186 Mass. 101 | Mass. | 1904
The defendant was convicted on the first count of the indictment against her. In that count she was charged with the larceny of a ring. It appeared in evidence that on the 22d of December, shortly before five o’clock in the afternoon, when the store was crowded with shoppers for Christmas, a man and a woman (the woman being the prisoner whose exceptions are now before us) came into a jewelry store, walked to a showcase about forty feet from the door, and asked to see some signet rings. They had some discussion with the clerk as to which of the signet rings shown would “take” the initial she wished cut on it, and as to whether the cutting could be done by Christmas, and it was arranged that the initial should be brought in the next day. The man and woman were then invited by the clerk to go to the art room and see if there was anything there which they might like to buy. The clerk then busied himself in arranging a tray of rings for the next day’s trade. He liad two trays, each filled in part with rings for sale and in part with dummy rings put in when a ring was taken out on being sold. He had taken all the dummy rings out of one tray and filled it with diamond and ruby rings, when the man and woman appeared again; this was some twenty minutes after they left to go to the art room. The woman said she was interested in looking at pretty things, and asked if it would bother the clerk if she was allowed to look and ask questions. He answered that it
The officer who took her into custody testified that she said
The prisoner did not testify but offered evidence that the man who was with her was her husband; that their home was in Detroit, and “ that they left together a few weeks before the alleged larceny to go East.” No other evidence was offered by her.
Ten out of twenty-one rulings requested by the prisoner were refused. She took exceptions to the failure to give these rulings, and “ also to such instructions as the court did give inconsistent with any instructions asked for, and also as to that portion of the court’s charge relating to the presumption of coercion and the rebuttal thereof.”
The jury found the defendant guilty on this first count, and the case is here on these exceptions.
It is not necessary to go at length into the rule which raises a presumption that the wife is the innocent and the husband the guilty one when a crime is .committed by a wife in her husband’s presence. The rule and the reason for it are well stated in Commonwealth v. Wood, 97 Mass. 225. It also is settled in this Commonwéalth that “ when a married woman is indicted for a crime, and it is contended in defence that she ought to be acquitted because she acted under the coercion of her husband, the question of fact to be determined is whether she really and in truth acted under such coercion, or whether she acted of her own free will
On the evidence the jury may well have found that the larceny was the result of a preconcerted scheme to steal, in pursuance of which the prisoner had travelled from Detroit to Boston, to take advantage of the opportunities for theft in a jewelry store when crowded by shoppers just before Christmas; that the sole object in visiting this store and all that was done in it were in pursuance of- this scheme; and from the falsity of the story told by her and the failure to give any honest account of herself when she tried to, the jury were warranted in believing that the scheme was a deliberate one. If the jury believed this they had a right to believe that she was a guilty party, jointly liable with the husband for the larceny, and not an innocent wife acting under her husband’s coercion. The third request was rightly refused.
There was no occasion to instruct the jury as to whether what passed- in the jewelry store was sufficient by itself to rebut the presumption of innocence from coercion. That was not the question. The question was whether what happened there, considered with the other evidence in the case, was sufficient to rebut and did in fact rebut this presumption.
The defendant has argued that the whole conduct of the woman in the store must be thrown out in considering whether the presumption is overcome because dui’ing -all this time she was in the presence of her husband. It is true that the presumption applies to all her conduct, but as the presumption is not a conclusive one, her conduct, even in her husband’s presence, may be such as alone and by itself to overcome the presumption. See in this connection Commonwealth v. Moore, 162 Mass. 441.
The jury were told: “ Now, this case is like all others that you have had in this respect; the government is bound to prove beyond any reasonable doubt all the elements that are necessary to be proved in order to make out the guilt of the defendant upon
No instruction was given to the jury as to what proof of her marriage had to be made on the part of the prisoner to raise the presumption. It was correct to instruct the jury that the burden was on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “ the liability of the defendant, if she is a married woman and if with her husband at the time of the larceny, if there was any.” The instruction given was more favorable to the prisoner than the fifth ruling asked for by her.
The defendant has no right to pick out a part of the evidence and ask a ruling upon it. Commonwealth v. Gavin, 148 Mass. 449. Lufkin v. Lufkin, 182 Mass. 476. The law upon the matter covered by the eighth ruling was correctly stated, and the exception to the failure to give it must be overruled.
Exceptions overruled.