62 Pa. Super. 40 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1916
Opinion bv
The charge of perjury against the appellant arose out of a controversy between Mrs. Violet Boliver and Fedor Tode in regard to a lease for certain premises in the City of Pittsburgh. Mrs. Boliver caused a judgment to be entered against Tode on a lease containing a warrant of attorney for the confession of judgment. Tode, denying that he executed the lease, made application to the Court of Common Pleas to open the judgment, on which application a rule to show cause was granted. The appellant was called as a witness in behalf of the defendant in the judgment and testified among other things that Mrs. Boliver showed him a lease from her to Tode some time in the year, 1911, and that it was not signed by Tode. This was about two years after the date of the lease on which the judgment was entered. In answer to an inquiry whether the witness Mad an opportunity to see all the papers that Tode had there he answered, “Of course, we lived together six years me and Mrs. Boliver, nearly six years from 1905 to 1911.” The first, fourth, eighth, ninth and tenth assignments of error re
In the fifth, sixth and seventh assignments exception is taken to that part of the charge in which instruction was given as to the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence to support the principal witness. On this point the trial judge said, “I may explain to you now that in perjury a defendant cannot be convicted of that offense unless the testimony of the Commonwealth ig sworn to positively by one witness and is corroborated by other substantial facts”; and at another place in the charge in answer to a verbal request of the defendant’s counsel: “I repeat that it is your duty to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and I have defined to you what a reasonable doubt is, of every material allegation in this indictment by the evidence, not only of one witness, but of substantial corroborating circumstances.” It is contended for the appellant that this is an erroneous statement of the law; that the obligation of the Conn monwealth is to make out a case by the testimony of at least two witnesses or by one witness and such other evidence or circumstance as amounts to a second witness. At an early date the rule contended for prevailed in England and in some of the states in this country, but it has for a long time been modified and can no longer be regarded as in force where the testimony of a single witness is so far corroborated in a material matter as to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. The rule is thus expressed in Wigmore on Evidence, No. 2042, “As to the nature of the corrobora
The inquiry of the jury was limited to three of the subjects assigned as perjury in the indictment, the truth or falsity of each of which was submitted for consideration. We are unable to find from an examination of the charge that the jury could have been left in doubt as to the duty to be performed. The indictment was so marked by the court that there could have been no mistake in regard to the issues to be determined nor as to the necessity of a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of. the defendant as to the matters specified. There was no request for special instruction and it is not apparent that further instruction was necessary to enlighten the jury on the matter referred to.
The action of the court in moulding the verdict of the jury was in accordance with the practice in such cases
The judgment is affirmed and the record remitted to the court below with direction that the defendant appear in that court at such time as he may be there called and that he be by said court committed until he has complied with that part of the sentence which had not been performed at the time this appeal was made a supersedeas.