Commonwealth v. BoydCommonwealth v. Boyd
OPINION BY
In this аppeal, we are asked to address whether the requirement of issue preservation applies to claims that the sentencing court breached a duty in imposing a sentence that admittedly does not exceed the statutory maximum. Specifically, we must determine whether a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider the defendant’s аbility to pay before imposing fines, in contravention of
As Boyd’s claim on appeal is that there was no evidentiary basis for the fines im
Appellant, Martin Roger Boyd, Jr., was arrested following a shooting during the early morning hours of April 3, 2009. Thereafter, a jury found Boyd guilty of aggravated assault — serious bodily injury, attempted aggravated assault — serious bodily injury, two counts of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), two counts of simple assault, and carrying a firearm without a license. On June 24, 2010, the sentenсing court sentenced Boyd to an aggregate term of incarceration of not less than eight and one-half years to not more than twenty years. The sentencing court also imposed fines, costs, and restitution upon Boyd.
Boyd filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court ordered Boyd to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Boyd filed a timely statement, and the trial court filed its opinion in support of the verdict and sentence on September 16, 2010. Boyd’s appeal is now ripe for our review.
On appeal, Boyd argues that his sentence is illegal as the sentencing court failed to consider Boyd’s ability to pay the fines imposed. A sentencing court “shall not sentence a defendant to pay a fine unless it appears of record that ... the defendant is or will be able to pay the fine-” 42 Pa. Cons.StatAnn.
It is undisputed that Boyd failed to raise this issue at sentencing, through a post-sentence motion, or in his statement of matters complained of on appeal. For most issues, this failure, sometimes referred to as a failure to preserve the issue, would deem the issue waived for appellate review. Nevertheless, some issues carry such weight that Pennsylvania appellatе courts have refused to find them waived even when an appellant has not preserved the issue by raising it in the trial court.
One class of issues that has traditionally not needed to be preserved through presentation to the court below involves what has been called the “legality” of a criminal sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins,
[t]he classic claim of an illegal sentence is where the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense(s). A court is simply unauthorized to impose such a sentence. Another example of a clearly illegal sentence is one imposed by a court lacking jurisdiction.
Commonwealth v. Foster,
Boyd argues that the sentencing court lacked the authority to impose a fine without first determining, from evidence of record, that he had the ability to pay the fine. Therefore, Boyd’s argument continues, his claim is one that implicates the legality of the sentence and is therefore immune to waiver. In support, Boyd cites to lan
In Foster, the Supreme Court was asked to review this Court’s decision to vacate a mandatory minimum sentence. In particular, the Supreme Court was required to review the predicate conclusion that a challenge to the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence that was still within statutory guidelines constituted a non-waivable challenge to the legality of the sentence. See Foster,
It is true that the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this Court’s vacation of the mandatory minimum sentence. However, it is equally true that no single rationale for the vacation of the sentence garnered the support of a majority of the Justices. The lead opinion was authоred by Justice Baer, and joined by Justices Todd and McCaffery. The lead opinion states that the legality of the sentence imposed is
only implicated when a sentencing court’s inherent, discretionary authority to wield its statutorily prescribed sentencing powers is supplanted, abrogated, or otherwise limited, or the legislature’s intent in fashioning a sentence hаs been potentially misapplied. In our view, there is little doubt that when a sentencing court has no alternative but to impose a certain minimum sentence, its authority to act has been infringed upon. Thus, under this Commonwealth’s jurisprudence, any challenge thereunder must relate to a sentence’s legality.
Foster,
Under this reasoning, it is arguable that Boyd’s claim on appeal implicates the legality of his sentence.
As noted above, however, the lead opinion in Foster did not receive the support of a majority of the Justices. Three separate concurring opinions were penned, cumulatively recеiving the votes of the remaining four Justices. A close reading of the three concurring opinions reveals that the lead opinion’s reasoning was rejected by a majority of the Court.
Chief Justice Castille authored a concurring opinion, joined by former Justice Orie Melvin, that is critical of the reasoning employed by the lead opinion: “The difficulty here is that, tо make the case fit within its paradigm, the lead Justices adopt an overly broad rule redefining the concept of ‘illegal sentence.’ ” Foster,
Justice Saylor authored a second concurring opinion, in which he states:
To the degree [the lead opinion] reflects that review of lеgality-of-sentence claims has been made available in limited categories of cases beyond those involving claims that sentences exceeded statutory máximums — despite non-adherence to ordinary principles of issue preservation and presentation — I support its reasoning and holding.
