64 Pa. Super. 96 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1916
Opinion by
The opinion filed by Judge Miller disposes of the question involved in this case in a very conclusive manner. It is of importance to consider the effect to be given to the Act of June 18, 1895, P. L. 207, in its relation to the School Code Act of May 18, 1911, P. L. 309. The 30th Section of the latter act provides, “This act of assembly is intended as an entire and complete school code for the public school system in this Commonwealth, hereby established in every school district therein, and the following •acts or parts of acts, viz,— (enumerating over 200 acts or parts of acts), and concludes “together Avith any and all other acts of assembly, general, special or local, or parts thereof, that are in any way in conflict or inconsistent with this act, or any part thereof, shall, at the time of the taking effect of this act, be and the same are hereby repealed.”
The Act of June 18,1895, is not included in this list of repealed acts, and its omission is significant, from the fact that several cognate acts passed at the session of 1895 are included in the repealed list. This vaccination act, as it is called, was considered by the Supreme Court in Duffield v. Williamsport School District, 162 Pa. 476, in Avhich it was held, that “School directors may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, exclude from the public schools pupils who have not been vaccinated.” And again in Field v. Robinson, 198 Pa. 638, in which this Act of 1895, was held to be constitutional. On every theory of construction, these two acts must be considered as parts of
In Lyndall v. High School Committee, 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 232, (1902), we held, that under the Act of 1895, school directors have the power to suspend a teacher because she refused to comply with a regulation of the board requiring teachers to be vaccinated. And with reference to the same act the Supreme Court in Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, said, “The Act of June 18, 1895, is not á penal statute, and is not to be construed or administered by the rigid technical rule applicable to penal
The Act of June 18, 1895, is still in force, and, so far as our search has disclosed, the necessity for the enforcement of such legislation is recognized in every state of' the Union where the subject has been considered by the appellate courts.
The judgment is affirmed.