COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
No. 95-5175.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 9, 1996. Decided Aug. 27, 1996.
93 F.3d 890
Daniel R. Barney, Robert Digges, Jr., Alexandria, VA, and Roy T. Englert, Jr., Washington, DC, were on the brief, for amicus curiae.
Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (“Commonwealth” or “Massachusetts“) appeals a District Court‘s dismissal of its action seeking judicial review of a declaration by the Department of Transportation (“DOT“) that a Massachusetts licensing requirement was preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (“HMTA“). DOT had found the state licensing rule, which required hazardous-waste carriers to post at least a $10,000 bond before they might pick up or drop off hazardous waste in the Commonwealth, preempted according to its reading of HMTA‘s general preemption provision codified at
We disagree. Even if we accord DOT‘s interpretation of HMTA‘s preemption provision Chevron deference, we cannot conclude that any permissible reading of HMTA authorizes preemption of the Commonwealth‘s requirement. We thus reverse the District Court.
BACKGROUND
In 1975, Congress enacted the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act in an effort to develop a national regulatory scheme for the transportation of hazardous substances. See New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass‘n v. Flynn, 751 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir.1984). Although HMTA, as further amended in 1990 and as restructured in 1994, established some uniform standards in the interstate transportation of hazardous materials, the Act does not, by its terms, exclude all state participation in the regulation of hazardous waste being carried within that state‘s borders.
In one,
The second provision of HMTA that explicitly addresses preemption has a less clear scope. That section,
In the absence of federal action in this area of bonding requirements, a number of states, including Massachusetts, promulgated their own rules. Massachusetts established a bonding requirement that applies only to transporters of hazardous wastes who wish to pick up waste from or drop off waste at a location in Massachusetts. See 310 CMR 30.401(4). The regulation requires that a waste transporter, before it may obtain a license allowing such collection or disposal, must submit a bond of at least $10,000 in order to “assure that [it] shall faithfully perform all of the requirements” of its license and of the laws and regulations of Massachusetts. 310 CMR 30.411(3). If, at some later time, the transporter does not promptly remedy some established violation of Massachusetts‘s rules, the Commonwealth may seize part or all of the bond as payment of an appropriate civil penalty. See id. 30.411(8). Because this bond provides a surety only for the Commonwealth, and is not a general fund against which other parties may seek indemnity for their claims against the transporter, the bonding requirement is distinct from other forms of liability insurance requirements, which Massachusetts governs through a separate regulation. See 310 CMR 30.410.
On July 17, 1991, the National Solid Wastes Management Association challenged Massachusetts‘s bonding requirement, as well as those promulgated by Maryland and Pennsylvania, as preempted. Although neither HMTA nor DOT had spoken to such bonding requirements, the Research and Special Programs Administration, which is the body responsible for DOT‘s initial determination as to whether HMTA preempts a state regulation, nonetheless determined that HMTA preempted all three rules because the rules “create[d] an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of . . . HMTA” under what was then
DISCUSSION
We need not determine whether an agency‘s interpretation of a statute on the preemption question is subject to Chevron analysis in order to decide this case, as the agency‘s determination here cannot be upheld with or without deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under Chevron, “judicial review of an agency‘s interpretation of a statute under its administration is limited to a two-step inquiry.” Nuclear Info. Resource Serv. v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C.Cir.1992) (in banc). In the first step, the court analyzes whether it may, “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” clearly ascertain how Congress intended the statute to apply to the facts before the tribunal. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9. If the court can affirmatively locate such a clear meaning, it should declare that meaning and reject any “administrative constructions . . . contrary to [this] clear congressional intent” because the judiciary, not the agency, “is the final authority on issues of statutory construction.” Id. If the court cannot determine such a clear intent, it then proceeds to the second step of Chevron.
In this second step, a court must determine whether the agency‘s interpretation is a reasonable resolution of whatever ambiguity precluded a clear declaration of congressional intent in the first step. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 362 (D.C.Cir.1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990). This second inquiry is thus not independent of the first: what a court may consider a reasonable interpretation largely depends on the nature and extent of the ambiguity already identified in Chevron‘s first step. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 819 (1991); State of Ohio v. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 446 (D.C.Cir.1989) (deciding whether parties have advanced ambiguities “sufficient to permit” their readings); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1450 (D.C.Cir.1988) (finding agency reading to be the “more natural of the competing interpretations” advanced in the first step of the Chevron inquiry and thus holding it reasonable). Because the range of permissible interpretations of a statute is limited by the extent of its ambiguity, an agency cannot exploit some minor unclarity to put forth a reading that diverges from any realistic meaning of the statute lest the agency‘s action be held unreasonable. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36, 44 (D.C.Cir.1992) (Silberman, J., concurring).
