101 Pa. Super. 317 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1931
Argued March 10, 1931. Only three questions of the six listed by appellant in his statement of questions involved, are really raised by the record in this appeal. They are: (1) Is finger print evidence admissible in a criminal case for the purpose of identification? (2) If so, was there sufficient proof of the accuracy of the prints, the photographs of the prints, and the enlargements of the prints to justify their admission? (3) Was there sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of guilty?
Appellant was charged in one indictment with (1) burglary; (2) feloniously attempting to enter the dwelling house of one John Grove, without breaking the same, with intent to steal the goods and chattels, etc., of him the said John Grove; (3) receiving stolen goods. He was convicted on the second count. The facts on which the prosecution was based are as follows: About 7:30 o'clock in the evening of May 3, 1930, Grove and his wife left their home in Penbrook to attend a theater. The front door was locked; the back door leading into a pantry or outkitchen was not locked, but left so that some groceries which had been ordered might be delivered there; but the door leading from there into the kitchen proper was locked. The upper part of this door had several panes of glass. This glass had been washed during house cleaning at about three o'clock that afternoon. When the Groves returned home at 10:30 o'clock, they found from the disordered condition of the house that some one had *320 ransacked it during their absence; and they found that a pane of glass in the kitchen door had been broken and some glass pulled out and piled near a carton of groceries. The state police were informed. They came and, observing a finger mark on a piece of the glass, preserved it carefully and having dusted it with a powder to bring out the papillary lines on the glass, in accordance with the usual approved methods, photographed the finger print impression thus recorded on the glass.
Over six weeks later this defendant was arrested on another charge and impressions of his finger prints taken in the usual course with his consent. On examining these it was found that the print of the index finger of the left hand corresponded with the print on the piece of glass found in Grove's outkitchen. The piece of glass so found and the defendant's finger print impression, normal size photographs of both, and enlarged photographs of both, the latter having lines in red ink on them drawn to twenty-two points of identity, were offered and received in evidence. The state policeman in charge of photograph work testified that he had made and developed in the usual way all the photographs, and that the impression on the glass had not been altered in any way, but had been dusted with a powder necessary to bring out the ridges in the impression so as to make it possible to photograph it. All the exhibits had then been turned over to the assistant chief of the bureau of criminal investigation who produced them in court. The chief of the Pennsylvania State Bureau of Criminal Identification, a member of the State police, whose qualifications as an expert in this line were amply established, and admitted by the defense, testified that the finger print on the glass was the same as the impression of the defendant's left index finger; and explained in detail the twenty-two points of identity which led him to that judgment. Two other witnesses were called by *321 the Commonwealth, one the assistant chief of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation in the State police and the other a finger print expert of the bureau, and it was agreed by counsel for the defense that they would testify that the finger print on the glass and the defendant's left index finger print impression were made by the same individual. It was also shown that the defendant lived in Penbrook about three blocks distant from the Grove home and that on the evening of May 3, 1930 he had been in the immediate neighborhood of the Grove home between seven and eight o'clock in the evening; had been seen walking past it.
On this state of the record we think the finger print evidence above-referred to was properly received in evidence; that there was sufficient proof of the accuracy of the prints, photographs and enlargements to justify their admission; and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
We do not think it necessary to go into detailed discussion of the facts on which the science of identification by means of finger print impressions is based. Its accuracy and reliability are too well established to require elaborate confirmation at this time by the courts of this State. It is well settled that the papillary lines and markings on the fingers of every man, woman and child possess an individual character different from those of any other person and that the chances that the finger prints of two different persons may be identical are infinitesimally remote. As early as 1893 a committee appointed by Mr. Asquith in England to inquire into the best means available for identifying habitual criminals agreed that "for the purpose of proving identity, the finger prints examined and compared by an expert furnish a method far more certain than any other," but did not then recommend its adoption because the scheme of classification then employed was less complete than the Bertillon anthropometric *322
system: "Identification by Finger Prints," by Tighe Hopkins, 114 Law Times (London) 293. Since then the method or system of classification of finger prints has been so improved that it has been generally accepted in England (Scotland Yard, 1901) and on the continent of Europe and India, and is in use in many of the states and most of the cities of this country. Those who are interested in reading the history of the subject in reported cases may consult: People v. Jennings,
Counsel for appellant has argued his case on the basis that the sole evidence on which conviction was based was identification by finger-print impressions. That is not the case, as we have seen. There was some other evidence, although not strong. But in at least three cases convictions were sustained where there was no evidence of identification beyond finger print impressions. In re Castleton, 3 Crim. App. Reports (Cohen) 74 (1909) the Lord Chief Justice of England, speaking for the Court of Criminal Appeals, held that finger prints might be received in evidence, and refused to interfere with a conviction for burglary, though the evidence of finger prints on a candle was the sole ground of identification. In State v. Connors,
In McGarry v. State,
Defendant also cites Com. v. Loomis,
In a book cited by appellant, "Finger Prints Can be Forged," by Albert Wehde and John Nicholas Beffel, the authors contend that by a process of etching on metal a finger print can be placed on a surface which the person, whose finger mark it is, never touched; in other words, that a finger print thus made, or "forged" as they call it, can be "planted" to secure an innocent person's conviction; but the book does not seriously question the individuality of each person's finger marks. It requires for the process the obtaining of a genuine finger-print impression of the person whose print is to be made, and admits the impossibility of "forging" the finger-print without such genuine impression. Whether the impression on the incriminating article was genuine, or "planted" in this manner, would be a question of fact for the jury, depending on the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the article: In re Castleton, supra; People v. Roach, supra; People v. Jennings, supra; Moon v. State, supra. In this particular case they were conclusive against any such "plant" or "forgery."
Appellant also complains that no motive was expressly proved. The circumstances pointed so clearly to "theft" as the motive that no other evidence on the subject was needed.
A case dealing with much the same principle as was involved in this one, viz., the admission in evidence of talking motion pictures, was recently decided by this court in a well-considered opinion by Judge *326
GAWTHROP, who referred to "the receptive attitude of the law toward any reliable mechanism produced by scientific knowledge for the discovery or recording of facts": Com. v. Roller,
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed, and it is ordered that the defendant be committed to the Pennsylvania Industrial Reformatory at Huntingdon in accordance with the sentence of the court below.