*1
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Sept. 1997. Aug. Decided *2 Erie, Anthony. D. Burt, for Brian P. Joseph Trabold, Erie, Elvage G. Conti, A. P. Christian Joseph for Com. Murphy, GAPPY, ZAPPALA, FLAHERTY, C.J., and
Before NEWMAN, CASTILLE, JJ. NIGRO *3 THE COURT OPINION OF CAPPY, Justice. for review is whether question presented
The jeopardy the double is barred appellant of Constitu- to the United States of the Fifth Amendment clause join- compulsory or the tion, estoppel, collateral principles of 110). (hereinafter § As we § 110. Pa.C.S. provision der of 18 joinder compulsory barred present prosecution find or constitu- equitable not reach the of 110 we do provision follow, For the reasons presented. claims tional Court is reversed. Superior decision of the necessitate a for review presented The nature of the claims history of procedural factual and description detailed 28, 1994, on March p.m. 5:30 approximately the case. At drove to the resi- years age, of who was then appellant, sister, Pennsylvania. in Angela, Corry, year of his 13 old dence friends, her also up to two of appellant pick asked Angela Ange- Corry. Appellant in at another residence juveniles, Ann, years age, also to the home Sue proceeded la years was 15 Ann and Michelle who up Sue they picked where age. Appellant Angela previously brought had Mi- Lancaster, in Corry family Pennsylva- chelle to from her home nia, away because Michelle wanted to run from home. At the Michelle, in appellant proceeded Corry behest of to a location Lucas, juveniles, picked up where he two male Steven and years age. each 12 around group finally stopping
The drove area at of an acquaintance appellant. Appellant the residence stopped particular knowing acquaintance at this location his in kept garage. Appellant, beer his with the assistance of Lucas, beer, burglarized garage stealing Steven and which youths. was then shared all the imbibing group After some of the stolen beer the decided to Erie, Pennsylvania. to that they travel Aware would need journey, boys funds to continue their and the com- appellant way mitted two additional At burglaries Erie. City, Pennsylvania, first stop they burglarized Union Waterford, home of Steven’s uncle. then drove to Pennsylvania boys burglarized where he and the a garage and money garage, stole from a truck within the belonging appellant’s stepfather. continued on group way they their to Erie where all room
stayed by appellant Knights one rented at the Inn day group spent Motel. The next some time at a mall in Erie and then to proceed decided to the state of Florida. to Florida During trip appellant, with the aid of Steven Lucas, committed additional burglaries and thefts. The journey abrupt came to an end on April Florida when the car was driving stopped by the police everyone custody. *4 and was taken into Upon Corry, their return to Pennsylvania, appellant and juveniles gave Corry four of the statements to the Police all of outlining Corry the above actions. The Police forwarded by juveniles the statements and appellant Pennsyl- the to the vania Police. The Police Department brought State 3, charges against appellant on June 1994 at Information No. 1994, 1485 of in the of County. Court Common Pleas of Erie with 1485 were interference at Information No. charges minors; children; purchase, and corruption of custody of the beverages.1 of brewed transportation consumption, 2, 1994, guilty to three counts pled September appellant On No. 1485 of 1994. of minors at Information corruption 2, charged appel- that appellant pled, to which Counts juveniles male state transported the two lant had during parents of their permission Florida without aid, abet, time, encourage entice or did period ranging criminal acts commission of numerous minors and hand- money to the theft of burglaries from residential of a transportation with guns. charged appellant Count 3 of her permission without juvenile to Florida female commit juvenile the female encouraging as well as parents, sentenced on Octo- Appellant activities. various criminal months 21, of five to eleven 1995 to concurrent terms ber ($300). fined three hundred dollars incarceration and 6, 1994, Police filed Pennsylvania State On December were held for charges against Appellant, which following County, Pennsyl- of Common Pleas of Erie court the Court criminal vania, burglary, No. 32 of 1995: at Information or taking theft unlawful conspiracy, trespass, These arose direct- and criminal mischief. disposition Steven, Lucas on the ly appellant, from the activities of Steven’s uncle’s burglary 1994 for the evening of March City, County, Erie Penn- Township, in Union Union residence sylvania. Motion to Dis- pretrial filed a June
On that a arguing at Information No. 32 of miss the either charges was barred on the compulsory joinder. or estoppel collateral jeopardy, double Dismiss, Motion to hearing purpose For the appellant’s forth to the facts as set parties stipulated Angela, Sue interlocking and the statements confession to Dismiss was denied Ann, and Lucas. The Motion Steven interlocutory appeal by took an the trial court. 6301; 2904; 18 Pa.C.S. Pa.C.S. 18 Pa.C.S. 1. See: *5 right pre-trial from the denial Motion to Dismiss. The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. This court allowance of granted appeal. denial of a Motion to an pretrial Dismiss indict subject jeopardy grounds appellate
ment on double
to
appears
review unless it
that the claim is frivolous. Common
336,
(1986);
Brady,
wealth v.
