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Commonwealth v. Bellis
421 A.2d 271
Pa. Super. Ct.
1981
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*2 WATKINS, SPAETH, JJ. and Before HESTER WATKINS, Judge: Pleas, to us from the Court Common

This comes appeal Division, defendant-appellant’s involves the Criminal common law crimes his convictions of the appeal malfeasance, in office. De- misfeasance, and nonfeasance extortion and the conspiracy, charged fendant had been acquitted conspiracy common law crimes. He was tried first in the Defendant charges. extortion appealed and then Philadelphia County Municipal Court novo trial before the Court his conviction for a de He was tried before County. of Philadelphia Common Pleas on March of the common law crimes and convicted jury 28, 1977, defendant was sentenced to a September On $9,000 fined (2) (7) years term in to seven prison of two his conviction appeals the costs of He now plus prosecution. of the common law crimes. that the defendant it was established trial

At defendant’s of Philadelphia Council City was an elected member one It was also established that leader. majority and its in obtaining who was interested was an architect John Betts buildings Philadelphia work design contracts for was an Joseph Daly At this time one Airport. International Democratic City Treasurer assistant to the Party, was a member of the Democratic Committee. Beilis party Philadelphia. the majority political lunch Beilis at the Betts was invited to May, had told Betts that he Philadelphia. Beilis Locust Club from downtown” which “to meet some people wanted Betts people was to meet some to mean that he Betts understood meeting This from the Democratic Committee. Beilis also testimony. Betts’ according Beilis initiated time Beilis knew lunch. At this to the same Daly invited and had Party, in the Democratic position knew of his Daly, *3 do with anybody to “long anything known him before he had meeting Daly At the time of the lunch at Committee”. City of an planning was involved “was aware that Betts through . . . Airport at the International airport structure . . the grapevine.” . left the table. At that meeting the lunch Beilis

During work discussing Betts’ at the began and Betts point Daly budget for the discussed the amount airport. They The contract, fee, proceeding. how the work was Betts’ it $180,000. then told Betts that Daly fee was not to exceed of their fee to the give for to 5% architects “customary immediately agreed Betts Democratic Committee”. City were discussed at that of the pay-off do this. No details table, no further discussion time, Beilis returned that time. place of the contracts took contract for design In Betts received a June Beilis called Betts and $5,000. or about June On money some at this time”. give Betts to “them requested $4,000. “us” On June give Beilis told Betts that he should were he 29, 1971, Country went to the Philmont Club Betts $4,000 in Beilis containing cash. gave envelope Beilis an pocket. into his October placed envelope for an City Betts received the final contract with the addi- $175,000. tional fee Beilis Betts and an phoned requested

On July $5,000 on 1972 Betts July additional “contribution” $5,000 at the gave containing to Beilis Stouffer envelope Philadelphia bringing Restaurant in downtown the total $9,000. amount cash given pay- to Beilis Betts to The $9,000 ments of made to Beilis amounted 5% $180,000 fee. engineering design contract April

On Beilis and Betts had a conversation which that Betts been informed during Betts told Beilis had there was no record of Betts’ a donation to the giving Beilis told Betts Democratic Committee. City had It was also money “spread party”. been around established that Council had the “final approved capital improve- as to what was to be say” ments at airport. first on is that his convic- argument appeal

Defendant’s tions of the common law crimes should be reversed because specific statutory of the existence of crimes which deal with As au- charged. conduct of which the defendant for this the defendant cites former 18 thority proposition provides P.S. which that: en- provided duty “In all cases where a or remedy joined, directed to be done any thing act of the direction of said act provisions any assembly, inflicted, shall be and no shall be strictly pursued; penalty *4 or done of the com- anything agreeably provisions cases, be necessary mon law in such further than shall 1 such act into effect.” carrying Thus, actions amount to violations of if the defendant’s his convictions of the common criminal enactments statutory misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance charges law of in office cannot be sustained. repealed by Act of December

