Opinion by
Since the decision of this case by the learned court below, the whole substance of the litigation has been taken out of it by the repeal of the statute under which it arose. It is there
Section 4 of article 7 of the Act of May 23, 1889, P. L. 299, for the government of cities of the third class, рrovided that the “ council shall fix by ordinance the number, rank and compensation of the members of the city poliсe force, and prescribe all necessary rules and regulations for the organization and government thereоf. . . . The mayor shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the select council appoint, suspend or dismiss the said policemen, any or all of them, and in like manner all vacancies shall be filled.”
The first question that arises is thе construction of this section with reference to the mayor’s power as to the removal of a policеman once duly appointed and confirmed. Notwithstanding the opinion of the learned judge below, and the argument here, the language of the act is too clear to admit of any but one construction. The mayor “shall nominate,” thаt is his individual act not needing the concurrence or subject to the control of other authority. Then he shall “ by and with the advice and consent of the select council, appoint, suspend or dismiss.” All of the steps with reference to thе assumption of office and the removal, temporary or permanent, from it, are classed together and аlike required to be with the advice and consent of the select council. There is no diff eren ce in this regard, betwеen appointment and suspension or removal, and we could not make a distinction without contravening the plаin language of the legislature and its manifest intent.
It is argued that as the general purpose of the act is to chargе the mayor with the responsibility of maintaining the peace and security of the city through the police, it is necessаry that he should have such control over its individual members as will enable him to enforce discipline and be served by thosе in harmony with him. The learned judge below was much influenced by this view. But on the other hand it is undeniable that much of the best recent thought devoted to municipal government tends to the elimination of politics and personal influences from considеration and the establishment as far as practicable of a tenure of good behavior for all subordinate and non-political positions. The subject was earnestly and exhaustively discussed in the first congress and subsequently. See
There remains the question of constitutionality. Section 4 of article 6 provides that “ apрointed officers other than judges of the courts of record, and the superintendent of public instruction may be remоved at the'pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed.”
The fullest discussion of this provision that has been had so far is to be found in Houseman v. Com. ex rel. Tener,