510 Pa.
Our joinder rule of 110: prosecution prosecution barred When former
for different offense
Although prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is facts, on it based different is barred such former prose- cution under the following circumstances:
(1) The prosecution acquittal former resulted an or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of (relating this title when barred former prosecution for the offense) same and the subsequent prosecution is for: (i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same arising conduct or episode, from the same criminal if such offense was known appropriate prosecuting to the officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial jurisdic- and was within the separate court unless the court ordered a single tion of a offense; or charge trial of the such (iii) conduct, unless:
(A) formerly- offense of which the defendant was *6 the offense for which he is acquitted convicted or and each of a fact not subsequently prosecuted requires proof other of required by defining law each such to prevent substantially offenses is intended a different evil; harm or or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when began. the former trial
(2) terminated, prosecution The former was after the found, by indictment was an or final order or acquittal aside, judgment for the defendant which has not set been acquittal, reversed or vacated and which final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense.
(3) terminated, prosecution The former improperly was improper as termination is defined section 109 of this title (relating prosecution to when former prosecution barred offense) for the same and the subsequent prosecution is for an of offense which the defendant could have been convicted
had the former prosecution improperly not been terminated.
Appellant asserts that In present prosecution at 110(l)(ii) § formation No. 32 of 1995 is barred because the charges at issue arose from episode the same criminal culmi nating in prior charges his conviction on the corrupting morals of minors at Information No. 1485 of 1994. Each of 110(1)(ii) following four factors must be met before will 1) bar a subsequent prosecution: the former must 2) conviction; have in an acquittal resulted or a the instant prosecution on based the same criminal conduct or arose 3) from the same criminal episode prosecution; as the former prosecutor charges was aware the instant before the 4) commencement of charges; the trial on the former instant charges and the former were within the
62
Hockenbury,
court. Commonwealth
single
jurisdiction of
Bracalielly,
(1997);
530-32,
701 A.2d
1336
549 Pa.
469-71,
A.2d at 760.
540 Pa. at
necessary to
of the four factors
asserts that each
Appellant
110(1)(ii)
have been met.
under
present prosecution
bar the
one,
factors
this
we will address
opinion
For the
purpose
two,
factor is
four,
only
to factor
as
the second
prior
three
contention.
serious
at No.
to the first Information
pled guilty
a conviction for
plea
A
constitutes
guilty
1485 of 1194.
530-32,
Hockenbury,
Pa.
701 A.2d
at
purposes
aware of
prosecutor
no
that the
dispute
at 1336. There is
as all
charges,
the trial on the first
the current
before
at the
authority
to the prosecuting
crimes were known
acts occurred between March
All the criminal
same time.
acts were documented
1994. All of the criminal
April
*7
4,
April
confession of
appellant’s
the
for the
a
jurisdiction
the
charges
All
the
were within
1994.
ranging
the crimes
dispute
There is no
single court.
charges are within
felony
misdemeanor and
summary,
from
County.