To the extent, however, the lead opinion сonceives a rule of general application and/or sanctions, as the reviewability litmus, application of the dichotomy between claims of legal error and discretionary aspects of sentencing ... I hold a different view similar to that of Mr. Chief Justice Castille.
Id.,
Finally, Justice Eakin wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Cas-tille. This concurring opinion opines that, so long as the sentence remains within the statutory limits, it cannot be considered illegal. See id.,
Thus, we conclude that four Justices rejected the lead opinion’s application of the “bright line” test, and implicitly this Court’s line of en banc cаses that have followed such a test, and instead favored some form of balancing test when evaluating whether a sentencing claim is subject to waiver for procedural defaults. The exact contours of the balancing test are not well-defined, and may, in fact, be a source of contention even between the four Justices favoring such a test. We are therefore left to balance the interests involved based upon the circumstances of the case presently before us relative to the circumstances present in Foster.
Initially, we note the explicit language of the mandate contained in
After reviewing these categories, we conclude that only the first type of claim qualifies as non-waivable under Foster.
In contrast, the other categories of claims concerning the sentencing court’s consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay are subject to waiver under Foster. These claims would require the application of discretionary reasoning to the record before the sentencing court.
In the present case, Boyd argues that the sentencing court erred in imposing “financial conditions upon his sentences without an evidentiary basis.” Therefore, Boyd’s clаim falls into the first category of claims regarding the application of
However, we note that there was an evidentiary basis for the trial court’s imposition of fines. The sentencing court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report dated Aрril 14, 2010. This PSI report contains significant information regarding Boyd’s educational history, employment history, and existing assets. This information provided the sentencing court with an evidentia-ry basis upon which to impose a fine. Accordingly, we conclude that Boyd’s claim that the sentencing court violated
Boyd also contends that he was “not permitted to produce evidence” of his ability to pay the fine, and therefore various Constitutional rights were violated. However, we conclude that Boyd’s argument misconstrues the nature of the record before us. A sentencing hearing was held. The PSI report was placed into the record. Boyd’s counsel had the opportunity to supplement the record, but did not take advantage of this opportunity. As such, Boyd’s argument merits no relief.
In his alternate issue on appeal, Boyd argues that his convictions are against the weight of the evidence adduced at trial. Specifically, Boyd argues that the weight of the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the person who shot the victim. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10. Our standard of review is well-settled:
The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence as the fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and determines the credibility of the witnesses. As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment fоr that of the finder of fact. Therefore, we will reverse a jury’s verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. A verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks one’s sense of justice when “the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal,” or when “the jury’s verdict, at the timе of itsrendition, causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial conscience.”
Furthermore, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidencе. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Cruz,
In addressing this argument, the trial court states:
After a thorough review of the record, the Court finds that the jury’s verdict is not so contrary to the evidence so as to make the award of a new trial imperative. The jury was free to bеlieve the testimony of the six eyewitnesses who identified the Defendant as being involved in an altercation, pulling out a shiny object from his waistband, and hearing and/or seeing shots then fired. The witnesses testified at length as to where the shooting occurred and the observations they made of the Defendant. Medical personnel also testified regarding the injuries sustained by оne of the victims. An ammunition round as well as spent casings were introduced into evidence as well as photos of where the items were located when found. A firearm and tool mark examiner testified that the spent casings all came from the same weapon and that there was a possibility that the live bullet came from another weapon. Therе was also testimony at trial regarding a search warrant executed at Defendant’s residence and the clothing seized matching the descriptions given by the eyewitnesses. The jury verdict does not shock one’s sense of justice and is not against the weight of the evidence.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/2010, at 2. We cannot conclude that this reasoning constitutes an abuse of discretion, and therefore find no error.
In summary, we conclude that Boyd’s sentencing claim merits no relief as there was an evidentiary basis for the imposition of fines, and that Boyd was not prevented from supplementing the record in this regard. We further conclude that Boyd’s claim that his convictions were against the weight of the evidence at trial merits no relief. As such, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.