1. This section was Pa.C.S.A. § of a positive breach is “either the in office Misfeasance official of a a by public performance or the statutory duty motive”. corrupt or improper with an act discretionary (1942). Pa. Peoples, as the “breach has also been defined in office Malfeasance of a discretion- performance or the statutory duty positive motive.” McNair’s corrupt or improper an act with ary Thus, it is clear that (1936). Petition, Pa. 187 A. in office and misfeasance office the terms malfeasance or at best two same conduct to describe the are often used Common- the same offense. committing modes of different We Dolny, wealth therefore, interchangeably. the terms will, use we held that a defend- supra, Dolny, and nonfeasance be convicted of malfeasance ant may and conspiracy acquitted bribery he is although office the same proscribe does not bribery crime of because the misfeasance, malfea- law offenses conduct as the common that the reason office. We held sance and nonfeasance bribery may only a conviction for this was because the offender establishes that evidence sustained where the for his payment accept monetary or accepted agreed of which defendant offenses law action. The common or “improper the actor have require only convicted the instant is analysis applicable This corrupt motive”. of extortion rather charge statutory case which involved a (former 18 P.S. charge of extortion than because the bribery required of bribery, case of the crime 4318), as is the a “fee or reward” receive, take, to receive agree the actor or was not established which “fee or reward” for his conduct that the distinction Thus, outset appear law. it would at the extortion, on bribery between the crimes misfeasance, crimes of hand, law the one and the common hand, other office, on the nonfeasance in malfeasance and as an offenses) require, (statutory the fact that the former re- improperly offense, the defendant element of the other monetary payment some ceived or to receive agreed in the latter while in return for his conduct “reward” *5 is that the actor crimes) required law all that is be (common motive. “improper” “corrupt” motivated Bellis, However, the case of reversed the Supreme Court malfeasance, mis conviction of the offenses of defendant’s office, feasance, former 18 citing and nonfeasance in P.S. code, Code, (of the Penal Act of former 1104). case the defend June P.L. In that Sec. law ant was and the common crimes. bribery convicted of The reversed the convictions on common Supreme Court The bribery but conviction. Com law crimes affirmed from the distinguish monwealth to that case in attempts case that in case the defendant by pointing stant out our (which not was found of extortion we have found to guilty to analogous bribery be the crime of for our here as purposes above) discussed law crimes. guilty common This, argues, the Commonwealth indicates that no strongly remedy did in fact exist which was co-extensive statutory A analysis with the common law crimes. close that however, advanced opinion, reveals no such rationale there The held that since a statuto merely in. Court that case penalty existed for defendant’s misconduct Section ry the common law offenses. The precluded conviction for Court stated its opinion: guilty contention is he is not

“Appellant’s fourth malfeasance on mis- grounds his aforementioned (the could punished conduct be under Section only statute) and not under the common law. We bribery with this agree contention.” The Court then on to cite discussed that went Section application section’s to the case Peo of malfea ples, supra, reversed defendant’s conviction sance, misfeasance, doing, nonfeasance in office. In so (Section 4667) statutory the court stated “A penalty that: misconduct; therefore, pursuant exists for appellant’s for his miscon punished cannot Section (malfeasance).” in a of the common law duct based violation We Bellis, interpret holding this supra. Commonwealth v. convicted of defendant could have been mean if the offense, with the facts adduced consistent the case, he not also be then could the trial during *6 Whether not he common law offenses. convicted of the does not offenses was in fact convicted the at trial instant case the facts adduced matter. In the of defendant jury enable a to convict the were sufficient to did in reveals that the defendant extortion. The evidence $9,000 payments in improper receive cash fact personally Democratic that no record the The fact Betts. exists, and that money received this having Committee soon trip wife a to after Europe his on defendant took $4,000 coupled on July first receiving payment the defendant, himself who re with the it was the fact that evidence to certainly the was sufficient ceived payment fact, had, improp find defendant the to permit jury Therefore, a statutory because erly money. received the according law offense and not under the common Bellis, For that reason holding supra. malfeasance, we reverse misfea defendant’s conviction in office.2 sance and nonfeasance reversed; discharged. Judgments of sentence defendant SPAETH, J., concurring opinion. files a SPAETH, concurring: Judge, my but as agree discharged,

