COMMONWEALTH OIL REFINING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee

GEE, Before TATE, GARZA and Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge: Following entry of a consent decree be- tween the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC) and Commonwealth Refining Company, (Common- Oil Inc. wealth) (settling charges EEOC wom- en and Puerto Ricans at Peneulas, Rico, facilities), Puerto Common- wealth filed suit in federal district court for fees under of Title § 2000e-5(k) (1976), asserting U.S.C. § it was the prevailing party and that EEOC’s suit was in bad faith. The district court determined that there genuine was no issue of material fact and granted the for summary EEOC’s motion judgment, 56(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. We find that the district court erred in granting summa- ry judgment holding without a full hearing to resolve the presented by issues Common- wealth’s claim: whether defendant “prevailed” so, whether EEOC acted bad faith pressed and/or frivolous claims. Therefore efforts evidentiary hearing reorganization and Commonwealth’s for an we remand opinion. successful, with this findings plan in accordance and in June 1981 a proved approved by was bank- arrangement of Background I. Subsequently, company court. ruptcy was charge EEOC February In an action in federal district that alleging against filed Commonwealth the EEOC seeking attorney’s VII, 42 violating Title company alleging to of Title VII § discriminating seq., by 2000e et U.S.C. § (a) prevailed against it had EEOC that re- and Ricans with against women Puerto by the 1975 proceedings in the initiated promotion compensa- and spect hiring, to Rico, Peneulas, petro- proceed- Puerto had (b) tion at its and that the EEOC charge, fol- investigation An complex. chemical and no “in bad faith ed 1977 the is- February lowed in EEOC and legal of the factual and belief merits to finding a reasonable cause sued decision espoused.” it positions charge of the true. specific portions believe Complaint as- Amended Commonwealth’s efforts, compli- though conciliation Ensuing separate three “claims for relief” serted intervening in- cated Commonwealth’s by first purportedly prevailed. The which Chapter XI reorganization and solvency theories to conclude that advanced two led to a ultimately conciliation proceeding,1 had been the Commonwealth A entered agreement. consent decree was (a) that under the consent decree: and the bank- parties approved or remedy “no relief the decree contained 1981. ruptcy January court in many of the more substantial discrimi- decree set out procedures consent originally] been natory practices had [that whereby publicize Commonwealth in and alleged original charge the [EEOC’s programs, and equal employment policies subsequent determination]”; (b) and that monitoring compliance. provided and ultimately parties the decree entered rep- agreed Commonwealth to increase relief been offered afforded less than had Ricans in resentation of Puerto and women Commonwealth to the EEOC earlier entry positions opera- level in six different The second as- negotiations. conciliation departments, tional and contact local that serted Commonwealth was colleges Puerto agencies Rican referral (before entry in its future recruitment efforts. The de- in its successful effort identify, cree instituted procedures also decree) the consent EEOC’s defeat train, female even counsel and current attempt Chapter to evade XI’s automatic employees promotion into “tar- certain ll-44(a), R. stay provision, Bkrptcy. get jobs.” agreed area Commonwealth commencing from a Title barred EEOC $50,000 a efforts. budget year to fund these The third VII suit district court. assert- addition, provided decree consent been a ed that Commonwealth had relief women Puerto for all identifiable 77 of ini- ing party because names Ricans against whom Commonwealth victims tially likely past identified be- discriminated of the provisions February tween 1973 and the of the date were ultimately consent decree withdrawn. Special decree. The decree that a provided $525,000 sought in fees Master, empowered wages to award back plus the costs and incurred and preferential seniority prefer- and order itself. The EEOC filed action promotion, ential all hiring or would hear dismiss, or in alternative for motion cases resolve could not summary judgment, through A informal conciliation efforts. summary judgment. motion for filed cross fund of one million dollars was established no genu- district court concluded that any potential satisfy liability on existed, issues material fact denied past claims. ine seq. et U.S.C. § motion, granted persisted after its character as one of This followed. appeal EEOC. these has become clear. 434 U.S. at at 700. appeal, On Commonwealth asserts Both decisional authority and the prevailed against the EEOC on unequivocal language 706(k) itself, § claims advanced which were EEOC however, require plaintiff, equally with a either frivolous or undertaken in bad faith defendant, to demonstrate that he is the and is therefore to an entitled award of “prevailing party” as a threshold for recov 706(k) attorney’s fees of Title ery fees. Our Court’s test of VII.

