Appellant challenges: (1) the four extensions of the Rule 1100 rúndate; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; (3) the lower court’s denial of his suppression motion; and (4) the lower court’s decision to allow a Commonwealth witness to testify as an expert. Because we find all of appellant’s claims meritless, we affirm the lower court’s judgment of sentence.
On December 13, 1979, appellant was arrested and charged with possession with intent to deliver and delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy, after police observed appellant receive two credit cards in exchange for a small plastic packet later found to contain heroin. A preliminary hearing was originally scheduled for December 24, 1979, however, on that date the first in a long series of delays occurred which were to characterize the procedural history of this case. Eventually, on June 3, 1981 a hearing was held on appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, namely, the credit cards and packet of heroin. Immediately following the hearing, and the denial of appellant’s suppression motion, a non-jury trial commenced. At the conclusion of trial, appellant was found guilty on all charges. Post-verdict motions were timely filed and denied. On November 5, 1981 appellant was sentenced to two concurrent *90 prison terms of three-to-twenty-three months. This appeal followed. 1
Appellant alleges that the time for trial was improperly extended, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c), on four separate occasions. However, before turning to the four Rule 1100 extensions in the present case, we must first consider some of the principles applicable to Rule 1100 extensions in general. Under Rule 1100(c), the Commonwealth may be granted an extension of time for trial if a court finds that trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite the exercise of due diligence by the Commonwealth. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c);
Commonwealth v. Sharp,
287 Pa.Superior Ct. 314,
*91 With the foregoing facts and principles in mind, we shall now address appellant’s challenge to each of the four extensions seriatim:
I. The Extension from June 10, 1980 to August 25, 1980
On June 3, 1980, a Commonwealth extension petition was timely filed pursuant to Rule 1100(c). A hearing on this petition was held before the Honorable Ned L. Hirsh on June 26, at which time Judge Hirsh granted the petition and extended the time for trial until August 25, 1980. Although the record does not contain a transcript of the June 26 extension hearing,
2
we are able to conclude that the Commonwealth’s first extension petition was properly granted. This Court has previously held that the Commonwealth need not prove that it acted with due diligence on prior trial or hearing dates for which a Rule 1100 extension was not sought.
Commonwealth v. Tann,
298 Pa.Superior Ct. 505,
Subsequent to the granting of the Commonwealth’s first extension petition, appellant executed two written waivers of the Rule 1100 rúndate. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)(2). 4 The first waiver, executed on August 12, 1980, extended the time for trial to September 17, 1980; the second one was executed on September 17, and extended the trial deadline to November 22, 1980.
II. The Extension from November 22, 1980 to January 20, 1981
On November 21, 1980, the Commonwealth timely filed its second extension petition. The Honorable Ethan Allen Doty presided at an evidentiary hearing on this petition on December 30, 1980. In considering whether the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence, Judge Doty effectively took judicial notice of the uncontested notation of a prior hearing judge who, on November 18, 1980 (the last trial listing before the November 22 rúndate), certified “Arresting officer ill.” (N.T. December 30, 1980 at 6). Based upon this uncontested notation, Judge Doty appar
*93
ently found that the Commonwealth’s diligent efforts to try appellant prior to the rúndate were thwarted by circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control.
See Commonwealth v. Tann, supra
(where unavailability of Commonwealth witness was beyond Commonwealth’s control, it was reversible error not to grant Commonwealth’s extension petition);
accord, Commonwealth v. Sharp, supra.
Accordingly, Judge Doty granted the Commonwealth’s extension petition and extended the Rule 1100 rúndate to January 20, 1981. Thus, in deciding whether the grant of the Commonwealth’s second extension petition was proper, the question we must address is: may a court effectively take judicial notice of uncontested notations in the court record in determining whether the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence in accordance with Rule 1100(c)? We believe that this Court’s recent decisions in
Commonwealth v. Harris,
315 Pa.Superior Ct. 544,
THE COURT: .1 have 2-6 normal run date of 8-6. .Commonwealth petition filed 7-17. Timely filed.
.2-13 to 2-22, voluntary defender unprepared. Less than 30 days.
.Not chargeable, 4-19 5-30, wrong defendant brought down.
.5-30 — 7-13, motion to suppress denied. Judge Cipriani recused himself.
.7-13 — 8-15, Judge Shiomos recused himself had defendant previously on a jury trial.
.It would appear that there are three court continuances and one defense continuance. No Commonwealth continuance, as far as I can ascertain from this record.
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: .Your Honor, our indication for July 13, is that Judge Shiomos recused himself upon the advice of the district attorney who advised him that he had had the defendant prior.
THE COURT: Well, nevertheless, it was Judge Shiomos’ decision. It wasn’t a Commonwealth continuance, it was Judge Shiomos who continued it.
[ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: .We were ready on call.
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: .We also moved in this case to relist the case.
THE COURT: .Well, again, that would be the court’s fault.
.Based on the entire record I will find due diligence. The listing is now 8-15. We will make it August 17.