I must appellant separate the I this majority’s reasons differ from submit opinion. Municipal conviction Court

Following appellant’s appeal misbehavior in office and his to the lower court for a novo, trial de filed information con- the Commonwealth first sisting charged two counts. The count $4,000 with the with misbehavior in office connection 29, 1971; Betts payment from John on June the he received I, (18 The Act December No. Section Pa.C.S.A. 107(b), 1973), June abolished law crimes effective common providing it is a crime that: “No conduct constitutes crime unless under this or another statute of the Commonwealth.” title in connection with the same offense charged count second Betts on July received from $5,000 payment the bill of filed a subsequently 1972. The Commonwealth charged that he was informing appellant particulars 1) “[djuties imposed because he breached these offenses Rule Home Philadelphia under the officials upon public seq.,” 1.1-100 et Charter, Pennsylvania Title Code § 10.10-100; 2) duties set forth in section those specifically he, John Betts that conveyed impression “deliberately of a contract defendant, awarding influence the could International Terminal at regarding 3) gave impression Airport”; “deliberately International Betts, he, making political Betts that John to John occasions”; Betts 4) “gave John two contribution on defendant’s acting as Joseph Daly reason believe political where the Locust Club meeting at a agent *7 and John Joseph Daly between contributions were discussed 1 Betts.” of the Common- points the salient The outlines majority in the most favor- proof light wealth’s that proof. Viewing Commonwealth, the Commonwealth giving and able to the therefrom, reasonably arising inferences the benefit of all 27, Arizini, v. 277 419 A.2d 643 Pa.Super. Commonwealth y. 206, Madison, 397 Pa.Super. 263 (1980); Commonwealth entitled to find that I (1979), jury believe set forth in allegations proved had the Commonwealth however, remains, question The particulars. the bill in of- of misbehavior proof constituted whether that fice. proving at trial to that was restricted

1. The Commonwealth guilty the acts thus set forth in office because of was in the bill of of misbehavior particulars, other acts. Common and not because of Simione, 473, (1972); 764 Commonwealth Commonwealth 447 Pa. 291 A.2d wealth v. v. 151, (1978); Russell, Pa.Super. 261 395 A.2d 1365 495, (1976). Bartman, Pa.Super. 367 A.2d 1121 240 v. alleged although particulars may also the bill of It be noted that guilty in because he breach- of misbehavior office 1939, Pennsylvania Crimes Code set forth “in the ed the duties 4318,” Extortion, dealing specifically portion 18 P.S. § 10.10-107(3) Home Rule in set forth section Charter, claims at trial. abandoned these the Commonwealth 429 149-50, 139, Pa.Super. 240 Steinberg, v. In Commonwealth discussed the nature and 379, (1976), 385 this court office, as follows: of misbehavior of the offense elements malfeasance, nonfeasance misfeasance or The offense of office, is a office, misbehavior commonly more called Evans, 190 v. common law misdemeanor. Commonwealth mem., 387, 179, aff’d 399 Pa. 154 A.2d 57 Pa.Super. 899, denied, 233, 5 A.2d 364 U.S. S.Ct. cert. 147 Pa. (1960); Mecleary, L.Ed.2d 193 The offense has been care Super. and by defined the courts of this Commonwealth fully Kessler, Proce The Law of Criminal legal scholars. 1 N. 504; Perkins, 2 id. R. (1961); dure in Pennsylvania 1969). ed. It has been reiterated (2d Criminal Law 482-90 when there is a breach of a offense occurs “[t]he performance by public or the positive statutory duty improper corrupt official act with an or discretionary of a motive. Peoples, Com. Petition, Pa. 187 A. 498

