This is an appeal from the denial of appellant’s Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) petition without a hearing after the appointment of counsel. The court held that appellant waived his right to PCHA relief by waiting nine and one-half years before bringing this collateral attack on his judgment of sentence. Although the court erred in finding a waiver, we affirm the denial of rеlief due to the frivolity of appellant’s PCHA petition.
Appellant was sixteen years old when arrested for first degree murder and other offenses. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, his judgment of sentence was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on October 16, 1974.
Commonwealth v. Blagman,
Appellant’s excuses for the delay included his youth at the time of triаl, his IQ of eighty-seven, his family’s inability to afford counsel for him, his second-grade reading level and his ignorance of the law and how to prepare a petition. On the other hand, apрellant was twenty years old when first incarcerated at Camp Hill in 1973. When he arrived, the law clinic told him to wait until a decision was made on his direct appeal. In 1978, appellant оbtained a high school equivalency diploma, yet did nothing for five more years until he was transferred to Pittsburgh in 1983. While at Camp Hill, appellant used both the legal clinic and the law library, but never filed a postconviction petition until March, 1984.
After the hearing, the court concluded as a matter of law that appellant’s “delay of approximately nine and one-half years bars consideration of [his] petition for relief.” The court cited
Commonwealth v. Alexander,
This was error. “The concept of laches ... has no place in the criminal law.”
Commonwealth v. Doria,
an unexplained delay in filing a PCHA petition is a factor to be considered in assessing the merits of the issues raised in the petition____ We should take care, then, to distinguish between finding a petitioner’s claims meritless based, in part, on delay in filing a PCHA petition, and dismissing a first PCHA petition without considering the claims raised therein____ The latter is inappropriate.
*370
Id.,
348 Pa.Superior Ct. at— - —,
The cases relied upon by the Commonwealth and by the PCHA court do not support the conclusion that a delay in filing may constitute a waiver of the right to file a first PCHA petition. The cases, instead, involved waivеr of the right to withdraw a guilty plea due to unexplained delay following sentencing or involved waiver of a specific issue rather than waiver of the right to file a PCHA petition.
See Commonwealth v. Alexander,
We must therefore consider the merits of appellant’s PCHA petition and determine whether he is entitled tо a hearing on any of the claims raised therein. A hearing is required when “a petition alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief”; no hearing is necessary “if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support either in the record or from other evidence submitted by the petitioner.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9549. Inasmuch as appellant’s claims are patently frivolous and without a trace of support, no hearing is required to deny the relief requested in his petition.
*371 Appellant’s postconviction petition challenged trial counsel’s effectiveness on five grounds: 1) failure to challenge confessions which were the product of unnecessary delay between arrest and аrraignment, 2) failure to raise the issue of the voluntariness of his confession when he was a sixteen-year-old juvenile with a second-grade reading level, 3) failure to object to improper prosecutorial remarks and to preserve this issue on appeal, 4) failure to object to the inadequacy of the jury charge, and 5) failure to call a cruсial witness to testify at trial.
When reviewing the effectiveness of counsel, we determine first whether the underlying claim has merit. If it does, we then ask whether counsel’s handling of the matter had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Counsel is not ineffective unless there was no reasonable basis for the action, and counsel may not be faulted for failing to take baseless or meritless action. Finally, a finding of ineffectiveness requires a showing that the course of action pursued by counsel was prejudicial to the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Clemmons,
The first two issues have been finally litigated' adversely to appellant. The arguments made by appellant were considered and rejected by the supreme court оn direct appeal ten years ago.
Commonwealth v. Blagman, supra,
Appellant’s remaining allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel provide no grounds for relief. “Where it is clear that allegаtions of ineffectiveness of counsel are baseless or meritless then an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and the unfounded allegations should be rejected and dismissed.”
Commonwealth v. Clemmons,
*372 The third issue is а spurious claim that trial counsel was inéffective in failing to object to unspecified prejudicial remarks during the prosecutor’s closing statement at trial. Appellant’s argument is thаt counsel did not raise the issue of prejudicial prosecutorial remarks either at trial or on direct appeal, and his failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance. Appellant, however, provides absolutely no basis for us to assume that any prejudicial comments were actually made during closing argument. 1
The fourth issue is that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the inadequacy of the jury charge at appellant’s trial. He makes specific reference to the absence of instructiоns on appellant’s own testimony, on circumstantial evidence and on expert opinion testimony, as well as a failure to charge the jury on the burden of proof as to the voluntariness of his confession.
Where a charge to the jury adequately states the law and creates no likelihood of confusion, counsel will not be deemed ineffective in failing to oppose the charge. Commonwealth v. Rowles,501 Pa. 514 ,462 A.2d 619 (1983). In reviewing a jury’s instruction we must look to the whole charge, and not just isolated excerpts therefrom. Commonwealth v. Waller,322 Pa.Super. 11 ,468 A.2d 1134 (1983).
Commonwealth v. Davis,
Finally, appellant challenges trial counsel’s effectiveness for failing to call “a crucial witness” to testify at trial. Not only has appellant neglected to explain how the testi *373 mony was crucial to appellant’s case, he has failed to identify the witness. In 1981, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
Assertions of ineffеctiveness in a vacuum cannot be ineffectiveness. Counsel who is alleging ineffectiveness must set forth an offer to prove at an appropriate hearing sufficient faсts upon which a reviewing court can conclude that trial counsel may have, in fact, been ineffective. This Court will no longer consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the abstract.
Commonwealth v. Pettus,
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order denying aрpellant’s petition for postconviction relief.
Notes
. The record does not contain a transcript of the closing arguments during appellant’s trial. We are informed that the сourt reporter’s death during the intervening ten years has rendered the notes of testimony permanently unavailable. It is this sort of possibility which makes delay in raising a claim an important factor in evaluating the merits of the claim.