*1 Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH Tony ARDESTANI, Appellant. Pennsylvania, Appellee,
Joseph Metis, Appellant. H.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Sept.
Submitted 1997. Decided June *3 Sasinoski, Swan, Kevin Pittsburgh, G. Suzanne M. Bethel Park, Tony for Ardestani. Colville,
Robert E. Michael W. for Streily, Pittsburgh, Com. in No. Appeal Docket W.D. Connor, Uniontown,
Jack W. for H. Joseph Metts. Hook, Uniontown, Graci, Peter U. Robert Harrisburg, A. for Com. in No. 0036 Appeal W.D. Docket 1996. C.J., FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY,
Before and CASTILLE, NEWMAN, NIGRO and JJ. THE JUDGMENT ANNOUNCING
OPINION THE OF COURT ZAPPALA, Justice. held in our
On December Court that Article Section from precludes police Constitution Pennsylvania 8 of the into home of an individual to elec- an informant sending conversations absent a determina- tronically record his neutral, authority. Alloca- judicial probable tion of cause in the instant consolidated cases determine granted tur was Brion. We hold that our decision applicability properly preserved and appellants raised because in at all adjudication, stages of the same issue decided direct at the time pending appeal cases were on and their decided, are to the benefit of the they entitled was we Accordingly, decision. reverse orders convictions. appellants’ affirmed the that solic- Appellant Tony record establishes Ardestani his an acrimonious Following ited to murder wife. individuals Richard approached June of Ardestani separation anyone he knew who and whether would inquired Vecchiola later, $10,000. Approximately year kill for one Vec- his wife Ardestani meet Otis While suggested chiola Winstead. July home saw route to Ardestani’s Winstead en Hoover and informed her of Ardestani’s Detective Elizabeth his killed. Hoover Winstead to plan accompanied to have wife residence, but he was not home. Winstead there- Ardestani’s after discuss murder. Later met Ardestani met month, portrayed with Ardestani again Winstead *4 meeting, arrange- At that partner. payment Hoover as his killing out dis- carry and were specific plans ments cussed. 22, 1992, Deputy with authorization from a Assis- July
On body Attorney, tant Hoover was fitted with a wire and District apartment. to Ardestani’s Winstead accompanied Winstead his asked he wanted wife killed that week- Ardestani whether “Yeah, end, I replied, guess.” gave he He then Hoover and and a of the victim to her description Winstead and directions passed Ardestani in a home. As and Hoover each other doorway, narrow Ardestani his hand on waist placed Hoover’s body placed and felt wire. then under Hoover Ardestani arrest. recordings, a suppress alleging
Ardestani filed motion to wiretap interceptions that the warrantless of his conversations I, Pennsylvania violated Article Section 8 of the Constitution. taped The trial court denied motion and a of the recording played jury conversation for the at trial. Ardestani was was thereafter convicted of criminal solicitation. The common pleas post-trial court denied motions the constitu- challenging Ar- tionality intercepted conversations and sentenced years destani to to ten imprisonment. three sentence, Superior judgment Court affirmed the alia, holding, inter interception the warrantless wire Ardestani’s home did not violate Article Section While Petition for of Appeal Ardestani’s Allowance was pending Court, before our we Brion. decided On March we granted allocatur and remanded the case to Superior remand, for in light reconsideration of Brion. On sentence, Court again judgment affirmed the concluding retroactively Brion was not to on its en based Metts, bane decision Pa.Super. appeal granted, 544 Pa. Our Court again granted allocatur and directed that this case be consolidated with Metts.
