The defendant, Robert Aldrich, appeals from his convictions of unarmed burglary in the nighttime (count I), two counts of larceny over $250 (counts II and III), attempted larceny (count IV), 1 and from the order denying his motion for new trial. He contends that the two larceny convictions are duplicative, and that his conviction of attempted larceny is duplicative of one of the larceny convictions. We conclude that the two larceny convictions are not duplicative because the facts support two convictions based on two separate takings. We further conclude that *114 attempted larceny is a lesser included offense of larceny, and that, on the facts presented, the attempted larceny conviction is dupli-cative of one of the larceny convictions. 2
Background. On January 6, 2008, at approximately 5:30 a.m., a 911 dispatcher received a telephone call from the owner of a single-family home in Cambridge. The caller relayed that she had been awakened by the sound of a door closing and, upon investigation, had found an uninvited man in her home. Two police officers observed a man, later identified as the defendant, at the front door of the caller’s home, along with a stack of items on the front porch that later were identified as the homeowner’s possessions. As the officers approached, the defendant slammed the front door and ran inside toward the back of the house. Other police officers at the rear of the house then saw the defendant jump through an open window “Superman-style” and land face down in the snow. The police found an eyeglass screwdriver underneath the defendant. An officer on the scene compared the screwdriver with marks found near the latch of the window, and testified that the marks were consistent with the screwdriver found underneath the defendant.
After the defendant’s arrest, the police learned that foreign currency was missing from the homeowner’s foyer. At the police station, officers took and inventoried the defendant’s wallet, which contained foreign currency from five different countries. When the booking officer’s back was turned, the defendant retrieved the money. The money subsequently was discovered in the ceiling of the cell in which the defendant had been held.
The defendant appeared pro se at trial. His primary defense was that various workers had keys to the house, and that no break had occurred.
Discussion. Represented by counsel on appeal, the defendant now contends that (1) the two convictions of larceny of over $250 in foreign currency are duplicative; and (2) one of the convictions of larceny of over $250 in foreign currency and the attempted larceny conviction are duplicative.
1.
Larceny of foreign currency.
“[Successive takings of property actuated by a single, continuing criminal impulse or intent or pursuant to a general larcenous scheme may, but need not, be charged as one crime.”
Commonwealth
v.
Murray,
401 Mass.
*115
771, 774 (1988). Where the convictions “are derived from separate and discrete acts, those convictions cannot be duplicative.”
Commonwealth
v.
Mahoney,
Here, the jury properly could have found that the defendant took foreign currency that did not belong to him at two different times and in two different locations — once from the homeowner’s foyer, and a second time from the booking area at the police station. The defendant’s contention that the police did not have an ownership or possessory interest in the currency is of no moment. To sustain a conviction of larceny over $250, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant stole the property “of another.” G. L. c. 266, § 30, as amended by St. 1945, c. 282, § 2. “Direct proof of ownership, though preferable, is not essential, since the statute only requires a showing that the defendant was not the owner.”
Commonwealth
v.
Souza,
2.
Larceny and attempted larceny.
The defendant also contends that the convictions of larceny of the foreign currency from the home and attempted larceny of the items removed from inside the house and placed on the porch were part of a single larcenous act “at a single time and at a single place” and are therefore dupli-cative.
Commonwealth
v.
LeBeau,
There is little doubt that the taking of the foreign currency from the home and the attempt to take the personal belongings on the porch arose out of a single course of conduct, and were part of a
*116
single larcenous scheme. See
LeBeau,
supra,
4
Where one crime is a lesser included offense of the other, or where there are multiple counts of the same offense, multiple convictions must rest on separate and distinct acts. See
Commonwealth
v.
Vick,
In determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another, the “traditional rule in Massachusetts ... is that a defendant may properly be punished for two crimes arising out the same course of conduct provided that each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not. ... As long as each offense requires proof of an additional element that the other does not, neither crime is a lesser-included offense of the other, and convictions on both are deemed to have been authorized by the Legislature and hence not [duplicative].”
Id.
at 431 (citations omitted).
See Morey
v.
