COMMONWEALTH оf Pennsylvania v. William C. BARTLETT, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued April, 20, 1979. Decided Oct. 1, 1979.
406 A.2d 340
The only issues raised by appellant are whether the guilty plea colloquy was sufficient tо insure a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea of guilty and whether the record of these proceedings is sufficiently accurate and precise to permit meaningful review. It is difficult to imagine how remanding this case will further narrow these issues. We have received briefs and heard oral arguments on the merits of this case. This case is ripe for our decision.
I would, therefore, decline the Commonwealth‘s invitation to remand to the court below and would reach the merits of this case.
Arthur M. Rosenbaum, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
O‘BRIEN, Justice.
Appellant, William C. Bartlett, was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery Cоunty of murder of the first degree, robbery and conspiracy in connection with the stabbing death of Milton Hawkins, whose body was found on the morning of January 14, 1970. Appellant was sentenсed to imprisonment for life for the murder conviction and five to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the robbery conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. Sentence was suspended on the conspiracy conviction. Appellant took a direct appeal to this court, where he was represented by trial counsel. This сourt affirmed the judgments of sentence, Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 446 Pa. 392, 288 A.2d 796 (1972) (Bartlett I). Appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA),
Appellant argues that PCHA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness in his failure to filе a motion to suppress the confession because of lack of probable cause to arrest. The suppression hearing was held pursuant to a defensе motion to suppress an inculpatory statement appellant gave to the police after being arrested. The basis of the motion was that the statement was involuntarily given. That contention was rejected. We agreed in our opinion on the direct appeal (Bartlett I) that it was
In order to pass upon appellant‘s allegation, we will first examine the circumstances surrounding the arrest and conviction. The following facts were brought out at hearing. Decedent‘s body was discovered at or abоut 8:00 a. m., on January 14, 1970. His children, Gary and Clementine Hawkins, told police they had seen a red Mustang in the vicinity that morning. Neighbors told the police appellant owned a red Mustаng. The police went to appellant‘s home and told him they were looking for William Bartlett. Appellant told them he was his brother, Charles, and declined to speak with thеm further. Sharon Kitt was also present but the police did not know her identity at the time. She also refused to speak with them. Shortly afterward, the police saw Kitt driving a red Mustang. They stopped her and she could not produce identification for herself or an owner‘s card for the vehicle. Appellant had been driving a blue Mustang ahead of hеr. He stopped, walked over to the red Mustang, and said he could straighten out the matter. However, he did not have a driver‘s license or owner‘s card. The police told appellant and Kitt they would have to accompany them to the station while they determined who owned the vehicles. At the station, appellant said he was his brother and produced signed identification belonging to the brother. He signed his brother‘s name in the presence of police, who observed that the signatures did not match. Kitt eventually told the police who she was and who appellant really was. The police then told appellant they knew who he was and he admitted his true identity and was immediately arrested for the murder of decedent. The inculpatory statement followed.
At trial, separate witnesses testified that decedent was with appеllant and that he got into a red Mustang. There is also testimony in the suppression record that the police were told before the arrest that appellant owned a red Mustang, that such a car came to decedent‘s house the morning of the killing, and that decedent got into it.
There is no ineffectiveness if the course of аction followed by counsel had a reasonable basis designed to advance the interests of the client. Com. ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). We do not see what reasonable basis there was for trial counsel‘s failure to challenge the legality of the arrest because of lack of probable cause when such challenge would arguably have beеn meritorious. We find it to be at least arguable that that information did no more than cast suspicion on appellant and did not tie him closely enough to the crime to give rise to probable cause. If a claim has arguable merit, an inquiry must be made into counsel‘s basis for not pursuing it. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). At the very least, this question should have been pursued at the PCHA heаring. PCHA counsel did not do so. According to his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the reason was that he thought the merit of the matter was settled by our affirmance on direct aрpeal. That is not so.
Appellant also alleges that post-conviction counsel was ineffective in not examining trial counsel on his reasons for certain actions which allegedly rendered ineffective his representation at trial and on direct аppeal. Since we are remanding for a hearing on the question of the legality of the arrest, it is not necessary for us to reach the merits of the other instances of allegedly ineffective representation.
The order of the court of common pleas is reversed and the case is remanded for a new PCHA hearing.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion.
LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent; I would affirm the lower court‘s order. Trial counsel was effective. Counsel need not raise issues that are devoid of merit. I adopt the opinion of the Honorable Robert W. Honeyman dated June 30, 1977.