138 A. 915 | Pa. | 1927
Argued May 23, 1927.
These two cases raise but one question, viz.: Did the court below err in valuing defendant's no-par capital stock at $100 per share, when determining the amount of bonus which should be paid on the various increases thereof? Defendant being a domestic corporation, this question is to be answered by considering only the statutes of the State; it is not affected by any provision of the Constitution of the United States, or the Acts of Congress passed in pursuance thereof: Roberts
Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson,
Section 1 of our Act of May 3, 1899, P. L. 189, provides "That all corporations hereafter created under any general or special law of this Commonwealth [with certain exceptions] . . . . . . shall pay to the State treasurer, for the use of the Commonwealth, a bonus of one-third of one per centum upon the amount of the capital stock which said company is authorized to have, and a like bonus on any subsequent authorized increase thereof." By section 3 of the Act of February 9, 1901, P. L. 3, 5, the bonus is to be paid "upon the actual increase of the capital stock," but the pertinent provisions of section 1 *384 of the Act of 1899, above quoted, are not otherwise altered. In the present case, the bonus has been calculated only "upon the actual increase of [defendant's] capital stock."
When these statutes were passed, no-par shares had not been authorized in Pennsylvania. This was first done by the Act of July 12, 1919, P. L. 914, section 11 of which [P. L. 916] provides that "For the purpose of computing the bonus required to be paid under the laws of this Commonwealth . . . . . . each share of stock without any nominal or par value, under the provisions of this act, shall be the equivalent of a share having a nominal or par value of $100." It is clear that this refers to shares of stock, for so it says, and hence it is not necessary to consider the numerous statutes and decisions, industriously compiled by defendant's counsel, showing that the words "capital stock" may refer to corporate assets; such statutes and decisions are irrelevant here.
Assuming the Act of 1919 to be constitutional, as we will hereinafter show it is, the accuracy of the decision below seems hardly open to attack. Appellant urges, however, that we decided the other way in Com. v. Wayne Sewerage Co.,
Appellant next contends that the Act of 1919 offends against article III, section 3, of our state Constitution, which provides that "No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." We do not agree with this contention. The title is as follows: "An act authorizing stock corporations, other than building and loan associations and corporations authorized by law to transact a banking or insurance business, to make provision, upon formation, reorganization, merger, or consolidation, for the issue of either or both preferred or common shares without nominal or par value; regulating the same and such corporations; and prescribing the method of determining the number of shares and capital of corporations issuing shares in such manner." *386
Few, if any of the provisions of the Constitution, are as often invoked as this one, and its scope and effect should now be fairly well settled. In Reeves v. Phila. Surburban Water Co.,
Nor can appellant be heard to assert that the Act of 1919 violates article III, section 6, of the state Constitution. This objection was not made in the exceptions filed in the court below, and cannot be presented here for the first time: Delaware, Lackawanna Western R. R. Co. v. Com.,
The Act of April 20, 1927, which was passed to "amend, revise, consolidate and change the laws relating to bonus," is prospective only, and has no relevancy here.
The judgments of the court below are affirmed. *388