status as “prevailing party” in civil rights II. The “Prevailing Party” Test cases, laid down early and reaffirmed in to Defendants

Applied case, case after declares: “The proper focus is plaintiff whether the has been successful 706(k) provides: Section of Title VII on the central issue ... as exhibited by the action or proceeding fact that he acquired has the primary relief court, discretion, subchapter in its sought.” Iranian Students Ass’n v. Ed may prevailing party, allow the other wards, 352, 604 F.2d (5th Cir.1979) 353 than the Commission or the United J.) (Goldberg, (emphasis added). See also States, a part fee as Sterrett, v. Taylor 663, 640 (5th F.2d 669 costs, and the Commission and the Cir.1981) (identical language, citing Ed United States shall be liable for costs as a wards); v. Coen Harrison County School private person. Bd., 24, (5th Cir.1981) (identical 638 F.2d 26 (Emphasis added). known, well As is Su- language, citing cases).2 Edwards and other preme decisions, Court most notably Chris- We have applied this' test of “prevailing tiansburg Garment Equal Co. v. Employ- status equally plaintiffs to both ment Opportunity 434 U.S. defendants. Kimbrough See EEOC v. In 412, 694, 98 (1978), S.Ct. 54 L.Ed.2d 648 Co., 98, 103 (5th vestment 703 F.2d Cir.1983) have grafted “permissive onto the and dis- (awarding costs to employer as cretionary statute,” language of the Chris- party but denying attorney’s fees under tiansburg, 418, 699, 434 U.S. at 98 at S.Ct. Christiansburg; United v. Alleghe States requirements further for the recovery Industries, 742, ny-Ludlum 558 F.2d 743 attorney’s fees which differ radically de- (5th Cir.1977) (withdrawn part, 568 F.2d pending on whether the party “pre- deemed 1073, (5th 1074 Cir.1978)). vailing” or defendant. Prevail- civil plaintiffs are to recover While it may easily fees not lend itself to circumstances,” “in all but special articulation, 434 further this single pro- U.S. test 417, at 698, 98 citing commonsense, S.Ct. Albemarle vides a practical yardstick of Paper 405, Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. success. In many lawsuits, if not most 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d (1975). settled,3 Prevailing de- whether tried or possible it is . fendants may recover only upon finding compare allegations made with the re- frivolous, that the plaintiff’s claim is unrea- sults obtained pick out a winner: a sonable, groundless, faith, made in bad or plaintiff who carried the on his day major passing parties sought 2. As the Court indicated in suit.” See reversing a recent decision —, 1933, an award of attor- U.S. 103 S.Ct. ney’s fees because the district court did not (1983). 1939 and n. 76 L.Ed.2d 40 properly relationship consider the between the plaintiffs extent of success and the amount of may cases hold that Our be award, applied the fee the test in this Circuit grant judicial awarded absent a of formal relief “generous ap- differs from the formulation” long moving party as as the has achieved the plied First, Seventh and Ninth Circuits primary sought, relief he Iranian Students “plaintiffs ‘pre- under which be considered Sawyer, (5th Ass’n. v. 639 F.2d vailing parties’ purposes Cir.1981); Kimbrough, 652 Robinson v. F.2d they any significant litiga- succeed on issue in (5th Cir.1981). tion which achieves some of the benefit Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co. major issues. See defeated the claim, who a defendant (5th Cir.1983)(remanding Ltd., 701 F.2d 553 In other cases thrust of the suit. fairly be said to entitle- could of defendant’s that neither for determination in such event day, have carried fees under § ment to either. no fee award there should be unclear). judg- basis for denial where ment of the district court Thus, was re- court below the district precedent 706(k)and case quired by Section the cause REMANDED. REVERSED and for relief advanced weigh the claims by it the results obtained the EEOC TATE, dissenting: Judge, Circuit was to determine whether Commonwealth respectfully I dissent. the initial step determining whether remands for reverses and step, the next to a fee award. As entitled as to whether the defend- further evidence to determine whether required employer ant Commonwealth—which frivo- by claims advanced the EEOC were entered into a consent decree previously lous, harass Com- vexatious or practices dis- ending past employment its However, by the order issued monwealth.4 Ricans and fe- criminating against Puerto judgment granting summary the trial court by which Commonwealth males grounds forth no for its for the EEOC sets satisfy past allotted one million dollars decision, findings, or any opinion, nor were pay for back discrimination-based claims filed. This separately conclusions of law indeed the seniority1 and denial of —was parties this Court and the leaves both it is entitled party” so that “prevailing Indeed, limbo. appeal 706(k) of Title attorney’s fees under § the trial court’s decision argues 2000e-5(k). control- Ignoring 42 U.S.C. § judicata that the based on the notion res Court, as precedent Supreme ling effects of the consent decree barred Com- sense, majority flouting well common as undeveloped monwealth’s claim. Both the argument, assert- accepts Commonwealth’s state of the record and our restricted role as suit, might that it be post-decree ed this by divining us from appellate prevent an court plain- “prevailing” despite regarded — grounds the several on which district seeming victory achieved tiff Commission’s may ruling. have based by the consent decree—because Com- on all the issues in prevail did not mission of the lack in the dis- clarity Because case, because, in Commonwealth’s order, and of the lack trict court’s because characterization, (instead the latter issues findings on whether Common- express pre- which the Commission to of the ones on prevailed wealth or whether it is entitled ma- vailed) the central issues and the Christiansburg, we re- were attorney’s fees under of the suit.2 hearing jor for an on these thrust evidentiary mand Eckerhart, steps hiring goals provided Supreme affirmative indicated in for 4. As the Court should Puerto Ricans 103 S.Ct. at the district court to end discrimination separate inquiry regard by conduct factual al- and females and which Commonwealth by the satisfy past each “unrelated claim” advanced claims lotted one million dollars to Indeed, [any plaintiff. “if claim seniority arising unrelated] wages for back and denial of frivolous, attorney’s recover the defendant past discrimination. from Id n. responding fees incurred to it....” arguments might be 2. However relevant these by to a contention Employment Opportunity Equal 1. The Commis- (dubi- partially complaint against sion had filed a the defend- “prevailing party” tante) even was not the alleging that Common- ant Commonwealth fees, they purposes the award of practices employment wealth’s discriminated irrelevant, completely as the dissent will are origin on the basis of sex and national and that elaborate, the court— to the issue before damages ap- corporation was liable in “pre- itself was the whether Commonwealth January proximately $2.8 million. litigation, vailing party” consent decree was entered into which, inter court, which, alia, a consent decree was ended approved by inter elaborated, For reasons to fees that be district relation to the results obtain. court correctly rejected Commonwealth’s that, arguments and found as a matter of U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 1943. law, under the facts shown Commonwealth Application of principles to the could not be a VII prevailing party Title present undisputed facts seems to me to be entitled to attorney’s fees. plain. With regard litiga- Title VII

