Commonwealth v. Beaufort, 112 A.3d 1267

Commonwealth v. Beaufort

112 A.3d 1267

Pa. Super. Ct.

2015

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COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Michael T. BEAUFORT, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

March 24, 2015

1267

Submitted Nov. 24, 2014.

cause and may be based upon hearsay.

In re J.M., 556 Pa. [63, 75-76 n. 9], 726 A.2d [1041, 1046-47 n. 9]. . See also .

Appellant was committed under section 302. Appellant complains that Officer Scicchitano was allowed to testify about his telephone conversations with Appellant‘s father and with Appellant‘s mother during which information was conveyed about threatening instant messages Appellant sent to his sister. The testimony was offered at the hearing to explain the officer‘s role in the issuance of the warrant for Appellant‘s section 302 commitment.⁷ As this Court recognized in In re R.D., supra, a warrant for a section 302 commitment need not be supported by probable cause and may be based on hearsay.

Finally, the trial court noted it “lied solely on the involuntary commitment paperwork in making its determination that there was sufficient evidence for the involuntary commitment.” T.C.O., 7/3/14, at 4. Therefore, even if it could be determined that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony, any error is harmless. Appellant is not entitled to relief based on his third issue.

Because Appellant is not entitled to relief on any of his three issues, we shall affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Jeffrey M. Krulik, Assistant District Attorney and Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Kevin A. Holleran, Philadelphia, for appellant.

BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.:

Michael T. Beaufort (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered February 21, 2014, following his conviction for two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). For the following reasons, we affirm.

On April 12, 2012, Appellant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, DUI. His case was listed for trial in Philadelphia‘s Municipal Court. Prior to trial, Appellant moved for dismissal of his case pursuant to the municipal court prompt trial rule, Pa. R.Crim.P. 1013.¹ That motion was denied, following a hearing, on February 22, 2013. On April 10, 2013, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated trial in Municipal Court and was found guilty of DUI. On June 17, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 72 hours to four months of incarceration and a concurrent six month term of probation.

On July 17, 2013, Appellant filed an appeal in the Court of Common Pleas seeking a trial de novo. On January 27, 2014, following a waiver trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of DUI. On February 3, 2014, Appellant filed a motion for extraordinary relief with the Court of Common Pleas again seeking appellate review of the Municipal Court‘s denial of his Rule 1013 motion to dismiss. On February 21, 2014, the court denied Appellant‘s motion and sentenced him to 60 days to six months of incarceration and a concurrent term of six months’ probation. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied following a hearing on March 6, 2014. This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with the trial court‘s request to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises a single issue for our review: whether the Municipal Court erred in denying his request for dismissal under Rule 1013. Appellant‘s Brief at 2. This claim is moot.

An appellant convicted in Philadelphia‘s Municipal Court has two appellate options.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1006(1)(a) provides that a defendant convicted in Philadelphia Municipal Court has the right to request either a trial de novo or file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. This Court has held that when a defendant files a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sits as an appellate court.

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118-19 (Pa.Super.2011) (citations omitted). “A trial de novo gives the defendant a new trial without reference to the Municipal Court record; a petition for writ of certiorari asks the Common Pleas Court to review the record made in the Municipal Court.” . These options are mutually exclusive. Pa. R.Crim.P. 1008(A) (“The notice [of appeal from a Municipal Court ruling] shall state which method of review is being sought in the court of common pleas by indicating whether it is a notice of appeal or notice of a petition for a writ of certiorari.“).

Appellant‘s claim that the Municipal Court erred in denying his Rule 1013 motion was reviewable by writ of certiorari. See

Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super.2006); . However, because he forewent that option in favor of proceeding to a trial de novo, the issue of whether he was timely tried in the Municipal Court became moot. (“Appellant was afforded a trial de novo and, therefore, matters pertaining to the proceedings before the district magistrate are irrelevant.“). Thus, the Court of Common Pleas did not err in declining to address Appellant‘s issue.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Notes

The rule reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “Trial in a municipal court case shall commence no later than 180 days from the date on which the preliminary arraignment is held.” Pa. R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(1).

Akbar, which involved a challenge to statements explaining the course of police conduct, this Court explained:

Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied,
581 Pa. 671, 863 A.2d 1143 (2004); Pa.R.E. 801(c). Nevertheless, certain out-of-court statements offered to explain the course of police conduct are admissible; such statements do not constitute hearsay because they are offered not for the truth of the matters asserted but merely to show the information upon which police acted.
Dent, supra at 577-79. See also
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 489 Pa. 559, 414 A.2d 1032 (1980) (holding content of police radio call did not constitute hearsay where Commonwealth introduced call to explain police conduct and not to prove truth of content of tape).

Akbar, 91 A.3d at 236. Although not exactly on point with the present case, the same analysis is appropriately applied here where the officer was not offering statements for the truth of the matters asserted but rather to show the information upon which the police acted in the course of issuing the warrant for Appellant‘s commitment.

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.