Pleas of Erie
jurisdiction of the Court of Common
the
thus,
County,
Erie
venue
All the
at issue arose within
charges
McPhail,
Accord,
v.
547 Pa.
Commonwealth
is not at issue.
(1997).
one,
Thus,
and four
519,
factors
three
We as the episode the same criminal charges at issue arose from The convicted. appellant previously for which criminal burglary, with charges appellant Information City criminal mischief in Union trespass, theft and 28, burglary, committed the night of March crimes, and juveniles, in concert with two Steven and related is also of that concerted action Lucas. As a result crimi argues that these charged conspiracy. Appellant with prior corrupt as the episode nal arose from the same In charges. prior Information ing the morals of minors Steven, Ann taking Lucas and Sue appellant was convicted
63 of their Corry Pennsylvania permission from without on committing burglaries area and parents, Florida, way transporting juveniles out of the jurisdiction Pennsylvania. conviction arose from prior 1, 28 commencing continuing through April acts on March present burglary charges 1994. The arose within the time charges, juvenile set forth in the span prior and with co-conspirators. Hyde, “in defining
As this court stated what acts single only constitute a not episode, temporal logical of events sequence important, relationship but also 491, the acts 500 Pa. at between must be considered.” 458 In temporal logical A.2d at 181. our consideration of the acts, relationship guided by between the criminal we are policy designed considerations that 110was to serve: (1) to a protect person governmen- accused crimes from being undergo tal harassment of forced to successive trials stemming episode; for offenses from the same criminal (2) judicial economy, as a matter of administration and finality unduly burdening judicial assure without process Stewart, v. repetitious litigation. See Commonwealth 493 Pa. [24] 29, 425 A.2d [346] 348 [(1981)]; Commonwealth Holmes, 536, 541, (1978); Pa. 391 A.2d Commonwealth v. Tarver, 467 Pa. [401] 357 A.2d [539] [(1976)]. “By requiring compulsory joinder of all ... charges arising episode], from same criminal [the only defendant need ‘run gauntlet’ once and confront the [* awesome resources of the state.” Commonwealth v. * *12] Campana, (Campana I), 452 Pa. [233] [(1973)]. 440-441 A.2d [432]
Hude,
With these considerations mind we review the temporal logical relationship between the in the first Information and those within the second information. In the first Information with appellant charged corrupting the Steven, morals of Ann by removing Lucas Sue them from 28, Corry, Pennsylvania encouraging on March their acts, burglary and including in various participation they Florida where theft, juveniles the transporting specify not the The information does first apprehended. were in connection with the referenced burglaries location of the However, specific delinea even without corruption charges. Information, at in the first were issue burglaries tion of which 28, 1994 is of March City night in burglary the Union already been crimes has appellant connected to the temporally criminal acts of, charged first Information as the convicted 1, 1994. 28, 1994 through April from March spanning in the crimes argues The Commonwealth prior to the logically are not related information present Here, not involve the same conduct. they as do criminal acts: on the nature of the focuses Commonwealth and theft. burglary of minors versus the morals corrupting A but lacks substance. appeal, has surface argument This upon duplication not conditioned relationship is logical A exists where the logical relationship acts. identical criminal duplication a substantial criminal acts reveals sequence of A.2d at Bracalielly, 540 Pa. at and fact. issues of law case, of issues duplication In such a substantial present support appellant’s The evidence to of law and fact exists. as taken conviction is the statement original Steven, Police; testimony statements Corry and/or juveniles; of the Angela; parents Ann and Lucas and Sue In investigation. Police officers involved and the again will be all of the above witnesses present prosecution that a testimony. high Given present required trial must be testimony from the first of the percentage trial, of factual duplication a substantial repeated the second obviously present. issues is be called witnesses that would only additional trial, in the first trial are the that were not needed Although and the Police. two burglary State