tion decree, concluded the consent plaintiff Commission—whether it be re- I. garded as having won “substantial relief” has most recently Court (as to apparent did) me is or instead as summarized the to the principles apply achieving “only (as limited success” Com- award of fees to the claims) monwealth is the civil Title VII litiga- (which and entitled to thus tion: far it sought). has not The defendant Com- monwealth, having lost the merits on prevailing plaintiff ‘should ordinari “[A] some of the “significant issues” advanced ly recover an unless special is thus not entitled to circumstances would render such an award ” recover attorney’s fees: Commission’s unjust.’ Commonwealth, “suit” against which did — U.S. —, —, 1933, 1937, L.Ed.2d obtain relief ending employment discrimi- “ (1983). ‘plaintiffs con nation, was, if only because the Commis- sidered “prevailing parties” success, “vexatious, sion’s frivolous, not or purposes they any signifi succeed brought to harass or embarrass” so as to cant issue in litigation achieves some relief, entitle even if sought the benefit the in bringing the had been prevailing ” U.S. at —, suit.’ 103 S.Ct. at 1939 in party litigation. (emphasis added). “A defendant For these simple easily administered attorney’s recover an fee only where tests, the majority post-judg- substitutes a frivolous, the suit vexatious, or brought ment procedure whereby a court may to harass or embarrass the defendant.” employer award a defendant at —, at —U.S. 103 S.Ct. 1937 (empha fees, though the Title VII claimant sis added). With regard present won substantial relief the basis of the litigation, where the did plaintiff not recov employer’s past discrimination. Deduced er on the merits on all claims advanced from a few decisions of this scattered cir- suit, the Court stated: issues, cuit on quite different the majority Where the has plaintiff prevail failed to that, finds after the of the litiga- conclusion on a claim that is in all respects distinct tion affording employment-discrimination claims, from his successful hours relief against employer, the court may spent on the unsuccessful claim should be employer determine that the is the considering excluded in the amount of a (and thus entitled to fee. Where lawsuit consists fees), enunciating for first time a re- claims, of related plaintiff who has won quirement that, merit-litigation after con- substantial relief should not have his at- cludes, weigh the the court must claims torney’s fee simply reduced because the advanced the Commission adopt district court did each obtained, not conten- then successful results deter- tion where plaintiff raised. But mine claims rejected whether the were friv- success, olous, achieved only vexatious, limited the district to harass or only employer. Pretermitting court should defiance award amount of alia, pay it allotted one million dollars to discrimination. back- wage past employment and other claims 1388 (or supple- of those any) issue the central jurisprudence circuit Court Supreme 640 F.2d at 670. mentary proceedings. sense) permit would