[(1942)]; McNair’s Evans, [(1936)].” supra, of a performance 154 A.2d at 82. Where or motive is improper corrupt with an discretionary duty issue, concepts have clarified the the courts “A must discretionary duty defined the terms as follows: caprice be exercised with reason as opposed arbitrary ‘ action; “imports the term discretion the exercise of wisdom, skill, judgment, contradistinguished as ’ violence, and rash unthinking folly, heady injustice.” Brownmiller, .... Commonwealth v.

120, 907, In [(1940)]. 14 A.2d its sense misbe mere errors in encompass judg havior in office does not discretion, but an ment or from sound official departures duties which the exer perform require must those official interest of the Common cise of a sound discretion to the willful arbitrarily, wealth and not and with a capriciously, Brownmiller, supra and .... corrupt design. Com. The willful need not arise from corrupt per and motive Evans, sonal supra, benefit.” Commonwealth 190 Pa. 225-26, 154 Accord, Super, (1959). at 82 Common- Schwartz, wealth 210 Pa.Super. mem.,

(1967), (divid aff’d (1968) denied, court), ed cert. U.S. S.Ct. (1970). L.Ed.2d 541 argues

The Commonwealth that appellant performed a act with an discretionary improper corrupt motive when he “used his as a position powerful official” to cause Betts “to whether or question not contract with city] [his on might depend payment of the sums [requested appel- Commonwealth Brief at 11-12. This argument, lant].” however, overlooks the distinction set forth in Common- Blatstein, wealth v. 317-319, between “misconduct of one while in office” and misconduct “in the exercise the duties of office.” [] Blatstein,

In the coordinator of a committee established by the City of expedite planning and con- struction of a new stadium sports was convicted of bribery misbehavior office. This court affirmed the bribery conviction, but reversed the conviction of misbehavior in office because the Commonwealth had failed to prove more than the defendant’s solicitation a bribe: office,

In order to show misconduct in it is not sufficient to show that Blatstein solicited or even accepted a bribe. The Commonwealth must demonstrate that Blatstein fol- lowed the sought course conduct which the bribe secure. As Professor Perkins has said: officer,

“The corrupt receipt of a bribe for exam- office, is ple, criminal misconduct one while but such a in the exercise recipient clearly acting not office, the duties of his nor is this act wrongful under office, color of his has been bribery always recog- fact, nized as if an officer separate offense. corruptly corruptly receives a bribe and then does what do, he has been bribed to he is of both guilty bribery added.) in office.” R. Per- (Emphasis misconduct kins, Criminal Law 482 of solicitation of bribe not proof necessarily

Since does office, entail of misconduct in *9 Sherry his offer to upon acted that Blatstein had to show so, which the to do failing the committee. advising trial, it to failed at admitted virtually Commonwealth in office. of misconduct guilty was that Blatstein prove of this proof its failed in having The Commonwealth erred when element, lower court additional necessary, on of judgment in arrest motion dismissed appellant’s it malfeasance, misfeasance charging the indictment nonfeasance in office. 317-318, A.2d at 515.

