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Commonwealth v. Brown
399 A.2d 699
Pa. Super. Ct.
1979
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*1 Ms. Helfrich cross-examining before transcript secure the circumstances, there was no these Under following day. the continuance. denying reversible error reasons, judgment of sentence of For the foregoing affirmed. the court below is hereby J., JACOBS, HOFFMAN, former President consideration or decision of this case. not in the participate Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH BROWN, Appellant. Bradley Pennsylvania. Superior Court of Dec. 1977. Submitted March Decided June Appeal Petition for Allowance of Granted *2 Packel, Defender, Chief, Public Appeals John W. Assistant Division, for Philаdelphia, appellant. Chief, Stiles, Attorney, Ap- R. Assistant District

Michael Commonwealth, Division, appellee. Philadelphia, peals JACOBS, WATKINS, President and Judge, Before CERCONE, PRICE, der HOFFMAN, VAN VOORT SPAETH, JJ.

PRICE, Judge: 28, 1977, appellant non-jury January

Following ag- robbery3 of criminal guilty conspiracy,2 was found motions for a new trial and in assault.4 Post-trial gravated denied, and was sen- were judgment arrest of from four to ten imprisonment years to a term of tenced proba- and a term of charge, state-supervised on the robbery on the criminal conspiracy charge, proba- tion of five years imposed tion ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍to run consecutive sentence The that the as- sentencing court found robbery charge. into the bill. now charge merged Appellant robbery sault him be charges against contends that the should dismissed violated his to a right speedy because the Commonwealth reasons, following under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100. For thе agree are constrained to with contention. we *3 2, 1976, a criminal was complaint lodged On April him charging robbery, aggravated with against appellant the of Pa.R. precept assault and criminal Under conspiracy. 1100(a)(2),5the Commonwealth had 180 to days Crim.P. 21, 1976, bring appellаnt May appellant peti to trial. On the below to certain evidence. On suppress tioned court 15, 1976, after 175 had run for Rule 1100 days November motion to was heard the appellant’s by purpo.es,6 below, DiBona, per Judge court below. The court granted evidence, as to but denied it as to appellant’s physical motion after appellant’s Immediately ruling confession. motions, DiBona, sua recused himself from sponte, 2. 18 Pa.C.S. 903. §

3. 18 Pa.C.S. 3701. §

4. 18 § Pa.C.S. 2702. 1100(a)(2) provides

5. Pa.R.Crim.P. that: “Trial in a court case in complaint against which a written is filed the defendant after June 30, eighty days 1974 shall cоmmence no later than one hundred complaint from the date on which the is filed.” waiver, Appellant waiving signed thereby 6. a written his Rule 1100 rights forty-two day period September for a between and Novem- time, therefore, period calculating ber 15. This is excluded from the run time under Rule case case-in-chief, continued the to Decem- through the run for bills 136 1976, even date though ber 22.7 was November to a to extend petition failed file The Commonwealth December through i. e. November 15 period,8 this during which is time, properly no within period, and there was filed an 1100(d).9 Aрpellant applica- under Rule excludable 7, 1976, days fifteen after on tion to dismiss December was by This motion denied run of November 22. on 14,1976. December on December On lower court case until the trial listings subsequent all other his Rule 1100 rights. waived January we are com- appeаl, the facts of the instant upon Based was to right speedy to hold that pelled him to failure bring due to violated Commonwealth’s Rule 1100. trial within the time mandated pur- normally day have the 182nd would been November However, calculating poses Rule 1100 run time. since Saturday, day, plus day, on а it, 180th November fell succeeding computation Sunday immediately are omitted from See § of the run time. 1 Pa.C.S.A 1908. 1100(c)provides 8. Rule that: any prior expiration period for commence- to the “At trial, may apply attorney for the Commonwealth ment extending of trial. for cоmmencement court for an order the time upon copy application A through be the defendant of such shall served attorney, any, shall have the his if and the defendant also granted only application if right be be heard Such shall thereon. period despite prescribed be within the trial cannot due commenced granting Any diligence such order the Commonwealth. specify period application within which the trial shall the date *4 shall be commenced.” 1100(d)provides that: 9. Rule trial, determining period of there “In the for commencеment delay stage period any at of excluded such of shall be therefrom proceedings as from: the results attorney; unavailability defendant or his the (30) days granted (2) any thirty at the continuance in excess only attorney, provided request the the or his that defendant (30th) period beyond day be so the thirtieth shall excluded.” past time It be noted we have held in the that the should that period during judge not be which has recused himself should a Commonwealth v. 168, Bellamy, Pa.Super. charged appellant. 254 (1978). 385 A.2d 579