(and common County v. Harrison School of a Likewise Coen “prevailing party” as a characterization Cir.1981), where the Board, (5th 638 F.2d substan against whom employer defendant prevailed on had not ordered, rights plaintiffs civil procedural tial relief was a “prevailing were arguably but in the face merit-trial envisaged fly and issues scheme had been sought the relief because injunction recent Court’s filed, the after suit was voluntarily granted re supra, “[a] test, but never- issue result cited the central not fees should quest all nomi- the denial of but affirmed — U.S. theless major litigation.” in a second the suit was not fees because nal —, at 1941. S.Gt. about. major “a factor [success] II. at- may not collect rights plaintiff A civil demanding that a state fees for torney’s this curious conclu- majority reaches he would have done officer do what decisions inapposite sion on the basis of 638 F.2d at 26. case.” this circuit. upon by relied The final decision stated in Iranian

It relies on the test contrary majority seems to Edwards, present 604 F.2d Association v. Students present case. majority’s position Cir.1979) the civil (5th —where Opportunity Com- Employment Equal in which we stated plaintiffs prevailed ,— Compa- Kimbrough Investment mission v. whether focus is proper that “[t]he em- (5th Cir.1983), an F.2d ny, 703 on the central has successful been (unlike on the merits ployer relief acquired primary issue” or “has but employer), defendant added). (emphasis at 503 sought.” 604 F.2d fees as a nevertheless denied in this that the issue overlooks ap- the strict test party” under whether inapposite decision was VII defendants —that to Title plicable after a which had obtained relief plaintiff, meritless, frivolous, “unreasonable, order, suit be could be re- temporary restraining though vexatious,” F.2d at 103—even as a in the absence garded previ- merits and won on the employer the on the showing “probable of a of success had thereto, alia, government the inter tried). Id. ous (had fully the case been merits” offer of settlement rejected employer’s “a holding actual was that The court’s action of an affirmative through adoption ‘prevailing party’ can be a the Commission though and even plan, only he though the relief has obtained substantially evidence that used statistical is the re- preliminary or [citation omitted] pointed value. The court probative lacked I am unable sult of a consent decree.” Id. “investigation government’s out that holding or of this language to read from the unlawful discrimina- for potential showed a civil any implication decision was of the evidence and that some tion” defendant, whom relief has been against hiring “[discriminatory] of ordered, “probative” can become the somehow therefore and it concluded practices,” might have because the defendant ing party F.2d at was not vexatious.” “the case did. actually lost more than he 103. upon by other decisions relied The VII defend- Thus, Kimbrough, a Title in to the similarly inapposite are