231 Pa. Super, While the Common- case. present controls the Blatstein prove to been sufficient evidence have may wealth’s accepted Betts or money either extorted appellant appel- evidence that bribe,2 no presented the Commonwealth councilman, or his as position act in any lant committed he with the office, payments in connection under color of was Indeed, there was what evidence Betts.3 received from appel- he never asked testified that to Betts contrary. his airport to regard his behalf with on lant to intervene intervene; contract; volunteered never appellant intervene; and that did not appellant knowledge that to his Aviation with exclusively representatives he dealt of Com- Department Philadelphia’s Division of the is, course, unnecessary evidence was whether the to decide 2. It acquitted appellant since these crimes sufficient to establish charged bribery. Municipal and was not of extortion Court office is defined as An act under color of act, right one who has no pretense made official to do an “a authority pretext or cover for the right; as a act; of official such the use wrongfully corrupt done an act or vicious commission of some by authority pretended his office.” an officer under Bruno, denied, refused, U.S. Super, xxxiii cert. allocatur (1965), quoting 13 L.Ed.2d 558 85 S.Ct. Channing, proof correctly that its Although asserts the Commonwealth pay- acquiring his office used to show that sufficient paid not have would that Betts in the sense ments from Betts appellant councilman, no there was not been a had payments, used right appellant pretended an official payments, or pretext authority to secure or cover as his official authority his office. pretended acted under otherwise Burns, William the Director his contract. concerning mérce *10 that Betts was 1970 and testified during of Aviation the basis of his abilities and proven on the city hired leasing space airlines that would be of the recommendation terminal; department neither he nor his at the thereof, council, any with or member city consult required to consult that he in fact did not hiring; to Bett’s respect with politician regarding or democratic any with councilman any any politician nor other that neither hiring; Bett’s Mayor and that the hiring; with him about ever spoke Commerce, Burns’s Director of appointed the Philadelphia of at the the Director of Aviation Brough, Austin superior. he was Assist- trial, that in 1971 time of testified appellant’s Burns’s account Aviation, of and confirmed ant Director that while city He also testified hiring. Betts’s regarding of funds approval for the ultimately responsible council was it was not otherwise airport, for at the capital improvements of the funds allocated. expenditure in the directly involved therefore, was sufficient to proof, The Commonwealth’s if it only in office showed of misbehavior convict appellant The Com- duty.4 positive statutory of a appellant’s breach require- satisfied this the evidence argues monwealth section 10-100 of breach of showing appellant’s ment by Charter, provides: which Home Rule Philadelphia Activities; Penal- in Certain Engage Not to Councilman ties. solicit, statute, shall benefit no councilman provided by

As contract indirectly any or directly interested or be for paid kind to be any of of property for the purchase directly he be interested nor shall City Treasury, from the any erection of for the any contract indirectly paid to be services structure, supplying any or for the nor shall he solicit or City Treasury, for out of the stating, assume, explicitly that in order Many without of our cases in office because of a of misbehavior to be convicted for an official breach of clear, duty, It is' positive statutory must be wilful. the breach however, negligent See breach is insufficient. of a 2), (No. Hubbs (1934); Brown, 175A. 748 (1939); Perkins, Law, 3(D)-Misconduct in Office Ch. R. Criminal position to any any person appointment recommend the per- service, be interfere nor shall in the civil Philadelphia members the duties formance of department, in any Police, employees other any or of City. board or commission Commonwealth, received when According in Betts’s interest Betts, $9,000 acquired from he total of this violation contract with nice several argument presents This provision. 10-100’s of section scope as to the problems

construction present However, if we assume even prohibitions.5 he when provision violation of this purposes appellant’s Betts, appellant’s accepted payments requested still improper. in office was of misbehavior conviction *11 (1963)6 notes, provides: 5104 18 P.S. majority As the § enjoined, or duty remedy provided where a In all cases provisions penal to be done the thing by directed any said act shall assembly, act of the directions any inflicted, or shall be no penalty and strictly pursued; of the common the provisions done agreeably anything for cases, necessary shall be further than law in such act into effect. such carrying the indictment of a prohibits section 5104