Of course, what may be thought ambiguous in the first step of Chevron (and thus what may define a reasonable interpretation in step two) depends on the issue in question. Even a bona fide ambiguity—a point sufficiently unclear that the court cannot affirmatively declare what Congress intended the statute to mean—may be unclear in only one direction: for example, a court may not be able to say how Congress intended to regulate particular speech based only on the text and context of the statute, but the court may still reject as unreasonable an agency interpretation of the statute that would result in a ban of all such speech, in light of well-established understandings of the First Amendment. In such cases, traditional presumptions about the parties or the topic in dispute may limit the breadth of ambiguity and thus affect both the first and second steps of Chevron. In Native American law, for example, statutes must be “construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.” Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (D.C.Cir.1988) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 2403, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989). As a result of this presumption, we have rejected agency interpretations of statutes that may have been reasonable in other contexts because the agency interpretation would not favor the Indians. See id. at 1445-46. Other time-honored canons of construction may similarly constrain the possible number of reasonable ways to read an ambiguity in a statute, though the application of the canon alone may not suffice to make the intent of the statute sufficiently clear for the court to pronounce what Congress intended.
In light of these considerations, and as we review a district court decision to dismiss de novo, see Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994), we must reverse the District Court in this case. Although the District Court properly identified the issues—whether it should review DOT‘s determination that HMTA preempted the Massachusetts bonding requirement according to the deferential principles of Chevron and whether the agency‘s regulation was
Neither the Supreme Court nor this one has ever definitively decided whether an agency‘s determination that an explicit preemption provision in a statute it administers blocks some state action is reviewed according to Chevron. See, e.g., Illinois Commerce Comm‘n v. ICC, 879 F.2d 917, 921 (D.C.Cir.1989) (recognizing that the question of whether courts should extend Chevron deference to an agency‘s interpretation of an explicit preemption provision remains open); City of New York v. FCC, 814 F.2d 720, 725-26 (D.C.Cir.1987) (expressly not deciding whether an agency received Chevron deference for its interpretation of a new statutory provision that may or may not have terminated the agency‘s prior practice of preemption), aff‘d, 486 U.S. 57, 64, 67 (1988) (cautioning that courts should not disturb the reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies by an agency administering the statute without ever explicitly referencing Chevron); cf. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 1735, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996) (expressly not deciding the question of whether a court should defer to an agency‘s interpretation that a statutory provision, which does not explicitly authorize preemption, nonetheless preempts some state rule).
We thus assume, without deciding, that the principles of Chevron encompass an agency‘s interpretation of an explicit preemption provision, and proceed to examine DOT‘s application of HMTA‘s preemption clauses to Massachusetts‘s rule. DOT claims that any state rule of the sort promulgated by Massachusetts poses “an obstacle” to accomplishing HMTA‘s general goal of uniform waste regulation under
It does not. DOT‘s interpretation of HMTA, while perhaps not conclusively forbidden by the statute itself, could not be deemed reasonable in light of the text and structure of
1. Chevron: Step One
In fact, we would be almost compelled to reject DOT‘s reading of
An examination of
Additional elements of the statutory scheme also counsel against the expansive reading offered by DOT. Section 5119, the other preemption provision of HMTA, does not permit DOT to override state procedures for the “transportation of hazardous material” in a state until 26 states approve the recommendations of a working group regarding such regulations.
DOT‘s interpretation also runs afoul of another established canon of statutory construction: the established presumption against preemption in matters of traditional state control. The Supreme Court itself has demanded that courts “be reluctant to find pre-emption” in these matters, dictating that “pre-emption will not lie unless it is ‘the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,’ ” as evidenced by the text and structure of the statute at issue. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). As the text and structure of HMTA, including
Nonetheless, the fact that a number of circuits have held that the obstacle test in
2. Chevron: Step Two
Finally, even if we afford to the Department the deference it claims, and if we then pass the first step of Chevron, we would still not hold the Department‘s interpretation reasonable. In light of the powerful and well-established presumption against extending a preemption statute to matters not clearly addressed in the statute in areas of traditional state control, we cannot credit an interpretation of an explicit preemption provision, such as the one of
Moreover, we cannot accept such a dubiously broad reading when the seeming goal of the statute that the agency seeks to “accomplish[]” through preemption is not even clearly grounded in that statute.
CONCLUSION
DOT‘s interpretation is impermissible, even if measured against the deferential standard of Chevron. See Illinois Commerce Comm‘n, 879 F.2d at 921. Not only does HMTA not specify absolute uniformity as its goal, neither
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the court‘s conclusion that the agency‘s interpretation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act,
