Dennis W. Beckwith appeals from the March 21, 1995, twenty-one (21) to forty-two (42) month judgment of sentence
Appellant raises several issues for this Court’s consideration, at least two of which require a detailed recitation of the events preceding appellant’s arrest. On May 11, 1994, Sandra Miller, on behalf of her sixteen yeаr-old daughter Jessica Miller, obtained a PFA Order prohibiting appellant from contacting Jessica, his girlfriend and the mother of his child, Samantha. The consent Order was signed by Jessica, her mother and the appellant. However, despite the Order, appellant and Jessica continued to live together until a day or two before July 18, 1994, the date of the incident in question. On that evening, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Jessica, her new boyfriend Shaun and daughter Samantha arrived at the second floor apartment Jessica shared with her mother, her younger brother and her mother’s boyfriend. Shortly thereafter appellant knocked at the front door and, upon being rebuffed by Jessica, climbed through the bathroom window and began fighting with Shaun. Shaun ran out the front door, down the steps to the street, and appellant and Jessica followed him. Upon hearing the ruckus, the landlady, who lived in the first floor apartment, joined Jessica and appellant and informed appellant if he did not leave she would call the police. Appellant left and Jessica returnеd to her apartment. Appellant soon returned, however, and, upon once again being turned away, entered through the living room window. When a reconciliation conversation between the two proved futile, appellant forcibly carried Jessiсa into a bedroom while attempting to muffle her screams with his hand. The victim’s pounding on the floor alerted the landlady who- called the police. Jessica testified that when appellant heard Officer Ann Walstrom knocking at the door he became enrаged, grabbed a knife and chased the officer backwards down the stairs to the street. Officer Walstrom testified that as appellant rushed at her wielding the knife, he repeatedly shouted “I’m going to f — ing kill you.” When a second officer arrived on the
Appellant was tried before a jury on charges which included, among others, defiant trespass and harassment. At a bench trial conducted six weeks later, allegations of indirect criminal contempt were addressed. Appellant contends the latter prosecution for indirect criminal contempt constituted double jeopardy since the charge alleged violation of the May 11,1994 Order prohibiting him from contacting the victim, and the charge of defiant trespass had been previously been adjudicated. In other words, appellant argues prosecuting him for criminal contempt was a duplication or repetition of the defiant trespass and harassment charges prosecuted during the jury trial. Accоrdingly, appellant prays the conviction and related three-month term of imprisonment imposed consecutive to the eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months imposed on the terroristic threats conviction be vacated.
As stated swpra, appellant was acquitted at trial of сriminal trespass but found guilty of defiant trespass, receiving for the latter conviction an eight-month period of probation to be served consecutive to the incarceration for terroristic threats. The court found harassment merged with terror-istic threats and imposed no further incarceration. Accordingly, we are faced with the query whether a violation of the PFA Order is a lesser included offense of defiant trespass, requiring vacation of the three-month sentence. To determine whether a defendant’s prоtection against multiple punishments for the same offense has been violated, this Commonwealth applies the test set forth in Blockburger v. U.S.,
To be found guilty of defiant trespass appellant had to have entered and remained on victim’s property, knowing he was not licensed to do so. Whether victim was at home at the time would be immaterial. Jessica was present at the time of the intrusion, however, providing the additional material element necessary to thereby trigger a viоlation of the existing PFA Order, resulting in indirect criminal contempt. This distinction was recognized in Commonwealth v. Allen,
Next, appellant argues the court erred by denying his motion in limine to preclude reference to the existing PFA Order, where violation of same was not at issue during the jury trial.
A judge has broad powers concerning the conduct of a trial, particularly with regard to the admission or exclusion of evidence. Commonwealth v. Kunkle,
Evidence of the existence of the PFA Order was necessary to explain the police course of conduct in responding to the disturbance on the evening in question. See Commonwealth v. Sneed,
Appellant argues next that the court erred by imposing the deadly weapons enhancement on the charge of terroristic threats.
Deadly weapon enhancement shall be imposed when the cоurt determines a deadly weapon, as defined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301, has been used during the commission of the convicted offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721; 202 Pa. Code § 303(4). There shall be no such enhancement for convictions of an offense for which the possession of a deadly weapon is an element of the statutory definition. Id. Such is not the case here. Appellant charged toward Officer Walstrom, flailing a kitchen knife with a six to eight inch blade, and screaming “I’m going to f — ing kill you.” The court properly enforced the deadly weapons enhancement provision, see Commonwealth v. Magnum,
Next, appellant contends the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial and/or to strike the jury panel on the basis it was wrongly infоrmed there was a PFA Order in effect at the time of the incident, and there was a pending complaint charging violation of that Order. Applying the reasoning set forth in our previous discussion, without further discussion, we find this argument devoid of merit.
Appellant also argues the prоsecutor’s comments during closing argument so prejudiced the jury as to prevent the panel from rendering a true verdict. The remarks in question allegedly misquote a purported stipulation between the parties and statements made by the defense during its opening. Aрpellant also takes objection to a chart employed by the Commonwealth during summation, on which it listed the charges with which appellant was charged and the word guilty penned next to each charge. Appellant argues the statements and chart improperly appealed to the emotions of the jurors and reflected the prosecutor’s personal opinion.
Without benefit of opening statements, this Court can only concur with the trial court’s finding the statements made and the use of
Lastly, appellant argues the harassment and indirect criminal contempt guilty verdicts were against the wеight of the evidence. Specifically, appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to establish he was aware of the PFA Order, and his telephone contact did not constitute contact prohibited by the Order.
A true “weight of the evidence” claim сontends the verdict is a product of speculation or conjecture. Such a claim requires a new trial only when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Commonwealth v. Ables,
Having found each of appellant’s arguments devoid of merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence entered March 21, 1995.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Notes
. On March 25, 1995 appellant was sentenced to eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months’ imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of terroristic threats. After a bench trial, in which he was found guilty of indirect criminal contempt, appellant was sentenced to an additional three month period of incarceration to be served consecutive to that imposed for terroristic threats. This Court reasonably interprets the aggregate sentence imposed to be twenty-one (21) to forty-two (42) months.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.
. Id. § 2701.
. Id. § 2705.
. Id. § 2709.
. Id. § 3503.
. Id. § 5110.
. Nos. 00835, 00908 and 00909 Pittsburgh, 1995.
. While the Allen Court consistently refers to the crime in question as criminal trespass, not defiant trespass, we believe the facts and reasoning are analogous to that before us. We acknowledge Judge Del Sole’s Opinion in Commonwealth v. Decker,