Appellant Joseph charged degree Metts was with the first Newland, murder of Piper Fayette a corrections officer at the County Prison. In the early morning January hours on sister, Kulenovic, Metts awakened his Wendy Sue and shooting guard jail.1 confessed to at the Kulenovic observed a gun and a purse containing the victim’s pay stubs her kitchen recognized gun table. She as to Paul belonging Kuba, fifty-dollar friend Metts. Metts then removed stated, bill from “I shot purse lousy fifty her for a Dwayne charged 1. Kulenovic’s husband was also murder and was Metts's co-defendant at trial. *5 for Kuba that he had shot Newland Metts later told dollars.” money. the with authoriza- February January
On Attorney, wore an Fayette County District Kuba tion from the his in- Metts about questioning electronic transmitter while During conver- volvement in the murder. one recorded sations, for shooting fifty to the victim dol- Metts confessed Wendy in the conversations were recorded home of lars. The days for Kulenovic, staying had been several where Metts to murder. prior the on the recordings a motion to the suppress
Metts filed Pennsylva- Article 8 of the they violated Section ground The court pleas suppression nia Constitution. common denied Metts subse- played jury.2 and the were for was tapes murder, robbery and related degree convicted first quently a life on murder theft He received sentence offenses. to for charge twenty years and a consecutive sentence ten his conviction. robbery appeal Superior pending,
While Metts’s to Court was affirmed Superior our Court Brion. The decided convictions, to that Brion was inapplicable Metts’s intercepted prior conversations that occurred December Brion Court subsequently date was decided. Our .the allocatur, question to the of whether Brion is granted limited case, appeal held to Metts’s and ordered that applicable case, similarly disposition our of a situated Common- pending (1997). v. Selby, wealth Pa. applies whether to the instant cases
The issue of Cabeza, by our Commonwealth controlled Cabeza, Pa. defendant’s time Court at the we decided appeal pending Superior was Scott, intro- permitting prosecutors where rule we abandoned the accused cross-examination prior duce arrests trial, reporter tape was 2. At the court indicated that the inaudible. reporter prepared a tran- agreed trial and a court-commissioned court According transcript, script that was admitted into evidence. stated, got fifty shot her the cash” and "I bucks off her.” Metts "I for in Cabeza had intro- character prosecutor witnesses. As the duced the defendant’s arrests to impeach his character witnesses, Court relied upon Scott and reversed judgment of sentence.
The Commonwealth appealed, contending that Scott should be because the law in effect the time of trial prosecutor’s sanctioned the of questioning line and the eviden tiary rule established in Scott was not of constitutional dimen rejected sion. We argument, Commonwealth’s and stated: only The noteworthy difference between Scott and [Cabe za Scott was is that argued ] and decided first. The instant may case well have been the case which overruled prior law if Scott had not been decided while appeal to [Cabeza’s] Superior Court pending. was question whether apply enlightened an rule in favor of a discredited one should not be determined by fortuity of who first has his case by decided an appellate court.
Therefore, we hold that where an appellate decision over-
rules prior law and announces a new principle, unless the
decision specifically declares the rule to
prospective
only,
the new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where
the issue in question
properly
preserved at all stages of
adjudication up to
including
any direct appeal.
232-233,
Here, Brion overruled prior law which sanctioned the warrantless wire interception of an accused’s conversation in his home. Our Brion did not specifically declare the new rule was to be prospective only. Accordingly, the Brion applies rule to all cases on direct appeal where the issue in question was properly preserved at all stages of the adjudication. Brown, Commonwealth v. See (1981) (fairness A.2d 905 demands that relief be granted not only in case which successfully law, contests a rule of but also in cases on direct appeal which suffer same infirmity); Litvin, McHugh (changes the law are applied to cases in system at the time the announced). change is Selby, conclusion the same
We reached involved the also 547 Selby, but held Brion.3 allocatur granted We application Brion. rejecting Com pending of the case disposition Brion should not be we applied, contention monwealth’s the outcome pending the case fact that we held that the noted controlled the case to be expected that we of Brion indicated Brion. We stated: rule, of the Cabeza illogic light in the Considered and then reaching the case pending indistinguishable situation analytically in an result opposite explanation. defies 688 A.2d at that we must next applies,
Having determined instant to the of that decision examine whether intercepted conversations.4 suppression cases warrants *7 reasonably expect “an individual can held that we in his home violated will not be privacy right that his Id. at surveillance.” any electronic the use of through that the conversations concluded because at 289. We 652 A.2d and there was no home in the defendant’s intercepted were judicial authority, by a neutral cause determination probable I, Pennsylvania the 8 of Article Section recordings violated the of Appellant The facts suppressed. and must Constitution conver indistinguishable. virtually case are Ardestani’s in the criminal himself implicated Ardestani sations in which in his home without determination recorded solicitation were authority. Accordingly, judicial by cause a neutral probable of suppressed. have been tapes the should case, not conversations were Metis’s the In Appellant in home, intercepted but rather were in Metts’s recorded sister, Notwithstanding Wendy Kulenovic. of his home Although plurality opinion. Selby was a recognize that 3. We Brion to the regarding applicability of controlling, it is instructive instant cases. noted, preserved the issue properly appellants raised 4. As both pursuant intercepted admissibility conversations challenging of I, Pennsylvania Constitution. Section 8 of to Article controls. We have fact, in we find that our decision not possess property right held an individual need in to invoke place protections; invaded constitutional rather only possess legitimate he must of in expectation privacy Brundidge, area searched. Commonwealth v. 533 Pa. An expectation of privacy is when present the individual’s conduct exhibits an actual expec- tation of which is privacy recognized by society as reasonable. Id.
