¶ 1 In this appeal, we are confronted with a host of constitutional challenges to the recently amended Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-65 (“the Act”). Because we find that none of the claims warrants that we strike the Act on constitutional grounds, we affirm.
¶ 2 At age seventeen, Appellant was charged with armed robbery and related offenses. Pursuant to the terms of the Act, his case went directly to criminal court, where he had the option of requesting treatment within the juvenile system and the burden of establishing that he was entitled to same. This process of “decertification” from criminal court to juvenile court was for decades only applicable to murder cases; however, the 1995 amendments to the Act now provide that any juvenile over the age of fifteen who has committed one of several enumerated crimes, and utilized a deadly weapon during that commission, is to be tried in criminal court unless he can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer to juvenile court would sеrve the public interest. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6302; 6322. This rebuttable presumption of treatment as an adult now extends to a variety of crimes, including rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated assault, robbery, kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter and conspiracy to commit any of these crimes. 1
¶ 3 As he did in the trial court, appellant makes a series of constitutionally based arguments regarding the amended Act’s considerably wider net. We begin by noting that “duly enacted legislation carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality and this presumption will not be overturned unless the legislation clearly, plainly and palpably violates the constitution.”
Commonwealth v. Swinehart,
¶ 4 Not surprisingly, a number of appellant’s claims have been confronted and resolved by our supreme court in the context of murder cases. Appellant argues that those cases have “limited applicability” in this case. We disagree. To the extent thаt the murder cases set forth the standard by which specific constitutional challenges should be considered, we find them not only relevant, but binding. Further, where those cases provide analysis of and insight into the underlying purposes of the Act, we will adhere to their reasoning. We address each claim separately.
¶5 Appellant first argues that the Act’s provisions are not rationally related to its purposes and, further, that its application is arbitrary. If true, this would constitute a violation of equal proteсtion and due process.
Commonwealth v. Wade,
¶ 6 At a hearing in the trial court, appellant was permitted to incorporate the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, a juvenile law expert who testified in another case regarding juvenile punishment and recidivism. Dr. Fagan studied the precise issue appellant sought to bring to the court’s attention, i.e., the relative “success” of treating juvenile offenders in criminal court. Dr. Fagan’s opinion was that adult treatment of juvenile offenders does not prevent those individuals from committing mоre crimes once they are released; instead, the likelihood of recidivism for this group is enhanced. See Jeffrey Fa-gan, “The Comparative Advantages of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Of *374 fenders,” Law and Policy, Vol. 18, Nos. 1 and 2 (January/April 1996).
¶ 7 Relying on Dr. Fagan’s conclusions, appellant asserts that the purpose underlying the Act, public safety, is endangered by the Act’s provisions, not advanced. As a result, there is lacking even a rational relationship between the Act’s intent and its terms.
¶ 8 The Commonwealth responds with a number of arguments. It notes first that Dr. Fаgan’s studies were made in New York and New Jersey, not in Pennsylvania. The relevance of such studies, asserts the Commonwealth, is therefore questionable. Further, even conceding the validity and the applicability of the studies, the Commonwealth suggests that Dr. Fagan’s results could be interpreted as supportive of the amended Act. They may reflect the fact that some youthful offenders, perhaps those committing the most serious' of crimes, do not respond to rehabilitative measures. When viewed in this way, the Commonwealth submits, the Act is quite rational since by its terms, it reserves juvenile treatment for those likely to respond to it.
¶ 9 The Commonwealth also asserts that appellant is wrong when he states that specific deterrence is the sole purpose underlying the Act. Instead, the Commonwealth argues, holding violent juvenile offenders accountable for their actions is another goal of the statute, as is the incapacitation of those persons. Drawing the line for juvenile treatment to exclude initially yоung people who commit violent crimes while armed with deadly weapons is an inherently rational decision, so argues the Commonwealth.
¶ 10 In
Wade,
our supreme court faced constitutional challenges to the Act in the context of a murder charge. The
Wade
court specifically framed the issue before the court as “whether excluding the crime of murder from the original jurisdiction of Juvenile Court bears a rational relationship to the legislative objective sought to be advanced by the Juvenile Aсt.”