victim nothing involved there is departments are police different investigations ongo- two different were indicating that record *9 other, separate the two which led to of each ing, independent were Corry Police contrary, the To prosecutions. regarding information incriminating relevant of all possession to prior Informations activity set forth both criminal all the chose Police Police. by the State involvement any The dual to the State Police. information to forward the is not offices law enforcement of two different involvement facts of this given the charges joinder preclude to sufficient issues, first legal appellant’s for the Bracalielly. As case. Cfi ground was of the minors the morals corrupting for conviction to commit minors enticing encouraging ed on his charges also Information thefts. The second burglaries criminal form of the theft, in the the variation burglary and legal of the issues commonality disguise charges cannot Thus, present find that informations. we the two within first as the episode criminal arise from the same charges did temporally criminal acts are all of the as set four factors that all Accordingly, we find related. logically have under present prosecution necessary to bar met. been our guide considerations which policy to the
Returning goals of policy that the it is undeniable question, of this review in this instance. by separate trials § 110 be thwarted would prosecutions criminal undergo forced to two will be necessary support prosecutions to both all the evidence when time. at the same of the Commonwealth within the hands up give will forced to majority of the witnesses be The vast courtroom pressure again undergo time and their everything virtually in the second trial repeat testimony, resources trial. Both trials tax the stated in the first that was identical law enforce Attorney, almost of the same District The Common judicial system. ment personnel, unnecessary caused duplication no for the offers reason wealth Having matter. join this by the failure to 110(1)(ii) case, in this we to be met the four factors of found rule compulsory joinder purpose further find that go present prosecution permitting violated would be forward.
Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that even if find we the criminal acts at issue constitute a single episode, not barred because of the exception 110(iii)(A). found in argument This is without merit for the *10 reason Madame Justice Newman so eloquently stated in Com 4, Geyer, monwealth v. 546 Pa. 590 n. 687 A.2d 817 n. (1996): that, clarify here contrary We to the Commonwealth’s 110(1)(iii)(A) contention, Section does not as an operate 110(1)(i) (ii) exception to the application Section or to a subsection, 110(1)(i), 110(1)(ii) given set of facts. Each 110(1)(iii), provides an alternative basis for the of a bar subsequent prosecution, by as indicated disjunctive ‘or’ 110(1)(iii)(A) in the of the Interpreting text statute. Section as eliminating subsequent bar to prosecution whenev er each offense requires proof of an additional fact not required by the other meaningless would render subsections (i) (ii).
This court to adopt interpretation refuses an 110 which all would render of the language beyond statute subsection (1 )(iii)(A) meaningless.
Accordingly, appellant’s present prosecution is barred compulsory joinder provision 110(1)(ii), of 18 Pa.C.S. decision of the Superior affirming Court the order of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed. The information is quashed is discharged.
NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion ZAPPALA, in which J., joins.
CASTILLE, J., dissents.
NIGRO, Justice, concurring. join
I Mr. Cappas Justice majority opinion since I agree that the instant barred the compulsory joinder provision However, 18 Pa.C.S. I write separately express my akin, belief that this case is both factually legally, to Commonwealth v. Hockenbury, 549 (1997). Pa. 701 A.2d 1334 As articulated Mr. Justice I joined, I Hockenbury, which opinion dissenting Zappala’s there arose from at issue believe for which the defendant as the episode here, I same conclusion reach the convicted. Since previously majority opinion. join I
ZAPPALA, J., concurring opinion. joins this
717 A.2d Pennsylvania, Respondent, COMMONWEALTH Bruder, Petitioner. BRUDER, David Edward David a/k/a Pennsylvania. Supreme Court *11 Sept.
PER CURIAM: NOW, 1998 we GRANT day September, this 9th AND following limited to the Appeal for Allowance of the Petition issue: AFFIRMING ERR IN THE COURT
DID SUPERIOR RELIEF WITH- THE OF POST CONVICTION DENIAL DID NOT HEARING, PLEA COUNSEL A WHERE OUT BE- PETITIONER’S A APPEAL ON FILE DIRECT REQUEST ALLEGED PETITIONER’S HALF DESPITE PETITIONER’S CON- SO, IMPLICATING TO DO THUS A APPEAL? TO DIRECT RIGHT STITUTIONAL