The record
establishes
Metts did not maintain a
permanent
residence and had been
at
staying
Kulenovic’s
home
her permission
days
for several
prior
the murd
er.5 These facts
possessed
establish that Metts
a reasonable
expectation
privacy
in his
society
sister’s home which
would
Rowe,
recognize as reasonable. See Commonwealth v.
433 Pa.
(1969) (defendant
Accordingly, Metts entitled to protections of Article Brion. Because Section 8 as espoused there was no determination of probable judicial cause a neutral authori- *8 ty, the recordings of Metis’s conversations in his sister’s home should suppressed. have been
Finally, we address the Commonwealth’s contentions even applies, the admission of that if tape-recorded the 5. Kulenovic testified that she apartment asked Metts to leave her on the day following girlfriend, the murder because she did not want his runaway, stay apartment day him. Metts left the on the after murder, the spend night but returned to apartment the at his sister’s several times to his arrest. estab error. It well amounts to harmless
conversations court is if only appellate harmless the that an error is lished no reason that there is a reasonable doubt beyond convinced to the have contributed that the error could possibility able Story, v. 476 Pa. verdict. Commonwealth (1978). establishing the burden of bears The Commonwealth Id. This burden is satisfied of the error. harmlessness the (1) to show: the error did is able when the Commonwealth minimis; or was de prejudice or the the defendant prejudice (2) merely cumulative evidence was erroneously the admitted substantially similar to which was of other untainted evidence evidence; properly or admit admitted erroneously overwhelming was so guilt uncontradicted evidence ted and insignificant by so affect of the error prejudicial and the contributed to the error could not have that comparison Mayhue, verdict. Commonwealth Williams, 421, 433 (1994); has 538-39 The Commonwealth instant cases. in each to meet burden failed case, the Commonwealth re In Ardestani’s Appellant of harmless error and contends type third lies to have his wife killed voiced his desire because Ardestani witnesses, of his overwhelming there was evidence numerous fails, as argument conversation. This taped absent guilt not uncontradicted. of conviction was support the evidence or re encouraged at trial that he never Ardestani testified kill Hoover or Otis Winstead to his wife quested Detective to have her killed.6 expressed that he never desire case, the Commonwealth con Appellant Metts’s taped confession was harmless tends that the admission properly cumulative of other tape merely was because admitted, As substantially disagree. similar evidence. We in Ari eloquently stated Supreme the United States Fulminante, 1246, 113 zona v. L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. (1991): Likewise, although he could not remember Metts testified surrounding shooting, shooting the victim for her he denied time money any other reason. or for *9 A Indeed, confession is like no other evidence. the defen- dant’s own confession is probably the most probative and him____ damaging evidence that can against be admitted The admissions of a himself, defendant come from the actor the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source infor- mation about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so may that we justifiably doubt ability put its out them of mind if even told to do so (citations omitted).
Id. at
Justice NIGRO files a in dissenting opinion Justice CASTILLE files a joins. Justice NEWMAN Justice,
NIGRO, concurring. to majority Appellants I with the that are entitled the agree Common holding of this Court’s application retroactive 256, under wealth v. 539 Pa. 652 287 outlined in Commonwealth v. retroactivity of general rule (1983).1 Cabeza, 228, 146, 148 However, 233, 503 Pa. 469 A.2d that, Pennsylvania I to under separately note current write should be law, retroactively of question whether analysis with an to the instant cases does end applied Cabeza. under rule, Cabeza holds that general is
Although
retroactivity
of
sweeping
Court has observed that
rule
retroactive
this
Blackwell v. Common-
universally justified.
is not
application
Blackwell,
wealth,
172,
1094
this
527
589 A.2d
retroactivity
general
Cabeza’s
rule of
but
Court reaffirmed
a new
apply
of whether
to
rule
observed
judicial
or
is a function of
discre-
retroactively
prospectively
(1)
to
by
tion
be
purpose
informed
three considerations:
(2)
rule;
by
the extent
law
by
served
the new
of the reliance
(3)
standard;
enforcement
on the old
effect
authorities
justice
the administration of
retroactive
182-83,
Id. (citing
of
standard.