Id.
at 461-68,
¶ 11 We believe the reasoning in Wade applies in this case. The rationale is even more compelling today since the amended Act redefined the purposes of the statute. In the amended language of the Act, the General Assembly retained the goals of preserving family unity, providing care and protection to juveniles, minimizing, whei'e feasible, separation of a child from his or her parents, and assuring fair and equitable proceedings. It also made significant additions to the Act’s stated goals. No longer does the Act seek tо “remove children from the consequences of criminal behavior”; instead, its goal is to “provide balanced attention” to the interests of protecting the community, imposing accountability and developing “responsible ánd productive members of the community.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(2).
¶ 12 In light of this new language, and in reliance on the rationale in Wade, we find that the amendments to the Act, which cause juveniles accused of the enumerated offenses to appear first in criminal court, are not arbitrary and instead аre rationally related to the statute’s objectives. The commission of a violent crime while armed with a gun is conduct of “such a serious nature” as to initially preclude an individual from the juvenile system.
¶ 13 Appellant next argues that the Act creates an “irrebuttable presumption” of adult treatment, contrary to the right of due process. He relies on
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation v. Clayton,
¶ 14 The Juvenile Act, of course, is far different from the law in Clayton. Here, appellant is afforded an opportunity to estab *375 lish that he belongs in the juvenile system. A separate section of the statute not only contemplates a hearing on the issue of decer-tification, but sets forth the procedure to be utilized at such heating, including the allocation of burdens and the factors to be considered. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6322; 6355. The Act’s presumption of adult treatment for specific offenses simply is not irrebuttable. 2
¶ 15 Appellant next takes issue with the fact that he bears the burden of establishing that he is amenable to treatment within the juvenile system and that such treatment will serve the public interest. He asserts that “fundamental due process requires that the burden of proof in criminal matters remains with the state throughout any criminal prosecution ... because the presumption of innocence may not be compromised.”
See Commonwealth v. Wagaman,
¶ 16 In response, the Commonwealth relies on
Commonwealth v. Cotto,
¶ 17 The Cotto court began its analysis by observing that any right to treatment as a juvenile is derived from statutory law as there is no constitutional guarantee to special treatment for juvenile offenders. Id. at 809. In finding that the term “public interest” was not unconstitutionally vague, the court considered the stated purpose of the Act, its legislative history and the list of factors, set forth in the statute, that the court must consider in determining whether decertification is appropriate. Finding that “public interest” was аmply defined by the legislature, and further finding that the Act provided adequate notice and guidance regarding the term, the Cotto court held that the Act was not unconstitutionally vague.
¶ 18 With respect to the allocation of burden at the transfer hearing, the
Cotto
court relied primarily on our supreme court’s analysis of the issue in the murder context. In
Commonwealth v. Pyle,
The decision to transfer has no bearing on either the procedural or substantive aspects of the criminal conviction in criminal court (i.e., it is still the Commonwealth’s burden to prove every fact necessary to constitutе murder beyond a reasonable doubt). Consequently, placing the burden on a petitioner in this manner in no way denies him his due process safeguards.
Id.
at 622 n. 13,
¶ 19 The Cotto court could find no reason to diverge from the holding in Pyle :
We find the reasoning of Pyle to be equally applicable to the amended Act, which mandates that certain violent offenses, in addition to murder, be filed directly in criminal court. A juvenile adjudicatory proceeding differs widely in purpose, scope and result from a juvenile transfer proceeding. At the adjudicatory stage, constitutional due process guarantees the juvenile almost the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded at an adult criminal trial. During the adjudicatory stage, whether in juvenile or criminal court, a full trial is held on the offenses with which the juvenile is charged and a final determination of guilt is made. At a juvenile transfer proceeding, however, the *376 inquiry is focused upon the narrower question of determining the appropriate forum for the adjudicatory proceeding — either juvenile or criminal court. No determination of guilt takes placе and the inquiry into the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged is limited to determining the amenability of treatment of the juvenile and the need to protect the public. Moreover, although the punishment ultimately imposed is related to the decision made at the transfer proceeding, the imposition of punishment does not occur until after the Commonwealth has met its burden of proving each element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 814.
