Commonwealth v. AndrewCommonwealth v. Andrew
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hirt
Opinion by
Hirt, J.,
The defendant, the President and a Director of Seaboard Mutual Casualty Company, was convicted of the fraudulent conversion of $48,209.57, and also of embezzlement of the funds of the corporation in that amount under §§ 827 and 828 of The Penal Code of
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June 24, 1939, P.L. 872,
The Seaboard Mutual Casualty Company was organized by the defendant and was incorporated on May 15, 1933. Throughout the life of the company the Board of Directors tacitly clothed him with broad authority in the conduct of its affairs. Defendant received no salary from the company. He however profited from business related to insurance contracts written by Seaboard, as we shall call it, through two companies which he operated as sole owner, viz: James A. Andrew Insurance Agency, a corporation, and Keystone Adjusting and Investigating Company. The agency corporation was the general agent for Seaboard and received commissions from it on contracts of insurance written in its name. The adjusting company settled its losses.
The laws of the State of Maryland required that a mutual insurance company have a surplus of at least $50,000 to qualify for doing business in that State. Seaboard had been writing insurance in Maryland. During 1947, particularly, serious inroads had been made on Seaboard’s surplus. The company however was not in apparent financial difficulty and it still could lawfully write insurance contracts in Pennsylvania. To qualify for continuing its business in Maryland however it was necessary for Seaboard to restore its surplus to the amount which would meet the minimum requirements of that State. Defendant undertook personally to raise $50,000 for this purpose. On December 18, 1947, the National Bank of Germantown loaned him $48,000 on his personal note. With the proceeds, togoiher with an additional sum supplied by the defendant, the bank bought United States Government bonds in the sum of $50,000. On receipt of the bonds they were delivered by *415 the hank to the defendant and were deposited by hixn with Seaboard to re-establish a surplus in the amount necessary to continue the operation of its mutual insurance business in Maryland.
Over a period beginning in 1938 various persons, in addition to the defendant who were interested in Seaboard, had advanced funds to it to create surplus funds necessary to meet the growing demands of the company’s business. These advancements were made under § 809 of Article VIII of the Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 682,
Defendant’s relation to the chain of events, ending in the dissolution of the Seaboard corporation charges him with • fraudulent intent when he‘appropriated funds of the corporation under the guise of redemption of debenture certificates held by him.’ During the first nine months of Í951 the total insurance‘.written‘by Seaboárd was $548,651
less
than in‘.the same-.period of 1950.’ Between August‘1;‘1950’ and’ November 30, •1951, Seaboard’s‘income‘exceeded what it was. obliged to pay -out, in only‘two-months, ahd‘by’ the end-of the
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period total payments had exceeded income by $526,091. On August 1, 1950, Seaboard owned securities worth $545,000. Sales of its securities during the following fourteen months amounted to $454,866 and on November 30, 1951, it had left only $30,000 in bonds in its investment account. Defendant testified that the sales of securities were made to pay Lloyds of London. But the boohs show payment of only $82,249 to Lloyds and a total received by Seaboard from Lloyds of $108,364, during the period. Because of notice by the defendant to the Board of Directors that Seaboard did not have assets equal to its unearned premium reserve and other liabilities, the Board on April 12, 1951, under the Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 682, § 808,
Other events in close succession following the cashing of the check point to defendant’s fraudulent intent in the transaction. On November 29, 1951, insurance policies of nine persons, some of whom were personal friends of the defendant were cancelled by Seaboard on defendant’s order and were rewritten in another and solvent company represented by him. By November 30, 1951, Seaboard had collected only $68,608 on the assessments from policy holders. And on that date, three days after defendant had received the cash in question, defendant on behalf of the company wrote the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania, stating: “I wish to advise that the Seaboard Mutual Casualty Company is not collecting the assessments as anticipated. The Company cannot continue to do business.” And on December 5, 1951, five days later, the Board of Directors by resolution requested the Insurance Commissioner, as receiver, to take over the Company. The resolution recites that it was adopted on the representation of “James A. Andrew, President, that the Company has a substantial deficit and its condition will be hazardous to policy holders, and creditors and to the public.”
On the date when defendant received the company’s funds in question Seaboard had an actual deficiency in assets because only.$68,608 in assessments had been collected. ■ L‘ittlh more.’ has since, been.. collected from policy holders-by. the Insurance. .Commissioner so,.far as disclosed by’ this‘record, . But even:if the assessment had “provided‘funds sufficient.’ to..meet the’ rer quire‘ments. -of-the ■ 19-21 - Act,: supra, the . surplus • so: restored could not be characterized as .“surpluslearnings” from which‘‘debenture‘certificates could‘.have beencpaid *419 off lawfully. Tlie fund was an asset of the insolvent mutual casualty company to be applied, on final liquidation, to the company’s creditors in order of their priority. Defendant under the circumstances did not have a legitimate claim in any amount on any of the assets of the corporation. This case was tried before Judge Hagan, by agreement, without a jury. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony was for the trial judge as finder of the facts (Rosine v. Gerlach, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 240, 98 A. 2d 436) and the general finding of the judge has the force and effect of a verdict of a jury. Glen Alden Coal Company v. Commissioners, 345 Pa. 159, 169, 27 A. 2d 239. The testimony clearly supports Judge Hagan’s finding that the defendant fraudulently appropriated assets of Seaboard and used them for his own benefit. The evidence is also abundantly sufficient to sustain the adjudication of guilt on the counts under The Penal Code charging defendant with embezzlement of corporate funds as an officer of the company. Cf. Commonwealth v. Van Buskirk et al., 155 Pa. Superior Ct. 613, 39 A. 2d 311; Commonwealth v. Grant, 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 399, 183 A. 663; Commonwealth v. Huster, 118 Pa. Superior Ct. 24, 178 A. 535. Under the testimony as reflected in the findings, the defendant stands convicted, as charged, beyond all reasonable doubt.
The trial judge on sentencing the defendant treated him more leniently perhaps than the circumstances admit. Under the terms of the sentence a fine of $5,000 will be remitted and the service of a prison term avoided, on the discharge by defendant of his civil liability to return to Seaboard’s Receiver, the fund which he fraudulently converted.
Judgment of sentence affirmed and it is ordered that the defendant appear in the court below, at such *420 time as may be fixed by that court and that be be committed until be bas complied with tbe sentence or sucb part thereof as bad not been performed when bis appeal was made a supersedeas.
Woodsid-e, J., took no part in tbe consideration or decision of this case.