majority on the merits after trial Sterrett, 640 ant who In Taylor issue. to in held not entitled (5th Cir.1981), where was F.2d 669-70 applica- the strict test fees under test, reiterating rights plaintiff a civil defendants, govern- because for to such (who fees ble had been awarded vexa- held be action could not be merits) attorney’s ment’s success on the was denied upon had relied government in tious where the supplementary proceedings evidence rejected) (but eventually probative prevail which he did not on the merits Here, discriminatory hiring practices. I. Context Facts February Equal Employment Op- In an did the Title VII defendant not not portunity charge against filed was merits, prevail on but consent Refining Company alleg- the Commonwealth Oil ing decree ordered to end discriminatory company discriminating against was that the respect hiring, women and Puerto Ricans with practices and to allot one million dollars for promotion compensation Peneulas, and its potentially owed because of them. backpay petrochemical complex. Puerto Rico An investi- gation followed, February Kimbrough, applicable, contrary in ra- in and the Com- decision, finding mission issued result to majority’s holding.3 tionale and charge Ensuing cause to believe the true. concil- efforts, though complicated by Conclusion iation Common- intervening insolvency Chapter wealth’s and XI perhaps For the reasons too lengthily reorganization proceeding, ultimately led to a agreement. conciliation A consent decree was stated, opinion in majority my ignores parties approved by entered and the bank- controlling jurisprudence holding January ruptcy court in the Title VII employer, defendant provided procedures consent decree whereby publicize equal Commonwealth, could Commonwealth was to conceivably employment policies programs, and and for moni- litigation, prevailing party this toring compliance its therewith. Commonwealth a consent decree remedy- concluded agreed representation to increase the of Puerto entry positions past Commonwealth’s Ricans and women level discriminatory in six operational departments, different contact practices requiring it to allot one mil- colleges agencies local Puerto Rican and referral lion those pay aggrieved dollars claims of in its future recruitment efforts. The decree also procedures counsel, identify employment discrimination. instituted past employees promotion train current female views, Under these it is irrelevant to dis- “target jobs”. into area certain $50,000 agreed budget year fund these upon cuss the issues which Commonwealth addition, provided efforts. the consent decree prevailed. However, claims to have be- relief for all women Puerto Ricans that Com- glides cause the so lightly by them against past monwealth had discriminated in the (in hiring February or between litigation, the context the entire I am decree) and the date of the that the Commission attaching litigation an overview of the identify. provided was able to The decree that a these as an to this appendix opinion, issues Master, Special empowered to award back wages, preferential seniority preferen- and order of subsequent the benefit en banc or promotion, tial would hear all cases that I Supreme Court review. Were to reach through not resolve could informal merits Commonwealth’s contentions conciliation One efforts. million dollars was al- satisfy past lotted to claims. I would be inclined to regard, view reorganization proved efforts light them as insubstantial successful, plan arrange- June and in 1981 a jurisprudence attempting insofar as to de- bankruptcy approved ment was court. company Subsequently, brought an action in pict Commonwealth as a party. seeking federal district court an allowance of I respectfully dissent. the Commission 2000e-5(k), to alleging of Title § U.S.C. § Appendix (a) prevailed against it had the Com- majority Neither the nor the dissent felt to be proceedings mission in the course of the initiated significance relevant the actual content and by (b) charge, and the 1975 that the Commission upon the issues which Commonwealth claims to proceeded had ble belief “in bad faith and no reasona- prevailed. view, my have In in the context of the legal merits and in the of the factual litigation, upon the issues which Commonwealth positions espoused”. it prevailed claims to have are insubstantial. For $525,000 sought plus Commonwealth