¶20 We are bound by Cotto. Despite appellant’s request that we refrain from following this established precedent, we simply are not at liberty to do so. Appellant argues that he has raised the burden of proof issue in a different manner than was done in Cot-to ; therefore, Cotto is not controlling. The “new” claim appellant purports to raise is his assertion that under the amended Act, a juvenile seeking decertification may testify in an effort to disprove elements of the charged offense and/or mount his defense prior to trial, thereby giving the Commonwealth an “incredible advantage.” While conceding that the Cotto court addressed this issue, appellant insists that this case is different and Cotto should not apply.
¶ 21 The Cotto court recognized that Pennsylvania’s statute differed from New Jersey’s in that New Jersey immunizes a juvenile’s transfer hearing testimony. The court stated:
The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act does not provide immunity to a juvenile testifying at his transfer hearing. Although the absence of such a provision does not affect our decision as to constitutionality, we believe that inclusion of an immunity provision would be prudent and merits legislаtive consideration. .
Cotto, supra at 815 n. 3 (emphasis supplied).
¶ 22 The excerpt quoted above establishes that the Cotto court, considered the very issue appellant raises here. Despite its recognition that a juvenile’s transfer hearing testimony is not immunized, the court found that the Act did not violate due process. Because Cotto is binding precedent upon us, we must reject appellant’s claim.
¶ 23 In another effort to avoid the holding in
Cotto,
appellant draws .our attention to
Commonwealth v. Halye,
¶24 Relying on
E.B. v. Verniero,
¶ 25 We have read with interest the Ha-lye decision and considered its application in this case. We have no way of knowing whether our supreme court may adopt a similar type of reasoning with respect to the statute at issue here; however, we have no *377 authority to do so. 3 While the analogy of Halye and Megan’s Law is intriguing in this context, there exists a case directly on point by which we are bound. Because Cotto analyzed and resolved the very issue appellant now raises, we must follow it. Aрpellant cannot prevail on his claim that the statute violates due process since this court already has considered the issue and held otherwise.
¶26 For the same reason, appellant’s vagueness claim must also fail. The Cotto court clearly held that the term “public interest” is not unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, appellant’s claim raising this same issue is unavailing. Cotto, supra, at 813.
¶ 27 Appellant next argues that juveniles, as a protected class, are deprived of fundamental rights as a result of the amended Act. In support of his argument, appellant attempts to establish that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to special treatment. However, the examples proffered by appellant fall short of establishing same. Indeed, all of the “special treatment” accorded juveniles occurs by way of legislative enactments, not laws mandated by the Constitution. Further, in some instances, a juvenile is accorded fewer, not more, rights than an adult.
See Commonwealth v. Williams,
¶28 Because appellant has not shown that juveniles are a protected class, and because the relevant case law establishes the contrary, appellant’s claim fails.
¶ 29 Appellant next asserts that even if the federal Constitution provides no relief, the state constitution does. He reliеs on
Commonwealth v. Davis,
¶ 30
Davis
does not stand for the proposition that our state constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, affords additional protections to juveniles. The
Davis
court merely held that
like an adult,
a juvenile cannot have his or her probation revoked, and, therefore, liberty denied, on the basis of hearsay alone. Further, the opinion in supрort of affirmance in
Davis
did not set forth a distinct difference between the protections of the state and federal constitutions. Instead, the court reasoned that even “if there is a doubt” whether the federal constitution provides such protection, “there is no doubt” that the protection is afforded by the Pennsylvania constitution.
Davis, supra
at 433,
¶ 31 In attempting to establish a basis for relief under the state constitution, appellant suggests that an analysis like the one set forth in
Commonwealth v. Edmunds,
¶ 32 We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments. First, notwithstanding the language in
Davis,
our supreme court has found federal and state due process clauses to be coextensive.
Pennsylvania Game Commis
*378
sion v. Marich,
¶33 Appellant raises another state constitutional claim and argues that the amended Act “dictates practice аnd procedure within the courts,” thereby violating Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That provision grants to our supreme court the “power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts.” Placing the burden of proof on the juvenile at the decertifi-cation hearing, argues appellant, is a matter of procedure over which the supreme court has exclusive power, which power is usurped by operation of the Act.