(decision that Article Section 8 search requires warrant to use of is to pen registers applied retroac- tively tripartite retroactivity analysis); under both Cabeza and McFeely, Commonwealth v. (1985); Tizer, Pa.Super. Commonwealth v. (1996); Blackwell, 601-03 also see 183 n. States,
A.2d at 1099 n. 6 (although Desist United supra prosecution, involved a criminal criteria in resolv- *11 ing the of or of question prospective application retroactive a Thus, new rule is no in civil litigation). contrary different to I position majority, of the believe current Pennsylvania tripartite law mandates that this analysis be considered when a determining announcing whether rule new should granted be retroactive effect.2 cases, however, applied
When
to the instant
I do not believe
that the three factors of
retroactivity
the Blackwell
analysis
in
militate
favor of granting
prospective
only.
Brion
effect
question
conducting
tripartite
2.
I also
the wisdom of
analysis
this
when
application
the issue involves the limited retroactive
of a new criminal
proportion only
rule of
pending
constitutional
to those cases
on direct
appeal
Kentucky,
at the
time of
decision. See
479 U.S.
Griffith
314,
708,
(1987)
107
(re-examining retroactivity
S.Ct.
requires individual, non-consenting is to in the home of a interceptions right against un- state constitutional safeguard important to citizens’ protect and seizures and reasonable searches See Common- to their homes. heightened right privacy DeBlase, 39, 665 A.2d wealth v. raised in
(issue posed of constitutional dimension fundamental of the nature and reach analysis complex 8). such, by Article Section As protected right privacy of allows to resolve retroactive of, conformity light review before it on direct cases constitutional with, understanding governing princi- its best ples.3 rely Justice Castille’s dissent on this the Commonwealth and Both Miller, in Commonwealth v. Court’s decision purpose support position of the Brion their rule, exclusionary a defect in the amplify rule and not to cure *12 reliability, weighs affecting in favor of trial the verdict’s criminal Miller, Court, examining prospective application Brion. analysis, retroactivity that where the purpose prong of the stated the overcome an major purpose doctrine is to of new constitutional substantially truth-finding impairs its aspect the trial that criminal given complete rule retroactive effect. function ... the new has been a Conversely, strongly supports prospectivity for the same standard rule, purpose exclusionary primary the amplifying the police conduct. to deter unlawful which is Superior employed this at The Court also
Id. at retroactively finding applying Brion to the language support to its Furthermore, given history the convoluted and constitution- Brion, uncertainty surrounding finally by al the issue resolved argument I am not the persuaded by Commonwealth’s under on prong the second that law enforcement authorities’ reliance require court-approved search practice did justified so clearly compel prospective warrant was as to application. in Brion came on the of a heels somewhat whether,
disjointed
history
wavering
and tortured
of cases
on
circumstances,
Pennsylvania
and under what
Constitution
police
allows the
to direct a
informant to
consenting
electroni
an
cally record
individual’s conversations and transmit
them
5704(2)(ii)
back to the
to
police pursuant
section
of the Wire
5704(2)(ii).
§
Act. See
tap
years
18 Pa.C.S.
Seven
before this
Court’s decision
Com
decided
Schaeffer, holding
monwealth v.
for
first
Article
time that
I,
8 required
police
judicial
Section
to obtain
authorization
in the form of
probable
a search warrant based on
cause
sending
before
informant into a suspect’s
confidential
home
to electronically
pursuant
record his conversations
to
5740(2)(ii)
§
of Wiretap
Act.
Schaeffer,
Pa.Super.