(.Harris, N.T. August 2, 1979 at 2-3). The statement: “Based on the entire record I will find due diligence,” was interpreted by our Court to mean that the lower court had taken judicial notice of the notations in the record and thereby found that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence. Therefore, while acknowledging that “mere as
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sertions of due diligence and unproven facts do not establish cause for an extension under Rule 1100(c),”
Commonwealth v. Harris, supra
315 Pa.Superior Ct. at 551,
Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Bright, supra,
the issue before our Court was whether a hearing judge could properly receive and consider uncontested notations appearing in the court record.
Bright,
like the instant case, involved a Rule 1100 extension hearing at which the defendant “offered no evidence at the hearing, and the Commonwealth only offered into evidence the record containing the notations made by the trial judge at the two previous listings of the case for trial.”
Id.
303 Pa.Superior Ct. at 101,
As in Harris and Bright, the hearing judge’s decision in the present case, granting the Commonwealth’s extension petition, was attributable solely to the fact that he accepted *96 as true the uncontested notation of a prior hearing judge who certified, “Arresting officer ill.” (N.T. December 30, 1980 at 6). With regard to the alleged illness of the arresting officer on November 18, 1980, the hearing judge specifically stated, “The Court further finds as a fact that according to the certification of the trial judge, the arresting officer was ill on November 18 and the matter was continued to January 19, 1981.” (N.T. December 30, 1980). Accordingly, the court at the second extension hearing concluded that the Commonwealth had “exercised due diligence in this matter.” (N.T. December 30, 1980 at 9).
Therefore, in light of this Court’s decision in Harris and Bright, and other cases cited above, we hold the grant of the second Commonwealth extension proper.
III. The Extension from January 20, 1981 to March 24, 1981
On January 19, 1981, the final listing before the January 20 rúndate, a Commonwealth witness was ill. Consequently, on the following day, the Commonwealth timely filed its third extension petition. At an evidentiary hearing on February 13, 1981, before the Honorable John J. McDevitt, the Commonwealth’s petition was granted and the run-date was extended to March 24, 1981. It is well settled that the illness of a Commonwealth witness may be a proper basis upon which to grant a Rule 1100 extension as the Commonwealth should not be penalized for events and circumstances which are wholly beyond its control.
Commonwealth v. Reihart,
302 Pa.Superior Ct. 515,
IV. The Extension from March 24, 1981 to June 3,1981
On March 24, 1981, the Commonwealth timely filed its fourth petition for a Rule 1100 extension.
6
A hearing was scheduled for April 16, 1981,
7
before the Honorable Ned L. Hirsh. Although Judge Hirsh granted the Commonwealth’s petition and extended the rúndate to June 4, 1981, we find that appellant has waived his right to challenge the granting of this fourth extension petition. It is well established that the failure of an accused to file a written motion to dismiss under Rule 1100(f) or orally move to dismiss at the extension hearing in question “constitutes a waiver of the Accused’s right to a speedy trial under Rule 1100”.
Commonwealth v. Goldwire,
279 Pa.Superior Ct. 451, 455,
Appellant contends further that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether accepting as true all of the evidence reviewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that each element of the offenses charged was supported by evidence and inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Lovette,
(a) Definition of conspiracy. — A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(I) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime;
Thus,
The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a common understanding, no matter how it came into being, that a particular criminal objective be accomplished____ The crime by its very nature is frequently not susceptible of proof except by circumstantial evidence____ A conspiracy may be inferentially established by showing the relationship, conduct or circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts on the part of co-conspirators have uniformly been held competent to prove that a corrupt confederation has in fact been formed.
Commonwealth v. Carter,
272 Pa.Superior Ct. 411, 414,
With the foregoing principles in mind, we review the instant facts: on December 13, 1979, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Police Officer Robert Murdoch of the Philadelphia Highway Patrol and his partner observed appellant and two other men engaged in conversation on the corner of Franklin and Clearfield Streets in Philadelphia. Although it was dark and the officers were about 40 feet from appellant, their view was unobstructed and there was adequate lighting from street lamps. As the uniformed officers approached in their unmarked patrol car, one of the men walked away while appellant and the other man continued talking. Officer Murdoch then saw appellant exchange a small plastic packet for two credit cards given to him by the other man. At the time he witnessed the transaction, Officer Murdoch suspected that it involved the sale of illegal drugs; his suspicion was based on the fact that he had made more than 75 drug arrests and many of those had involved the possession or dispensation of illegal drugs in small plastic packets similar to the one used in the present case. 8 Immediately following the transaction, the officers exited their car and walked toward the two men. As the officers approached, appellant and the other man quickly parted company and dropped the items in question. Upon finding the credit cards 9 on the ground near appellant’s feet and the plastic packet, containing a white substance, at the feet of appellant’s cohort, both men were arrested. At trial the Commonwealth presented Officer Frederick Perkins, a chemical laboratory technician with 14 years practical experience, for the purpose of establishing the contents of the plastic packet. Although Officer Perkins testified *100 that, although the results of the first kind of test he performed left open the possibility that the white substance was actually aspirin, his four other tests conclusively showed the substance to be heroin. Therefore based on the above facts, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant’s convictions for possession with intent to deliver and delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy.