¶ 34 The Commonwealth points out that the constitutional provision at issue suspends only those laws that “are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.” Art. V § 10(c). Relying on
Commonwealth v. Presley,
¶ 35 In
Presley,
this court was faced with the same argument with regard tо a law on the effect of previous juvenile adjudications in subsequent proceedings. It rejected the claim due to the lack of a rule on the issue.
Id.
¶ 36 Appellant’s final claim is that the trial court erred in its assessment under the terms of the Act, that is, it erroneously concluded that appellant did not meet
his
burden in establishing that he was amenable to juvenile treatment. The decision whether to grant decertification will not be overturned absent a gross abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Reed,
¶ 37 Appellаnt offered the testimony of Dr. Steven E. Samuel, an expert in forensic psychology and the treatment of juveniles, who opined that appellant was treated improperly during his previous juvenile commitments. According to Dr. Samuel, appellant should have been prescribed medication during his placement due to recurrent major depression. Dr. Samuel believed that appellant should be decertified to the juvenile system and placed in a “secure and locked treatment setting.”
*379 ¶ 38 In аddition to Dr. Samuel’s opinion, appellant offered the previously recorded testimony of Dr. Fagan, who did not examine appellant, but whose opinion addressed juvenile and adult treatment generally. As noted above, Dr. Fagan believes that treating juveniles in adult prisons is detrimental to their future and impacts negatively on recidivism.
¶ 39 In its cross-examination of Dr. Samuel, the Commonwealth brought out the fact that appellant had the benefit of juvenile treatment in previous instances, but did not respond well. Specifically, after an adjudication of delinquency for robbery, appellant was ejected from a treatment facility for assaulting another student. Less than a year later, he “went AWOL” from another facility while on a home pass and later was discharged from that facility. The following year, after facing theft charges, appellant was sent to yet another facility in Delaware, where he was involved in a physical altercation with a staff member. Less than six months after discharge from the Delaware facility, appellant was arrested on the instant armed robbery charges.
¶ 40 Based on the seriousness of the allegations lodged against appellant, as well as the juvenile treatment he previously was afforded but from which he apparently did not benefit, the court found that decertification was inappropriate.
¶41 Appellant’s history shows a significant pattern of violent and escalating criminal behavior. In light of the entire record, we find no abuse of discretion in denying decertification.
¶42 After reviewing appellant’s exhaustive list of constitutional challenges, we are compelled to agree with the Commonwealth that the majority of appellant’s claims are better addressed to the legislature than the courts. Indeed, we are persuaded by some of the policy arguments raised by appellant and, like the court in Cotto, we believe several changes suggested by appellant are “prudent and merit legislative consideration.” Cotto, supra at 815 n. 3. However, in light of the relevant law, we find that the Act passes constitutional muster and appellant is not entitled to relief.
¶ 43 Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Notes
. Even if the minor does not use a deadly weapon in the commission of an enumerated offense, his case is sent directly to criminal/adult court if he previously has been adjudicated delinquent of one of the enumerated crimes. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(2)(iii).
. Appellant argues that even though the accused is ultimately given an opportunity to rebut the presumption, the lapse in time between arrest and the decertification hearing is unacceptable. Clearly, the timing in these cases will vary among counties and defendants for a variety of reasons. However, it is the right to rebut the presumption to which appellant is entitled. Clayton, supra. The accused does not face trial in criminal court until the issue of decertification is resolved. Therefore, his or her due process rights are protected.
. The supreme court granted allocatur in Cotto on October 14, 1998.
. Appellant’s argument that the prosecutor can “control” who is treated as a juvenile by merely deciding when to oppose decertification assumes that the trial court will ignore its mandate to consider the various factors set out in the statute. We do not make the same assumption.
. Further, we agree with the Commonwealth that the entire Juvenile Act could be considered a usurpation of the supreme court's rule-making powers if considered in the manner presented by appellant. As a result, the entire procedure of juvenile certification and decertification would be void and all persons would be under the jurisdiction of the criminal court.