in fees might the benefit of those who be interested in the costs and fees incurred in the fee aspect us, setting the issues before I am action itself. The a Commission filed motion to Facts; forth: I. Context and II. The Issues summary judgment, dismiss and/or for and Com- Upon to Commonwealth Have Pre- summary Which Claims a monwealth filed cross motion for judgment (accompanied affidavit, by vailed. page a 40 ney’s plain- against 3. The also cites States fees VII United v. Alle- unsuccessful Title Industries, gheny-Ludlum (5th F.2d 742 558 Cir. tiffs could be assessed on the same basis as 1977), (1) which remanded claim of an defendants, against a stance the unsuccessful employer (which appeal) on an to panel forced 568 F.2d was later to rescind. the prevailed whether district to determine it had Cir.1978) (5th (on rehearing). petition 1073 for ‘significant pro- “a discrete’ on and I am see of this deci- unable to relevance (relating ceeding” to of an dismissal interven- sion to the issues. tion), (2) 558 F.2d at held that attor- record, by the entire mission on the merits women and Puerto Ricans the relief achieved the Com- (to employment of increase in- prepared a of Commonwealth’s member level, entry a history staff, detailing the Title legal house VII pages $1,000,000 past allotment for claimants of dis- controversy, appending several hundred $50,000 crimination, year programs exhibits). documentary The district group) promote of this can- recruit and members genuine materi- no issues of court concluded insignificant, nor could it be not be considered existed, 56(c), denied Com- Fed.R.Civ.P. al fact not, at the concluded that Commission motion, granted that of monwealth’s least, catalytic very significant factor in effect- appeal This followed. Commission. ing might be such relief.1 While Commonwealth pre- appeal, asserts that On Commonwealth ameliorating been successful in said to have defeats to cannot be considered the on claims either the Commission vailed Commission, such reduced losses faith, and is there- in bad or undertaken frivolous fore entitled to' upon success pursu- fees an award of be based. which award of 706(k) of Title VII. ant to 1Although claims that Commonwealth Upon Commonwealth Issues Which II. The early willing negotiations in its with the Prevailed to Have Claims voluntarily comply with certain Commission of the Commission’s Complaint asserted three demands, deny it does not purported- separate relief’ in which it “claims for response were made in direct that such offers ly prevailed: proceedings, nor that the to the Commission’s con- two theories to A. The first advanced precipitating was the cause of ei Commission had been the early clude that Commonwealth ing party offers or the remedial action to ther these which (1) that the ultimately consent decree: under the consented many remedy or relief for decree contained “no to the decree. discriminatory practices more substantial of the rejected chances of a Even if the Commission alleged originally] (as [Commis- had been advantageous [that more wealth settlement Common subsequent original charge and determina- asserts) sion’s negotiation or Commonwealth’s ultimately tion]”; (2) contends, did, successfully preserve entered ability that the decree as it many foreign employment than had been afforded less relief features of a service important program (that Commission it considered and as offered earlier conciliation subject negotiations. of attack the Commis serts was sion interim victories and defeats ment ultimate issue negotiations), during parties’ conciliation asserted that Commonwealth B. second within the settle prevailing party against the Commis- been a had sion because negotiation process are immaterial to the initially identi- 109 names plaintiff of whether a instead of a past likely under fied as victims of prevailing party the settle defendant is the decree, provisions were ulti- of the consent along Settlement efforts refused ment reached. the mer, mately withdrawn. way v. Lim are “of no moment”. Fernandes that Commonwealth C. The third asserted denied, (5th Cir.1981), cert. 663 F.2d prevailing party in effort to was a its successful U.S. —, 73 L.Ed.2d 1395 — decree) entering (prior the consent defeat (1982). decree here afforded con The consent attempt to evade the effect of Commission’s Chapter relief, significant some of the