However, appellant also seeks to attack his conspiracy conviction on the basis of Wharton’s Rule
10
which holds that “An agreement between two persons to commit a crime cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy when the crime is of such a nature as to necessarily require [sic] the participation of two persons for its commission.” 1 R. Anderson,
Wharton’s Criminal Law & Procedure
§ 89, p. 191 (1957).
See Iannelli v. United States,
[O]ur courts have considered that a partnership in crime presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual behavior.
Classic cases for application of Wharton’s Rule were adultery, incest, bigamy and dueling — crimes where the parties to the agreement are the only persons who participate in the commission of the substantive offense and the immediate consequences of the crime rest on the parties themselves rather than on society at large. Thus the *101 agreement in those cases does not appear likely to pose the threats to society that the law of conspiracy seeks to avert.
Id.,
283 Pa.Superior Ct. at 127-128,
Next, we must address the issue of whether appellant has standing to challenge the admission of the heroin and the credit cards into evidence. Following the suppression hearing, the lower court found that appellant lacked standing to challenge the admission of this evidence because he had relinquished his expectation of privacy in both the heroin and credit cards prior to his arrest.
11
How
*102
ever, appellant argues that he can: (1) attack the seizure of the heroin under the doctrine of “derivative standing,”
see United States v. Westerbann-Martinez,
Insofar as appellant’s abandonment of the credit cards is concerned, we recognize that physical evidence must be suppressed if its abandonment was coerced by unlawful police action.
Commonwealth v. Richardson, supra; Commonwealth v. Hall,
Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.... All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be con *104 sidered____ Police pursuit or the existence of a police investigation does not of itself render abandonment involuntary____ The issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search____
Commonwealth v. Shoatz, supra
Appellant asserts also that the lower court erred in denying his suppression motion on the ground that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. “Probable cause exists where there are facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he had
*105
reasonably trustworthy information sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect had committed a crime.”
Commonwealth v. Wise,
298 Pa.Superior Ct. 485, 489,
When we examine a particular situation to determine if probable cause exists, we consider all the factors and their total effect, and do not concentrate on each individual element____ We also focus on the circumstances as seen through the eyes of the trained officer, and do not view the situation as an average citizen might____ Finally, we must remember that in dealing with questions of probable cause, we are not dealing with certainties. We are dealing with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act. This is not the same ‘beyond-a-reasonable-doubt’ standard which we apply in determining guilt or innocence at trial.
Commonwealth v. Simmons,
295 Pa.Superior Ct. 72, 83,
Lastly, appellant contends that it was error for the lower court to permit Officer Frederick Perkins to testify as an expert regarding the nature of the white substance contained in the plastic packet. Specifically, appellant claims that the fact that Officer Perkins does not have a degree in chemistry and had only taken elementary chemistry courses in college makes him unqualified to testify as an expert in the field of chemical analysis. The issue of a witness’ qualification to render an expert opinion rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision thereon will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.
Commonwealth v. Mangini,
Having found appellant’s numerous contentions to be without merit, we affirm the lower court’s judgment of sentence.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Despite appellant’s conviction, the lower court refused to increase the amount of appellant's $500 bail. Consequently, appellant remains free on bail pending resolution of this appeal.
. Our repeated attempts to obtain a copy of this transcript from the Clerk of Court of Philadelphia County were unsuccessful. Thus, we are forced to conclude that this transcript cannot be produced.
. We note that there were six continuances prior to the May 13 preliminary hearing: two were joint continuances, one was caused by the unavailability of defense counsel, two were the result of Commonwealth witnesses failing to appear, and one was caused by the Commonwealth’s need for a drug analysis.
. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom:
(2) any period of time for which the defendant expressly waives
Rule 1100[.]
Here, because appellant effectively waived the Rule 1100 rúndate from August 12 to November 22, 1980, the Commonwealth's November 21, 1980 extension petition was timely filed.
. The numbers to which the court refers are references to months and days. For example, “2-6” should be read as February 6.
. The only listing after February 13, 1981 (when the third Commonwealth extension was granted), and before the March 24, 1981 run-date, was March 23. On that date, appellant failed to appear for trial and a bench warrant was issued. Clearly, the unavailability of appellant is not chargeable to the Commonwealth. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)(3)(i). Subsequently, on March 30, 1981, appellant waived Rule 1100 to June 3, 1981.
. We have repeatedly disapproved of the “practice of some courts of delaying consideration of a timely Rule 1100(c) petition until after the period has run.”
Commonwealth v. Mancuso,
247 Pa.Superior Ct. 245, 250 n. 3,
. Unlike appellant, we do not find it significant that Officer Murdoch had never previously witnessed a drug transaction in which credit cards were used.
. Neither of these two credit cards belonged to appellant or his cohort, and a subsequent investigation revealed them to have been stolen. However, the receiving stolen property charge against appellant was nol prossed prior to his arraignment.
. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertion, we find that appellant’s allegations in his written post-trial motions, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction and that his conspiracy conviction was contrary to law, were sufficient to preserve his “Wharton’s Rule” issue.
. In
Commonwealth v. Sell,