It is settled that has legislature where the for a common law offense person offense. criminal a alleged made the misconduct 486, (1979) A.2d 397 Bellis, 399 v. 484 Pa. Commonwealth 576, 345 Pa. Peoples, v. Commonwealth opinion); (plurality Bruno, Com supra; v. (1942); 28 Commonwealth 80, 106 A.2d 886 Ackerman, Pa.Super. 176 v. monwealth 438, 951, 99 L.Ed. 743 denied, 75 (1954), 348 U.S. S.Ct. cert. authority that a for its assertion cites no 5. The Commonwealth meaning of within the in a contract councilman becomes “interested” person illegally who a extorts or bribes section 10-100 when he Bruno, city. generally v. But see Commonwealth contracts with significance, explained if supra. Nor has the Commonwealth ....,” provided introductory phrase statute nor any, “[a]s “solicit,” by,” “benefit provision’s inconsistent use of the terms “interested in.” 1482, 334, 1972, 6, 5. Repealed by P.L. No. of Dec. the Act 434 Bausewine, v. Pa. also

(1955). See Commonwealth Brown, v. cf. Commonwealth (1946); Brown, v. Pa.Super. Commonwealth (1943); 29 A.2d 793 Buzak, Commonwealth (1979); 409 A.2d 108 v. Lit (1962); Pa.Super. man, (1958) (policy 144 A.2d 592 provisions under prosecutions general law does not permit availa are special provisions when penal applicable code contest the fact ble). does not The Commonwealth of a dignity provision having a penal section 10-100 is fol It therefore Assembly.7 the General passed by statute prosecute appel wished to lows that if the Commonwealth charge required this it violating provision, lant for law violation, not with the common him with that charge not in office. Because it did offense of misbehavior 10-100, held he not be violating may with section at trial though even violating provision, for to have convicted jury have been sufficient may properly charged had he been appellant of that offense Peoples, supra; it. Commonwealth v.

Bruno, supra. reached

For these reasons I concur in the result majority.8 Home Rule Charter 10-109 of the

7. Under section $300, may imprisoned 90 person days, be fined who violates section 10-100 Thus, 10-100 is a and removed from office. section Schenk, generally Tp. provision, see Lower Merion was authorized because its enactment *12 1949, 17, 21, 665, April 53 P.S. 13131 § the Act of P.L. under and article Constitution, IX, Pennsylvania the it has 2 of the section Assembly. by legislation passed Com- the force of criminal monwealth v. General Cabell, (1962). Pa.Super. 185 A.2d 611 my emphasized cannot conclusion that 8. It should be of a in on the basis of his violation be convicted of misbehavior office statutory proceeds than the one from a different rationale offense plurality majority majority opinion. the in The cites found Bellis, proposition opinion supra, for the in v. Commonwealth offense, statutory have been convicted of a because could op. Majority law offense. he could not be convicted of a common Thus, majority that in a case where the 426-427. seems to hold proof a common both a Commonwealth’s law establishes offense, jury may I do law offense. a not convict on the common Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH DAVIES, Appellant. V. Daniel Pennsylvania. Superior Court Argued Nov. 1979. July

Filed 18, 1980. Appeal Allowance of Denied Dec. Petition for holding I Bellis to hold no not believe this to of Bellis. read be e., concurring opinion, when the in this i. more than what is set forth nothing more than the breach Commonwealth’s establishes statute, may penal of a common law not be convicted the accused Where, however, proscribes offense that the same conduct. proscribes from the conduct conduct different common law offense proscribed evidence, statute, may, upon sufficient the accused See or both offenses. Common be convicted of either (1975). Dolny, Pa.Super. 342 A.2d 399 wealth v. case, present of misbehavior In the the common law offense upon appellant’s 10-100 of the violation of section office based Philadelphia proscribed conduct that the same Home Rule Charter proscribed by conduct A difference section 10-100. only proscribed have occurred if and common law would statute negligent, non-wilful act. See section 10-100 was violated Fahey, generally 40 A.2d 167 require explicitly Although 10-100 does not section violation, provision I believe the element of scienter for there to be a gener- requiring implicitly See this element. should ally (1980) (SPAETH, construed as Barone, J., concurring).

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Bellis
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 13, 1981
Citation: 421 A.2d 271
Docket Number: 178
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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