benefit siderable stay provision which XI’s automatic sought by the suit. As we have Commission’s commencing its Ti- barred the from Commission held, judgment long plaintiff need not obtain a suit in district court. tle VII satisfying every settlement claim asserted Only Alleged Success of A. and B. —Partial Thus, preser “prevail”. if the Id. order Commission foreign pro service vation of Commonwealth’s dissent, a Title VII As noted in the text of the (by given gram were which bonus incentives plaintiff be considered the Rico) in Puerto was a non-Puerto Ricans work purposes if he for succeeds victory a defeat for it and “ litigation ‘any significant issue whole, the defendant the context of suit as bring sought in the benefit ... achieves some of prevailing party. not be a could ” U.S. the suit.’ argu- Likewise meritless is Commonwealth’s 1933, 1939, —, —, 76 L.Ed.2d 103 S.Ct. because, “prevailed” by entering ment that it settlement, (1983). if the to me to be axiomatic that It seems potential liability it reduced its prevailing party enti “the” and thus originally past discrimination to a fraction of fees, also the defendant cannot tled to initially sub- claimed or because 77 of the names litigation prevailing party in the same “the” ultimately were with- mitted also entitled to the same issues and liability reducing potential its overall drawn. prevailing party. agains See the “other” initially past claimed discrimination from an Court, 706(k): in its Section “[T]he Title $2,800,000 $1,000,000, Commonwealth discretion, party a ... allow the does de- achieved neither more or less than part the costs.” fees as of partially agrees fendant who settlement charge Comparing initial Commission’s claim, satisfy plaintiff’s and thus avoids the risk a subsequent determination of satisfy plaintiffs having the whole of the of Puerto Ricans and women following damages on the a trial original claimed successfully opposing with the considerable relief afforded to Analogously, merits. groups (a initially group both yardstick to the consent decree individual claimants certain proposed measuring success that Common- proposes complaint), light wealth itself in its of who succeeds a defendant no more than has done plaintiffs having a dismissed in certain ultimately lost on the merits. suit have, Although as it main- tains, important preserved policies deemed to its potential aggregate operations, reduced its liabili- ty million from several million dollars one dollars, and reduced number of claimants initially proposed as victims discrimination, past hiring of lessening the incremental rep- “victories” of losses positive receipt equated cannot be a resent of The civil which it while the civil the with money damages, benefits, injunctive relief. rights plaintiff only has here “lost” might defendant, gained have from the only rights “gained” defendant has opportunity keeping part of of what already victory losing Its consisted had. of less might have. than The benefits received the Commission were Thus, substantial, not nominal. the de- regarded fendant settled on terms it geous, advanta- as partially the Commission remained as rights plaintiff, “prevailing par- successful civil ty” supra. v. Victory C. Commonwealth’s Procedural Regard Chapter Stay XI 754, Hampton, In Hanrahan v. 446 U.S. (1980), L.Ed.2d 670 that, plain Court made to be awarded litiga- fees as a in civil tion, party may only be so entitled where he “has established his entitlement some relief the merits his claim.” 446 U.S. at (emphasis added). S.Ct. at 1989 Common- purported victory, defeating wealth’s other attempt the Commission’s to avoid the automatic stay XI, provision Chapter exactly spe- interlocutory procedural victory cies mere re- jected support as insufficient to a fee award Limmer, supra, Hanrahan. Accord: Fernandes v. (rejecting 663 F.2d at 637 “interim setbacks interlocutory motions” immaterial the de- “prevailing” termination party). WHITE, Frank E. Plaintiff-Appellee,

ARCO/POLYMERS, Oil, INC. and Chemi-

cal Union, & Atomic AFL-CIO, Workers 4-227,

Local No. Defendants-Appellants.

No. 82-2505.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Dec.

Case Details

Case Name: COMMONWEALTH OIL REFINING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Dec 12, 1983

Citation: 720 F.2d 1383

Docket Number: 82-1581

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.