Commonwealth v. AmundsenCommonwealth v. Amundsen
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Montemuro
This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence entered after appellant pled guilty to two counts of homicide by motor vehicle related to driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of
1. Whether the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment in75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735 is an unconstitutional legislative infringement on the constitutional grant of power to district attorneys in Article IX, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to participate in sentencing decisions;
2. Whether the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment in75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735 unconstitutionally infringes on prosecutorial discretion in sentencing decisions in violation of the due process of law clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and
3. Whether the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment in75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735 denies a defendant the equal protection of the laws because the prosecuting authority has no discretion as to whether to request the minimum sentence while other so called mandatory sentences do provide such prosecutorial discretion and there *467is no reasonable basis for such different treatment of persons convicted of crimes.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735 , in pertinent part, provides:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person as the direct result of a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating section 3731 is guilty of a felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause of death and the sentencing court shall order the person to serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than three years.
Although appellant asserts three issues regarding the unconstitutionality of the mandatory sentence provision in this section, he actually raises only one argument, i.e. that the mandatory sentence provision denies the prosecutor the right and discretion to request the court not to impose the mandatory sentence. As a result, appellant claims that this section is unconstitutional.
In Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 339 Pa.Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985), we considered a constitutional challenge to the validity of
Although it is the judiciary’s function to impose sentences upon conviction, it is for the legislature to establish criminal sanctions, and, as one of its options, it may prescribe a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.
Id., 339 Pa.Superior Ct. at 39, 488 A.2d at 297. See also Commonwealth v. Cieri, 346 Pa.Super. 77, 499 A.2d 317 (1985) and Commonwealth v. Kostra, 349 Pa.Super. 89, 502 A.2d 1287 (1985). Furthermc -e, we stated that “it is neither new nor unique that the legislature has prescribed mandatory sentences” and since the selection of the mandatory sentence is a legislative determination, “it carries a *468strong presumption of validity, and of constitutionality.” Id. 339 Pa.Super. at 39, 488 A.2d at 297.
Although the claims in Hernandez were different than the challenges raised herein, we find that the reasoning of the court is equally applicable to this case. Contrary to the argument raised in appellant’s brief, it is the judiciary, and not the prosecuting authority, who has the right to impose sentences upon conviction. This function of the judiciary, as we held in Hernandez, is not unconstitutionally violated by the mandatory sentencing provisions in
Judgment of sentence affirmed.