Commonwealth v. AndersCommonwealth v. Anders
Lead Opinion
We certified this case for en banc review to address the following question: Does
The facts and procedural histoiy of the case are not complex. On April 26, 1996, appellant Joseph Wayne Anders, Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Rule 1405(A) governs the timing of appellant’s sentence. It reads, in relevant part, as follows:
RULE 1405. PROCEDURE AT TIME OF SENTENCING A. Time for Sentencing.
(1) Except as provided by Rule 1403.B [regarding psychiatric or psychological examinations], sentence in a court case shall ordinarily be imposed within 60 days of conviction or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
(2) When the date for sentencing in a court case must be delayed, for good cаuse shown, beyond the time limits set forth in this rule, the judge shall include in the record the specific time period for the extension.
The Huntingdon County court administrator originally scheduled appellant’s sentencing hearing for May 23, 1996. Pursuant to Rule 1405(A)(1), absent good cause for delay, the trial court was to sentence appellant within 60 days of appellant’s April 26 guilty plea — that is, by June 25, 1996. The court ordered a presentencing rеport to be completed by June 25.
The court administrator then rescheduled appellant’s sentencing hearing for August 1, 1996. We cannot clearly discern a reason for this rescheduling. Testimony at the sentencing hearing suggests that the delay may have been in response to appellant’s request to reschedule a certain meeting with a probation officer.
On the sentencing date, appellant moved for discharge, arguing that he had not been timely sentenced under Rule 1405 and that no good cause was stated for the delay. The trial court denied the motion without comment. The court then sentenced appellant to imprisonment for thirty (30) days to twenty-three (23) months, as well as various fines, tests, completion of a rehabilitation program, and a period of probation. This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that (1) he was not timely sentenced under Rule 1405(A), and (2) pursuant to Commonwealth v. Thomas,
First, we agree that appellant was not timely sentenced under Rule 1405(A). As noted above, the court sentenced appellant 37 days after the 60-day limit imposed by Rule 1405(A). Delays after 60 days are allowable “for good cause shown.” Rule 1405(A)(2), emphasis added. If good cause is shown, “the judge shall include in the record the specific time period for the extension.” Id.; see also comment, ¶ 6 (“... the extension must be for a spеcific time period, and the judge must include in the record the length of the extension.”). We read this rule and the comments thereto
Even if the trial court had comported with Rule 1405(A)’s technical requirements, we find that none of the Commonwealth’s proffered reasons for delay constituted “good cause.” Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that appellant was “unavailable for sentеncing” from March 14-22, 1996, and again from March 26 — April 16, 1996 — periods that appellant had spent in an alcohol rehabilitation program. This argument is unfounded, as appellant did not even plead guilty until April 26, 1996. The Commonwealth next contends that the delay could be attributed to appellant’s non-appearance at a probation interview. We have already addressed and rejected that argument аbove. Finally, the Commonwealth argues that delays in preparing the presentence investigation report contributed to the sentencing delay. There is no support in the record for this contention. We find that no showing of good cause or extraordinary circumstances was made in this case.
The critical question for purposes of this appeal is the appropriate remedy, if any, for a Rule 1405(A) violation. Appellant argues that pursuant to Thomas, supra, he must be discharged. In Thomas, defendant was convicted of indirect criminal contempt. He then filed post-verdict motions. Such motions were inappropriate, because
A majority of the three-judge panel in Thomas held that the trial court’s 73-day delay in disposing of defendant’s post-verdict motions did not constitute “good cause” or “extraordinary circumstances” warranting an extension of Rule 1405’s 60-day limit. Id. More importantly for our purposes, the majority vacated defendant’s sentence and discharged him from probation. The sole reason cited for this choice of remedy was “to effect the purpose of Rule 1405.” Id.
We expressly overrule Thomas to the extent that it holds that discharge is an appropriate remedy for a violation of Rule 1405(A).
Thomas also ignores and conflicts with the framework our case law has developed for analyzing claims of untimely sentencing. Our courts have recognized that a delay in sentencing may implicate two constitutional rights: the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and the right to a direct appeal as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Glass,
We have held that “delay in sentencing may implicate the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Commonwealth v. Andrews,
in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right has been violated, it must first be determined whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. Barker v. Wingo,407 U.S. 514 ,92 S.Ct. 2182 ,33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Jones v. Commonwealth,495 Pa. 490 ,434 A.2d 1197 (1981). If the delay is sufficient*1263 tо trigger further inquiry, the reviewing court must balance the length of the delay with the reason for the delay, the defendant’s timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and any resulting prejudice to the interests protected by the right to a speedy trial. Barker v. Wingo, supra; Commonwealth v. Pounds,490 Pa. 621 ,417 A.2d 597 (1980).
