104 Ky. 306 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1898
delivered the opinion op the court.
The appellee, Bragg, and two othefis, were jointly indicted under section 1164, Ky. Stat., charged with feloniously breaking a storehouse, with intent to steal, and feloniously taking goods therefrom, etc. A separate trial being had, the' appellee was acquitted, the other defendants pleading guilty. At the same term of court appellee was indicted under section 1199, Kentucky Statutes,, charged with receiving stolen goods. The second indict
The sole question presented is whether the acquittal under the indictment for feloniously breaking, etc., is a bar to the prosecution of the indictment for receiving stolen goods. It is true that it might be competent to prove certain facts, such as the possession of the stolen property, under an indictment for either offense; but the offenses charged in the two indictments seem to us to be separate and distinct offenses, which not only could not be joined in one indictment, but are entirely incompatible with each other, for, if appellee was present at the breaking of the storehouse, and took the goods at that time and place, he was a party to the housebreaking, and clearly could not be found guilty of receiving stolen property, within the meaning of section 1199. If appellee was guilty of the one offense as to the particular property found in his possession, he could not have been guilty of the other. Moreover, section 126 of the Criminal Code expressly forbids the joinder in one indictment of charges other than those which are grouped to