131 forth two which it grounds upon The Commonwealth sets of the court below should be opinion contends that the First, the contends that appel- affirmed. Commonwealth 15, 1976, that on lant’s trial commenced on November date for suppres- below heard motion appellant’s which court contention, To the Common- support sion of evidence. 1100,10 to Rule and Philadelphia wealth cites Comment IV). IV (Phila.R.C.P.C. Pleas Court Rule 600 600 Common Rule 1100 that trial commenc- provides The Comment to “[a] parties es when the trial determines that are judge them to to . proceed and ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍directs hear- present for the of motions which hаve been reserved ing . 600 IV that provides . .” Phila.R.C.P.C. “[a]ll in e. non-major pretrial suppression applications non-jury] [/. in the same hearing criminal cases shall be listed court- non-major room on same as the case scheduled Commonwealth, essence, in contends for trial.” The that motion, viewed in light when Phila.R.C. suppression IV, as a motion P.C. 600 should be classified “reserved for therefore, and, that signal time of trial” trial com- contention, menced under Rule 1100. With this we cannot agree. 1100,

In the we have held that under Rule past, normally, when commences the lower court ascertains that parties are and orders them to present proceed hearing of motion which had been reserved for any trial. Commonwealth v. Byrd, 250 378 A.2d Pa.Super. 921 Lamonna, see also v. Commonwealth (1977); Pa. 373 (1977). However, A.2d 1355 was holding expounded v. the case of Commonwealth Taylor, upon this court “[although proce- 10. This court has stated that the comments to our only interpretation dural rules serve as aids of those rules and us, binding upon adopted are not defini- we the Rule Comment (citation omitted)” tion of trial commencemеnt . . Common- Taylor, Pa.Super. wealth v. 985. See also Byrd, (1977). Pa.Super. 378 A.2d 921 However, case, present in view of the in this we are circumstances convinced that the motion to did not not, therefore, step signify constitute a first trial and commencement of trial under the Comment definition. *5 132 211, (1978), 984 wherein we stated

254 385 A.2d Pa.Super. will not that a motion which had been reserved for trial unless of trial under Rule 1100 the commencement signify time and “. . .it reflects a commitment of resources directly guilt-determining into the court below leads “Thus, Id., at A.2d at 254 385 process.” Pa.Super. a a motion will mark the commencement of trial hearing on is (1) under the accused warned only adequately Rule 1100 if that has until the time of trial hearing been reserved leads into hearing actually directly guilt-de- Dozier, v. 258 termining process.” Commonwealth Pa.Su- 367, 371-372, (1978). 392 per. A.2d 840 Dozier, As in v. Commonwealth supra, Commonwealth that, in the shows аlthough instant asserts record appeal on motion to was not hearing trial, it reserved for nevertheless did constitute explicitly procedures of because of the estab commencement Rules lished of Criminal Procedure. Philadelphia Dozier, must be However, rеject argument as in we shows that appellant’s suppression cause the record clearly guilt-determining did not lead into the hearing directly days There was a between the process. span thirty himself and the date on on which DiBona recused rights. which waived his Rule 1100 subsequent regаrd Rule 1100 in to trial Since the requirements satisfied, reject commencement were not we must the Com IV, based on Phila.R.Crim.P. 600 argument, monwealth’s “ that trial commenced November timely ‘[A] rule of a adopted by pleas court common procedure cannot as our rules of be used a means circumvent ” Dozier, procedure.’ supra, Pa.Super. 258 at 840, citing at Commonwealth v. 476 Pugh, n.4, Pa. (1978). A.2d n.4 addition, In we recuses judge have held that when pre-trial himself motions reserved following trial, “As soon as time of trial cannot commence. [the case, recused himself frоm the a trial could not judge] case, . . since the judge commence . . In the instant *6 recused himself there was no in this ‘jury’ trial. non-jury Therefore, trial had not ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍. . .” begun Commonwealth 168, 169, 254 Bellamy, Pa.Super. 385 A.2d 580 (1978).

