Commonwealth v. BaysoreCommonwealth v. Baysore
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Johnson
Wе are here asked to decide whether the new, five-year statute of limitations applies to a theft offense committed less than two years before its enactment where prosecution was not commenced until after the former two-year limitation period had expired.
Appellant was charged with the crimes of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, unauthorized use of automobile and other vehicles, receiving stolen property and criminal mischief. The crimes occurred on or about September 9-10, 1981. The complaint was not filed until August 14, 1984 and the information was filеd on September 21, 1984.
Following a non-jury trial in the form of a case stated, the trial court found appellant guilty on the first count, theft, and on the fourth count, criminal mischief. The court noted that the second count, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and the third count of receiving stolen рroperty merged with the first count of theft. By way of a Motion to Dismiss, and in a timely post-verdict motion, appellant raised the claim that the statute of limitations had expired. These motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to pay costs, restitution and to an indeterminate period of incarceration to range from the minimum of 9 to a maximum of 23 months. The court suspended sentence and *348 placed appellant on probation for three years. Appellant appeals from the judgment of sentence and raises the claim that the twо-year statute of limitations in effect on the date of the commission of the crime, rather than the five-year statute presently in effect, shоuld be applied so as to bar the prosecution.
Appellant argues that when the crimes occurred in 1981 the applicable statutе of limitations was two years. Act of July 9, 1976 P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2,
as amended by
Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(64),
as amended by
Act of October 4, 1978, P.L. 873, No. 168, § 1,
as amended by
Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 206(a) (current version at
Within the two year period, by Act of May 13, 1982, P.L. 417, No. 122, § 1 (current version at
The complaint was not filed until August 14, 1984 and the information was not filed until September 21, 1984. Thus, appellant argues that although aсtion was commenced within the amended five-year statutory period, it was commenced beyond the original two-year statutory period in еffect in 1981 and should be dismissed.
We agree with appellant and find that, while the legislature has the power to extend a statute of limitations retroаctively, it has not done so here. Accordingly, we reverse.
We note initially that, with respect to the criminal mischief count,
With respect to the theft conviction, appellant argues that the 1982 amendment of the statute of limitations should not be aрplied to a crime which occurred in 1981. We look first to the terms of the statute, itself, for guidance. By way of Act 122 of 1982, the Pennsylvania legislature amеnded
In stating when the 1982 amendment was to become effective the legislature made nо explicit mention of retroactivity. It did not use the word “retroactive,” nor did it say that it should be applied to crimes occurring before its effеctive date. The legislature merely stated “Section 1 shall take effect in 60 days.” Act of May 13, 1982, P.L. 417, No. 122, § 4(a). On its face, then, we see no clear and manifest expression of a legislative intent that the amendment be applied retroactively.
When we look to another amendment оf Title 42 Pa.C.S. we find that the legislature can, and does, manifest its intent that that amendment be applied retroactively. For example, when the legislature added
The principle embodied in the Statutory Construction Act, that the legislature must clearly manifest an intent to apply an act retroactively, is also recognized in case law. It was early established in Pennsylvania that the legislature cаn extend a statute of limitations by an amendment and can apply the new statutory period to crimes occurring before the extension, sо long as the original statutory period has not expired. Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506 (1880). However, in order for the new statutory period to apply to crimes occurring bеfore the extension, the legislature must explicitly refer to the fact that the extension is to be applied retroactively. Id. at 514. See U.S. v. Richardson, 393 F.Supp. 83 (W.D.Pa.1974), aff‘d, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.1975). The district court in the Richardson case stated that “Congress did not explicitly state that it intended the statute to apply retroactively as it assuredly could have done, and has done [in the past].” Richardson, 393 F.Supp. at 87, (footnote omitted). The court concluded that “the statute contains no reference to retroactive applicаtion because Congress did not intend it to be so applied.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Similarly, the Pennsylvania legislature, in enacting Act 122 of 1982, did not explicitly state, as it did with anothеr amendment to the same title, that it intended the amendment to apply retroactively. Without such an explicit expression of legislative intent, we refuse to apply the five-year limitation period to crimes occurring before its enactment. Appellant’s prosecution wаs commenced outside the applicable two-year period. Accordingly, we reverse appellant’s judgment of sentence fоr theft as well as *351 his judgment of sentence for criminal mischief and we order appellant discharged.
Judgment of sentence reversed. Appellant is ordered to be discharged.