [h]e was discharged.” (id. at 3.41). The lower court ruled, however, over appellant’s objection that the Commonwealth could ask the witness whether “she knows he’s been arrested but not for what,” (id. at 3.44), whereupon the following transpired:
[District Attorney]: [A]mong those people with whom you discussed [appellant’s] reputation, have you ever heard them say that [appellant] had been arrested two times before this offense, once in 1976 and once in 1973?
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
[The Court]: Overruled.
*487 [The Witness]: No, I have not.
[Defense Counsel]: Exception, sir.
(id. at 3.45). We are satisfied that appellant adequately preserved the issue for our review. 2
The Commonwealth contends next that аppellant is not entitled to the “windfall benefit” of a new trial because
Scott,
an evidentiary, non-constitutional ruling, should only be prоspectively applied.
Scott
recognizes that whenever a defense character witness has been cross-examinеd on the basis of a defendant’s prior arrests, the defendant is denied a fair trial because the prejudicial effect of such cross-examination greatly outweighs its limited probative value.
So ordered.
Notes
. Appeliant was acquitted of aggravated assault of another patron. All remaining charges were nol prossed. His mother was subsequently tried and convicted of voluntary manslаughter.
. The Commonwealth contends also that appellant failed to preserve the issue in post-trial motions. We disagree. Appellant’s post-trial motions alleged that “a character witness was improperly cross-examined by the Commonwealth as to specific crimes of the defendant.” In its opinion and order denying post-trial motions, the lower court reviewed and affirmed its side-bar ruling allowing testimony of appellant’s prior arrests based upon Commonwealth v. Jenkins, supra. Thus, appellant preserved the issue in post-trial motions, and it is properly before us in this appeal.
. Because of our disposition of this matter, we need not address appellant’s remaining contentions.