Commonwealth v. Glover,
An untimely sentence may also implicate a defendant’s right to a direct appeal. “The Due Process Clause protects the right to direct appeal when that right is guаranteed by the state,” as it is in Pennsylvania. Greer, supra at 138,
“The asserted right to promptness in appeals is framed in terms of due process rather than the speedy trial right, inasmuch as the latter right does not extend to the taking of appeals.” Glass, supra at 338,
Present Rule 1405 was adopted on March 22, 1993. Prior to the enactment of present Rule 1405, there wаs “no definitive rule limiting the length of time which may elapse between an adjudication or plea of guilty and the sentencing of the defendant.” See Commonwealth v. Button,
Because Rule 1405(A) sets forth a specific time limit for sentencing where previously there was none, yet leaves the rest of our speedy sentencing analysis unchanged, we conclude that Rule 1405(A) simply substitutes for the first Glover factor: namely, whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. Specifically, if the defendant is sentenced more than 60 days after conviction or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and the delay after the 60th day is not justified by good cause shown, then the delay is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. Only then will the court analyze the other factors of the defendant’s constitutional claim. On the other hand, if the defendant is sentenced within 60 days (and any extra time for good cause shown), then the inquiry ends and the defendant’s constitutional claim cannot stand. It follows frоm the above analysis, and from the fact that Rule 1405(A) does not contain a separate enforcement provision, that there is no remedy per se for a Rule 1405(A) violation; Rule 1405(A) forms just one part of the court’s analysis as to when a defendant’s right to a speedy trial or to due process has been violated.
In order to determine whether a defendant’s speedy trial or due process rights were viоlated, the trial court should consider (1) the length of the delay falling outside of Rule 1405(A)’s 60-day-and-good-cause provisions, (2) the reason for the improper delay,
The analysis adopted today integrates new Rule 1405(A) with our long-standing jurisprudence in this area in a manner that accommodates several different concerns.
Finally, we turn to the disposition of the ease as to appellant Anders. We find that because appellant failed to present to the trial court or argue on appeal that the interests protected by his speedy trial and/or due process rights have been violated, he has waived this challenge. See footnote 1, supra; Commonwealth v. McMillan, 376 Pa.Super.
The order of the trial court is affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. Sрecifically, appellant pleaded guilty to a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. 3731(a)(5). Two days before the court sentenced appellant, our supreme court held section 3731(a)(5) unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. Barud,
. Colloquy at the sentencing hearing was as follows:
*1261 [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would move for the defendant to be discharged for failure of the Commonwealth to proceed with sentencing within 60 days from the date of his conviction. My client entered a plea on April 26, 1996, and unless the Commonwealth can show good cause why my client was not sentenced within 60 days, I believe the case of Commonwealth v. Thomas states that you must discharge him. And I do understand my client did reschedule a probation appointment. However, his meeting with probation was on May 31, 1996. That gives the Commonwealth clearly enough time to proceed, and they did not proceed within 60 days. [MR. STEWART]: Your Honor, Mr. Anders was scheduled for sentencing May 23rd, 1996. That matter was continued to this date. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And it wasn't continued because of me.
[MR. STEWART]: No, it was continued because he was unavailable for sentencing purposes.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Sure, he was. He was out of rehab.
[THE COURT]: All right. I heard your motion. Motion denied. Now what do you have to say on behalf of your client?
Sentencing hearing, 8/1/96 at 2.
. "Comments by the Supreme Court’s criminal rules committee are not binding on the Superior Court, although those comments may be considered as effective aids in interpreting the meaning of the rule.” Commonwealth v. Reeb,
. "Good cause” for Rule 1405(A) purposes must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis. We trust that our courts will take heed of the official comment to Rule 1405(A), which
. “One panel cannot overrule a prior panel opinion; en banc action is necessary.” Darlington, McKeon, Sсhuckers & Brown, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice (2d ed.), § 3103:6.
. Our courts have tended to focus on the third and fourth prongs of the test. As to the third prong, it is well established that when a defendant fails to assert his rights in a timely fashion (for example, when he waits until the eve of sentencing), this fact "counts substantially against his speedy trial claim.” Glass, supra at 336,
The interests protected by the right to a speedy trial include (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) minimizing anxiety and conсern of the accused, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Glass, supra at 337-39,
. The interests protected by the due process right to a prompt appeal include (1) preventing oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limiting the possibility that a convicted person’s grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired. Glass, supra at 339-41,
. In light of Rule 1405(A)(2)’s good cause provisions, the “reason for the delay” factor now presumes that the delay was not for good cause. As noted supra, "good cause” delays do not even trigger a speedy trial claim. However, where the delay is not for good cause, courts should determine whether the delay was caused by deliberate wrongdoing, on the one hand, or negligence or overcrowding, on the other. The former reason weighs more heavily toward finding a violation. See Glass, supra at 335-37,
. Cf. Commonwealth v. Saunders,
Concurrence in Part
concurring and dissenting.
I join in the majority’s opinion with respect to all issues except one: I cannot agree that appellant Joseph Wayne Anders, Jr. has waived the right to argue that the interests protected by his speedy trial and/or due process rights have been prejudiced. As such, I would remand this ease to afford appellant the opportunity to make such an argument before the trial court, if he so desires.
Appellant raised, and did not waive, the issue of untimely sentencing. He relied exclusively on Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, in arguing that his untimely sentence mandated immediate discharge. Appellant was entitled to do so, as Thomas was not only good law at the time of his appeal, but was also the only published opinion discussing the remedies for а violation of Rule 1405(A). The majority’s opinion overrules Thomas and holds that a defendant must establish prejudice to the interests protected by speedy trial and/or due process rights. Thus, we have established a new standard for obtaining relief for a violation of Rule 1405(A). While the majority correctly declares that appellant was untimely sentenced, it fails to afford appellant the opportunity to present an argument that he is entitled to relief under the standards we announce today. Under these circumstances, I believe appellant should be afforded this opportunity. Cf. Hill v. Thorne,