(1987) (en banc),
Edmunds, 374, 395-99, 897-99 Given language fully that the purposes in Miller does not envision constitution, exclusionary coupled rule as embodied in our state protection right this Court’s ardent privacy of the fundamental home, persuaded argument one's I am not that this defeats retroactive application of Brion to cases. these *13 206 Blystone, v. this Court decided Commonwealth
pending, warrantless, to the challenge constitutional involved a state con of outside-the-home interception consensual unilaterally 5704(2)(ii) Act. Wiretap of the § to pursuant made versations (1988), 86 549 A.2d Blystone, 519 Pa. aff'd 299, 110 Blystone Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. grounds, other (1990). rejecting Blystone’s 255 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d conversations challenged argument, this Court held violate a defendant’s and did not were admissible properly 466, 549 8.4 Id. I, under Article Section rights constitutional Blystone, early in this Court Shortly at 88. after A.2d Barone, in curiam order per entered a in- had found decision which reversing Superior Court’s by citing subject suppression, simply to tape recordings home Barone, 118, 552 A.2d Blystone. 1048. decided Com panel of the Also (1989), Brion, monwealth v. Pa.Super. I, rev’d, that Article finding judicial to obtain require police 8 did not Section suspect’s informant into a home sending before an approval Blystone, validat his conversations on the basis record body wiretap consensual under one-party a warrantless ing Brion, sub silentio. 5704(2)(ii), § overruled had Schaeffer A.2d at 1107. decision Brion finally 1994, this
In December of Court’s body in-home use of uncertainty surrounding police ended the I, requires definitively holding that Article Section wires cause probable judicial to first obtain a determination police unilaterally interception in a consensual engaging before pursuant in a home suspect’s oral communications 5704(2)(ii) 261, 652 Wiretap § of the Act. Blystone in the Although interception at issue in did not occur residence, specifically address the issue this Court did not defendant’s Commonwealth v. significance locality in this context. See also (1988)(upholding Rodriguez, 519 Pa. 5704(2)(ii) § pursuant to interceptions made of oral communications 8, by Section challenges under Article Wiretap Act in the face of intercep- discussing the issue of citing Blystone specifically but without residence). private tions made in A.2d at 289. Given I history, do not believe that the prong second of the Blackwell analysis weighs favor of affording prospective effect only.
Finally, in terms of the third of prong the Blackwell analy sis, the retroactive application Brion will have a limited effect on justice, the administration of given that its applica tion is restricted to the instant only cases and those cases pending on direct appeal at the time of our in decision Brion which properly preserved the issue. Cleveland v. Johns- Cf. (1997) (third Manville 547 Corp., Pa. 1146 A.2d prong of Blackwell retroactivity analysis favored prospective applica tion since application retroactive of decision at issue would courts). place large burden on Cases involving unchallenged final, interceptions, which are now will not upset or affected by the application retroactive of Brion. See also Common Fowler, wealth 550 Pa.
(Brion is not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral appeal).
Thus, I find that the three factors of the retroactivity analysis do not in weigh favor of prospective application overall, therefore, find no reason to abandon general rule of retroactivity Cabeza. I join therefore in the result by reached majority that the rule articulated in Brion is to be retroactively applied to all cases which properly preserved the issue and which were on direct appeal when this Court issued its decision in Brion. Since both Ardestani and Metts fit this criteria for retroactive application, both Appellants are entitled to receive the benefit of principle announced Brion, which compels suppression of intercepted conversa- tions.
CASTILLE, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because I do not agree this Court’s holding Commonwealth v.