Commonwealth,
Applying the
Vick
framework, the elements of larceny are (1) the unlawful taking and (2) carrying away (3) of the property of another, (4) with the specific intent to deprive the person of the property permanently. See G. L. c. 266, § 30;
Commonwealth
v.
Donovan,
At first blush, under a strict
Vick
analysis, the recitation of the elements of the offenses of attempt and larceny, as set forth in
Bell
and
Liebenow,
suggest that each crime contains an element the other does not, because larceny requires the completed acts of taking and carrying away, while attempted larceny requires an overt act coupled with a failure of completion. However, our case law historically has treated attempt as a lesser included offense of the substantive crime.
7
See
Commonwealth
v.
Gosselin,
We construe
Porro
to mean that completion of a substantive offense and the noncompletion of the objective of the overt act are not separate and distinct elements for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, and conclude that the present case is controlled by
Porro.
8
Completion and noncompletion are two sides of the same coin — the presence or absence of a single element. Put another way, “a ‘lesser included offense is one which is necessarily accomplished on commission of the greater crime.’ ”
Id.
at 531, quoting from
Commonwealth
v.
D’Amour,
Treating completion and noncompletion as the presence or absence of a single element, rather than distinct elements of separate offenses, serves the purpose of our common law of double jeopardy. This approach addresses the concern that defining attempt and the substantive offense as separate crimes opens the door to strained and inconsistent verdicts, including acquittal of both attempt and the substantive offense in successive prosecutions. See Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law, at 615 (3d ed. 1982). See also Gosselin,
We also acknowledge our dicta in
Commonwealth
v.
Foley,
We hold that attempted larceny is a lesser included offense of larceny, and that the two offenses are, for purposes of double jeopardy, a single offense. Because the verdict here was based on a single act of larceny, the conviction of the lesser offense must be vacated. See
LeBeau,
Accordingly, on the indictment charging attempted larceny *120 (count IV), the judgment is vacated, the verdict and the habitual offender finding are set aside, and the indictment is to be dismissed. The remaining judgments are affirmed. The order denying the defendant’s motion for new trial is affirmed.
So ordered.
Notes
The Commonwealth also sought sentencing enhancement as a habitual offender.
The defendant also presented other arguments, which we address in a memorandum and order pursuant to our rule 1:28, issued this same day.
Commonwealth
v.
Aldrich (No. 2),
No argument has been made on appeal that the larceny was complete once the goods were placed on the porch. See
Commonwealth
v.
Vickers,
In LeBeau, the “relevant evidence demonstratefd] that the defendant . . . searched the victim’s one-room apartment; discovered, and took, cash, two rings, and the Keno tickets; and fled. Because . . . there was ‘but one incident’ of taking from the victim, at a single time and at a single place, the defendant properly should have been indicted on only one charge of larceny.” Id. at 262-263 (citation omitted).
General Laws c. 274, § 6, provides in pertinent part: “Whoever attempts to commit a crime by doing any act toward its commission, but fails in its perpetration, or is intercepted or prevented in its perpetration, shall, except as otherwise provided, be punished as follows.”
Bell, supra,
states that nonachievement of the substantive offense is an element of the offense. Several earlier cases had stated that there are two elements to a criminal attempt, intent and an overt act. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth
v.
Peaslee, 111
Mass. 267, 271 (1901);
Commonwealth
v.
Ortiz,
In some jurisdictions the Legislature has defined attempt crimes as lesser included offenses by statute. See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-9 (West 2002); Minn. Stat. Ann. §609.04 (West 2009); N.Y. Penal Law §110.00 (McKinney 2009).
Our holding relies on the reasoning in
Porro,
not
Gosselin,
as later developments have called into question the outcome in
Gosselin.
See
Brown
v.
Ohio,
For example, in
Vick,
the court held that armed assault with intent to murder is not duplicative of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, not only because of the use of a weapon and proof of a battery, but because armed assault with intent to murder requires proof of specific intent to kill, while assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury requires only a showing of general intent.
We also recognize that there is, as a practical matter, residual tension between
Porro, supra
at 532, which states the general rule that a single indictment for the greater offense allows the jury to be instructed as to the lesser included offense, and
Gosselin,