The Commonwealth’s second contention is that appel lant, silent while by remaining the lower сourt continued his case beyond date, the Rule 1100 run waived his Rule 1100 Indeed, rights. the court below came to the same conclu defendant, sion. “The his silence and apparent consent 15, 1976, on November led hearing judge and the Com 15, 1976, monwealth to conclude that the Decеmber him; date was therefore, to he acceptable cannot now claim the rule has been violated.” (Slip opinion 6). at With contention, we cannot agree. This court has considered such arguments the past, and has held that mere silence to a continuance which sets the date for trial the Rule 1100 run beyond date is not sufficient to constitute a waiver of appellant’s Rule 1100 rights.

“The Commonwealth . . . that even if argues is not 17, 1975, deemed to commence until November her appellant waived to relief right under Rule 1100 by failing object when thе lower court announced that the case would not be listed for trial until October 2nd term of court. It is of course true that ‘. . .a defendant waive may or consent to a violation of Rule 1100 his failure to raise the issue.’ Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 373 supra, [248,] [1355,] A.2d 1358 (1977); Commonwealth v. 468 Myrick, Pa. (1976). nоt, however, It is the defendant’s duty himself

bring to trial. E. g., Adams, Commonwealth v. 237 Pa. Super. (1975). more, A.2d 97 Without appellant’s failure to object to the lower court’s decision to list the case for trial after the of the expiration mandato cannot be ry period viewed as constituting consent to noncompliance with Rule 1100. and citation [footnote Commonwealth v. supra, Pa.Super. Taylor, omitted].” at 385 A.2d at 986-987. after the begin expiration

Since trial did not until not his to claim right did waive mandatory period, appellant no periods and there were violation Rule record,11 we must hold that ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍excludable apparent Rule 1100 rights. violated is reversed, and of sentence is judgment The discharged. J., VOORT, dissenting files a statement.

VAN der WATKINS, Judges, former JACOBS President J., HOFFMAN, not the consideration participate *7 decision of this case. dissenting: VOORT, Judge,

VAN der of discharge I dissent from the release respectfully the trial court grounds the in this cаse the defendant 1100. Pa.R.Crim.P. violated is or the procedure issue in this case whether not

The hear- suppression at the conclusion a continuing case any himself from hearing Judge after which the recused ing, the end of which thirty days for a hearing, period further the Run date and to was after period twenty-three days nor his neither the defendant counsel which continuance directly is into the objection, sufficiently leading made any a first in the trial to guilt step determining process of Rule 1100. requirements with prompt the comply pretrial of a motion held hearing have held that the We complies followed immediately by until the of trial case, hearing the on the In the instant with Rule 1100. 15, 1976. At the was on November to motion suppressed physical hearing Judge conclusion of the The suppress appellant’s to confession. but refused evidence n.6, have, previously as in taken into account 11. We noted days September forty-two (42) from 24 to November exclusion by reason of written waiver. in order that another then recused himself Judge hearing testimony hear the case uninfluenced might by hearing Judge The suppression heаring. adduced at objection the case to December 1976. No then continued made nor his day by appellant to this continuance was thirty of the fact that any counsel nor did make issue days the time of trial placed twenty-three this continuance Run date of Novembеr after the finds it hearing Judge I that where a suppression believe participation to himself from further recuse appropriate in the case to a hearing trial and the further postpones Run with the coupled after the date twenty-three days nor his counsel makе any fact that neither the defendant the issue of trial under prompt to such a objection delay waived the defendant. Rule 1100 has been part tried a of this case hearing Judge The suppression he held a motion and made suppression when on the motion. The continuance of ruling thirty day for the benefit of the defendant who trial was ordered he later acquiesced postponement. Thirty days dismiss for failure of the Commonwealth filed his petition him within the 180 as Rule days required by try is what is familiarly The tactics utilized defense After lulling called “sand the Commonweаlth. bagging” *8 into that the continuance believing the defense turns around and says trial was satisfactory, continuance, now if I in this I acquiesce effect “even discharge.” I would hold that my take it back and demand ordered at the conclusion of thirty days continuance appеar to enable the defendant to suppression ‍​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍trial, ac- for the conclusion of his before another Judge defendant, hiatus does not create such an quiesced if it did sever the trial process process as to sever the trial was waived the defendant prompt requirement made no objection proceedings. when he of sentence. I would affirm the judgment

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Brown
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Jun 15, 1979
Citation: 399 A.2d 699
Docket Number: 1556
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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