A.2d 287 given should be application. retroactive Fur- ther, I find the Brion inapplicable to the facts of appellant Metts’ case. Constitutions, or retroactive Federal the State and
Under new constitutional expounding for decisions effect prospective or required. prohibited trials is neither affecting criminal rules Commission, Ethics State v. Commonwealth Blackwell has This Court determining analysis types different several retroactive given should be particular whether rule is that a general application. or prospective effect cases where the retroactively to to be applied new rule is adjudication up stages all preserved is question properly Cabeza, appeal. direct including any to and (1983). However, retroactivity gener is the “although recognized Court has is application of retroactive rule, rule sweeping al judicial a matter of justified. Retrospective a case case basis.” exercised on must be discretion which Blackwell, 589 A.2d at *15 views the adopted approach has
This Court retroactively or new rule apply of whether decision (1) the of three considerations: as a function prospectively (2) of the rule; the extent by the new to be served purpose (3) rule; on the administra- the effect on the old reliance new rule. by the retroactive justice tion of v. Desist United 182-83, 1099 Id. (quoting 589 A.2d at (1969)).1 1030, 22 States, 244, L.Ed.2d 248 89 S.Ct. 394 U.S. 128, Miller, 457, 472, 417 A.2d v. In 708, 314, 649 Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d 479 U.S. v. Griffith for the (1987), Supreme held that a new rule the United States retroactively to all prosecutions is to be criminal conduct of final, exception for yet with no review or not pending cases on direct past. with the constitutes a "clear break” which the new rule cases in question applicable to the of whether is not Id. The of Griffith retroactively applied. The decision in Brion should this Court’s certainly questions applicable to all retroactivity principle of Griffith However, apply the same this Court need not concerning law. federal dealing law. State courts have with state standards to issues retroactivity own decisions when authority of their to determine the Harper Virginia Dept. See v. are at issue. questions of state law of (1993). 86, 99, Taxation, L.Ed.2d 74 113 S.Ct. 125 509 U.S. Pennsylvania Section 8 of the decided under Article Brion was apply the Blackwell Accordingly, this Court is free Constitution. concerning retroactivity. analysis
209 (1980), denied, 136 v. 449 Pennsylvania, cert. Miller U.S. 842 this Court S.Ct. L.Ed.2d stated purpose be served the new rule should receive primary major consideration. of purpose “Where new of aspect constitutional is to overcome an the criminal doctrine substantially impairs trial that its function truth-finding and so questions raises the accuracy guilty serious about of verdicts trials, in past given complete the new rule has been retroac Id., States, tive quoting effect.” v. United Williams U.S. (1971) 91 S.Ct. (plurality opinion). L.Ed.2d Conversely, “strongly prospectivi the same standard supports ty for a amplifying exclusionary the evidentiary rule.” Id., Desist, 249, 89 quoting supra, 394 U.S. at S.Ct. 1030 added). (emphasis question
The threshold is whether the decision announces a new law. principle Corp., Cleveland Johns-Manville does, If it then it is proper for this Court to give only prospective the rule effect. Here, Id. there is no that Brion dispute enunciated a new principle of law. in Brion Additionally, ruling was not by any ruling Rather, foreshadowed earlier this Court. was in holding Brion stark contrast to this Court’s earlier warrantless, concerning decisions unilaterally consensual in terception of conversations. v. Blystone, See Commonwealth 81, (1988), grounds, on other sub aff'd nom, Blystone Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 110 S.Ct. (holding L.Ed.2d 255 that statements obtained warrantless, through unilaterally interception consensual outside-the-home conversations were properly admissible and did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights under Article *16 I, 8); Section Rodriguez, Commonwealth v. (1988) 1211,
548 (citing A.2d 1213 Blystone to uphold intercep tions of body conversations where an informant with a trans defendant); purchased drugs mitter from the Barone, 118, curiam (per order citing Blystone Superior to reverse the Court’s Memorandum decision suppressing recordings taped that had in the been residence). also, See Commonwealth v. defendant’s 83, (1989), rev’d, Pa.Super. A.2d 1105 (1994) (citing Blystone, Superior Court deter A.2d 287 Article Section required mined that were not under police sending before an informant judicial approval to obtain prior In so a home to record his conversations. suspect’s into had Blystone that holding, Court concluded in Commonwealth v. overruled sub silentio its prior (1987) (en banc), 179, 536 Schaeffer, Pa.Super. recording a required prior to obtain a warrant police which infor using in his home a defendant’s conversations wired mant.) the time under the law existence at Consequently, po were appellants’ inculpatory intercepted, statements cause judicial probable were not to first obtain a required lice unilaterally consensual engaging determination before Blystone, supra. See July interception. On participant Ardes police intercepted by appellant a statement made that he to hire someone to kill his wife. indicating tani wished 8, 1993. January appellant Ardestani was convicted on t case, admitting of his tha interception statements Metis’ January he murdered a corrections officer occurred May February 1992 and 1992. Metts was convicted on did not decide Brion until December This Court long interceptions after both the of the statements appellants’ subsequent convictions. of the Blackwell factors leads to the conclusion
Application in Brion should not be this Court’s decision Blackwell, although First, retroactively. purpose under was designed safeguard the new rule announced not be enhanced or furthered privacy, purpose will previ- rule to applying interceptions the new cases where under circum- ously constitutionally permissible occurred Brion, could not stances at the time. Prior to defendant that he was entitled to the benefit of court order establish having his upon probable based cause conversations home, yet recorded in his as this Court had determined expectation privacy that there a reasonable under such was of Even if a circumstances. retroactive interest, cannot, it was privacy could restore a lost there privacy police intercepted no interest effect at the time Thus, nothing at issue. to restore. conversations there *17 vein, of application In similar retroactive the Brion rule goal do nothing primary suppression: will further the of Ohio, deterring police misconduct. See Mapp U.S. 81 S.Ct. (protecting L.Ed.2d one’s constitu- right against tional unreasonable searches and seizures law depriving enforcement officials of benefits derived information). using unlawfully police from obtained offi- in the instant matters in conformity cers acted strict with the in requirements constitutional force at the time that in question statements were intercepted. Evidence which was lawfully obtained should not be no suppressed since there was police misconduct to deter. Blackwell,
Under the in prong second the test enunciated rule, extent of on the question the reliance old there is no in prosecutors officers and involved instant mat- relied on they ters the caselaw effect at the time intercept- ed at Law conversations issue. enforcement officers for punished should be conforming their conduct to the law Here, in existence at the time that it they investigate crime. was reasonable for the officers involved conclude that there no impediments taping were constitutional the appellants’ conversations. Blackwell,
Finally, under the third prong applying Brion retroactively nothing does to further the administration of justice. fact, suppressing inculpatory statements issue, which were obtained constitutionally under permissible circumstances at time of hinders interception, the adminis- justice tration by placing law enforcement officials in the position being untenable unable to rely validity caselaw effect at the time of their investigations. Law enforcement officials should not be for punished inability their Court, to predict holdings where, the future of this especially as a new decision represents such a drastic Furthermore, from departure past precedent. retroactive place of Brion would on the burden courts which would be forced to determine whether evidence which was obtained constitutionally under permissible circumstances should, in retrospect, suppressed. Miller, the new rule of law announced under
Finally, criminal trials which appellants’ not cure a defect Brion did function, truth-finding substantially impaired the affected or *18 fact-finding in the process nor a serious flaw did correct Indeed, undeniably at issue enhances at trial. the evidence function, the relevance of seeking appellants’ the truth as to ultimate the case is statements the issues inculpatory I Thus, is not mandated. application undeniable. retroactive in the instant the Court’s determination agree exclusionary scope the of the expanded matter that Brion Miller, rule; therefore, preferred under result and Metts, 447 See prospective application. 346, A.2d 355 669 Pa.Super.
I the cases in which this Court has persuaded by am rule a clear prospectively represented a new rule where the Miller, 471, Pa. 417 at past. In 490 at A.2d break with 136, holding to give to retroactive effect this Court refused Williams, 293, 1177 483 Pa. 396 A.2d of Commonwealth v. (1978), denied, 446 100 64 L.Ed.2d cert. U.S. S.Ct. (1980), to police to obtain a warrant required which circumstances. suspect exigent a his home absent arresting this years over two before Court’s Miller’s arrest occurred of evaluating holding whether the holding Williams. effect, given should have been retroactive Williams objectives of rule exclusionary noted that the properly fruits suppressing would not be furthered evidence when found legal which were made. This Court also arrests justifiably pre authorities relied upon law enforcement caselaw, a a require did not warrant arrest existing Finally, in his this Court determined that suspect home. determining not truth implicate of Williams did Therefore, ran in governing all the criteria favor process. Miller, rule. at prospective application Williams Geschwendt, 137; at also Commonwealth v. A.2d see (1982) (plurality opinion) (applying Pa. ruling Mulgrew, of Commonwealth insanity instruction in defense concerning jury cases, a because the new rule was clear break prospectively past). from the in Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., recently,
Most
(1997),
at 1152. although this Court found that the first factor of Blackwell supported a retroactive application due to the significant purpose of promote fairness, the rule to the second *19 and third factors strongly only favored a prospective applica Simmons. tion of matters, In the instant the relevant factors weigh heavily in favor of prospective application of the rule; therefore, I disagree with the majority that the holding of Brion should be retroactively applied. I find the holding of Brion inapplicable to appellant
Finally,
Metts’ case. purports
protect
persons from govern-
mental
Brion,
within one’s own home.
invasions
privacy
For reasons, aforementioned I dissent.2 This dissenting opinion is joined by Justice NEWMAN. I further dissent as I do not believe correctly that Brion was decided. (Nix, See dissenting, joined at 290 C.J. Castille, JJ.). Papadakos and